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The aim of the thesis is to chart the development of the term solidarity as it appears in the 
European social and political thought tradition. It traces the emergence of the term in its 
modern form from around the time of the French Revolution to the present. The thesis is 
divided into three parts, the historical background in France in the early nineteenth century; 
the consolidation, application and limiting of solidarity theory by Durkheim and its final 
exhaustion in Habermas’s political thought. A historical perspective is maintained throughout 
the thesis. However this is not a straightforward intellectual history of a concept. The historical 
analysis that is present, particularly in the first third of the thesis, is given to show the 
relationship of solidarity to crisis. Placing the theoretical debates of solidarity into a historical 
picture allows for a comparative and linked progression to become visible. This helps to 
demonstrate that solidarity discourse tends to react to social and political reality, in a way that 
is rarely appreciated in the literature. The central claim is that writing on solidarity cannot be 
made sense of unless it is historically situated. Solidarity is a chameleon concept changing to fit 
its environment, be that in theory or in practice. The refusal to be definitively defined is one of 
solidarity’s more enduring, interesting and significant characteristics. It is this discussion that 
adds to a growing but very much underdeveloped literature on solidarity. Finally, whilst some 
form of solidarity must be present for society to function, this thesis argues that there needs 
to be a serious rethink of the way that it is currently understood, beyond the archetypal 
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Solidarity has been used to unite and to separate, to berate and to comfort. It is found in 
songs, paintings, legal statutes, philosophical essays and eponymous political movements. 
Solidarity can be called for, performed on the theatre stage and chanted through the streets. It 
can be worn in ribbons, pins, badges and armbands. It can be shown through walkouts, hunger 
strikes and hashtags. The history of solidarity is told in many different ways and through very 
different vocabularies.1 It could be told through workers’ movements across the globe with 
their intersectional relationships of immigration, race, gender, religion, culture and the 
natural/built environment.2 Their political and ethical realms become the arenas for fights for 
rights, that some, but not all will enjoy. These are movements that respond to the challenge of 
difference and similarity, of shared enemies and collective bargaining power. The history of 
worker and labour movements can be seen to be the energy, practice and limits of solidarity. 
They contain violent struggle, repressive reactions, and hard-won victories. They have been 
ideologically informed through intellectual theory and fought out with empty bellies. Physical 
bodies have been bound together and transcontinental allegiances have been forged. The 
history of workers’ solidarity is the history of capitalism, is the history of globalisation and 
contains within it perhaps the resources for liberation and equality in the future.  
The history of solidarity could equally be told through the development of the nation and then 
the nation-state, including the big transformations from Westphalia, past the French guillotine 
of 1789 and on to the welfare state of post-WW2. It can help to explain what it means to be 
English, French or German; the patriotism created through symbolic attachment to myths and 
past deeds, 1066 and 1966; the strong feeling towards a flag or an anthem that celebrates 
past-glories and past-injuries. The possibility of the nation, of a state, the large scale 
cooperative moment of a mass of people who do not know each other and yet identify as one, 
                                                     
1 See: Bayertz, K. (eds) (1999) Solidarity, Cornwall: Kluwer Academic Publishers; Stjernø, S. (2005) Solidarity in 
Europe – The History of an Idea, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Wilde, L. (2013) Global Solidarity, Croydon: 
Edinburgh University Press. 
2 For immigration see: Fine, J. and Tichenor, J. (2009) ‘A Movement Wrestling: American Labor’s Enduring Struggle 
with Immigration, 1866-2007’, Studies in American Political Development, 23, pp. 84-113, which has the following 
thoughtful summary of solidarity, immigration and labour: “In truth, labor’s positions are often an amalgam of 
solidarity for some and restriction for others. As history has unfolded, there has been an expansion by fits and starts 
of whom labor believes it can and should include.” p. 112. For Race, one of the most insightful is Hooker, J. (2009) 
Race and the Politics of Solidarity, New York: Oxford University Press, especially for the way in which race challenges 
the ability of forming political solidarity historically. From a North American perspective in the main, though far 
from exclusively, it highlights real issues of how far race challenges multicultural versions of ‘political’ solidarity in 
contemporary democracies. Its critical strength lies with its conscious attempt to historicise race and solidarity. See 
also Gray, B. (2004) ‘Remembering a ‘multicultural’ future through a history of emigration: Towards a feminist 
politics of solidarity across difference’, Women’s Studies International Forum, 27, pp. 413-429, which offers a useful 
survey of the literature on empathy, difference and solidarity. It also convincingly demonstrates the need to be 
aware of the connections between immigration, multiculturalism, global contexts and feminist theories of solidarity, 
understood historically. These categories will be explored in more detail over the course of the thesis.  
7 
is only possible because of something like solidarity. The history of community or of the 
societies that they form, or the nations and states that hold them together, could be told 
through a history of solidarity.  
The difficulty then with trying to write about solidarity is that there is no clear sense as to 
where it is located, what sort of thing it is, which methodology best captures its essence and 
which, if any, discipline can lay claim to it. Therefore, what will follow will not strictly adhere to 
any one prescribed notion or approach to solidarity. There will be discussions of the various 
attempts that have been made to give a coherent account of solidarity, however in the main, 
the historiography as it is, drawn from various different approaches, is meant as a way to 
explore the complexity of solidarity as a term and as a social, political and lived history. The 
emphasis will be on the ‘idea’ of solidarity as it comes to be used and understood by 
philosophers, sociologists and political theorists. The selection or non-selection of particular 
thinkers or schools of thought is not meant as a value judgement either way. The thinkers that 
have been chosen as case studies for this thesis are taken to be representatives or exemplars 
of the way in which solidarity interacts with historical events and social and political 
transformations over time. Although significant developments in understanding solidarity have 
emerged and have gained considerable attention in recent global scholarship, in the main, this 
thesis will be critically Eurocentric. The thinking behind this is to expose dominant ways of 
understanding solidarity, ones that have eclipsed other perhaps more radical proposals. The 
critique of the European tradition of solidarity scholarship reveals a potential new way to 
understand the history of Europe, in particular its self-understanding. Equally, by tracing the 
development of the idea of solidarity, from its birth around 1789 until the present gives a new 
perspective on how to understand the formation of nation-states, how welfare-states are 
possible, and to engage with perennial questions such as, what is a society? Can it be possible, 
and on what basis, to have an equal and fair society? And finally, how should Europe and the 
individuals that fall within it, interact with the rest of the globe? This final consideration 
becoming more pressing in the face of the current migrant and refugee crises.  
The thesis follows a structure of 5 chapters that broadly build on each other. They are also 
chronological, illustrating the way that discussions of solidarity have developed. There are a 
number of key points that are returned to throughout the thesis, which are the main 
motivations behind the thesis as a whole. They are; firstly, that to understand solidarity 
requires knowing solidarity historically. Secondly, and reliant on the first, solidarity has a fixed 
meaning only insofar as it is understood in context. Thirdly, solidarity is connected almost 
without fail to crises, implicit in many different ways. Finally, the study of solidarity usage 
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enables a form of social and political critique that could open up new avenues of discursive 
analysis and political activism. The layout of the thesis will now be introduced with short 
summaries of the chapters provided. The introduction will then conclude with a discussion of 
methodology. This is important to understanding the thesis as a whole, for there is not one 
overall methodology adhered to throughout.  
Chapter 1: The contested origins of modern solidarity  
Even when solidarity has been taken to be the direct subject of study it has still been difficult 
to ascertain in a cogent and clear manner a basic working definition. This first chapter aims to 
illustrate why this the case, whilst also attempting to provide at least a general definitional 
structure.  Solidarity has lacked an explicit historical dimension and this chapter in particular 
expands upon an area that is very much underappreciated in the literature. The other 
historical dimension that is underdeveloped is the enduring relationship between solidarity 
and crisis, an attempt to rectify this will also begin in this chapter.  
Specifically, what will be discussed is the emergence of solidarity as a social and political 
concept. Up until the French Revolution, solidarity had a restricted, technical meaning, as it 
was drawn almost exclusivity from the Roman legal tradition. What is examined is how the 
concept morphs from the legal to the social and political arena. It is made clear that the 
original foundation in law does not disappear and continues to have real consequences for the 
parallel development of solidarity socially and politically.  
The chapter is split into the following sections:  
A background to the term solidarity,  
French Social Romanticism and its context 1830-1848, 
Charles Fourier: 1772-1837,  
Pierre Leroux 1797-1871. 
The rationale behind exploring the historical development of solidarity through these topics is 
given in full in the chapter. However, in essence it is undisputed (although under examined) 
that solidarity in its modern form arrives in France post-1789. Therefore, France is the setting 
for most of the discussion in this historical chapter. The time frame covered is from the fallout 
from the French Revolution until around the beginning of the twentieth century. This is not 
meant to be a simple intellectual history of a concept. Nevertheless, it is important to 
appreciate the tangled progression of solidarity in the nineteenth century, as much of the 
contestation around the term in later forms stems from these machinations.  
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The French Social Romantic movement is the focus of the second half of the chapter. After 
giving some background analysis to the movement in general, a close examination of two 
thinkers Fourier and Leroux is given. Through analysing and critiquing their positions on 
solidarity it is shown how solidarity was taken from its legal origins and moved into social and 
political thought. Additionally, through the discussion of these two thinkers, areas of solidarity 
scholarship are brought together with unexpected consequences. The question of identity 
politics with religious, ethnic and national forms of solidarity are shown to be interlinked. In 
particular the hesitant adoption of solidarity by some in the Jewish community is used to 
demonstrate both the importance of solidarity but also its ambiguous character.  
The selection of topics chosen, it is hoped, goes some way to illustrating that the question as 
to what solidarity means is not simply an academic one, but is one that is materially palpable 
and strongly connected to lived experience. In terms of the structure of the thesis the chapter 
also functions as the foundation for the other chapters. The seeds of the ideas that Durkheim 
and Habermas develop, expand and mature, are found, to a large extent, in the clash of ideas 
presented in this chapter.  
Chapter 2: Durkheim and Solidarity as a wholly moral phenomenon 
This second chapter builds in some ways on the first but has a narrower focus in terms of 
scope. Durkheim as the figure that propels solidarity into being taken seriously as an academic 
subject is fairly well assured. However, the influence that he has is currently taken for granted 
and is rarely explored and developed in-depth. Therefore, one of the motivations behind this 
chapter is to demonstrate that Durkheim’s theory of solidarity, whilst being a classic of 
sociology that has an important place in intellectual historical terms, is also capable of 
informing and adding to, current solidarity scholarship. Durkheim’s theory of solidarity is also 
very important to one of the main themes of the thesis as a whole, namely crisis. Durkheim 
places a great emphasis on the role of anomie, a concept that could be roughly equated with 
crisis. The argument can then be made that given Durkheim’s preeminent position, as one of 
the first and most influential scholars of solidarity, responsible for its introduction into 
academic discourse, that its anomie (crisis) link is significant to how solidarity is viewed from 
the start. This entanglement will be explored in the first of the two chapters on Durkheim.  
The first chapter deals primarily with Durkheim’s theory of solidarity as articulated in his 
famous The Division of Labour in Society (1894). After introducing the main argument of that 
text, the chapter then moves on to focus on the role of law in relation to how Durkheim 
understood the individual. In general terms the idea of legislating solidarity is a complex and 
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controversial one, particularly currently in constitutional debates in Europe. Equally, the extent 
to which an individual and their individuality is established by and as a form of solidarity is part 
of the issues surrounding national and transnational identity. Therefore what constitutes a 
society and what is means to be a moral agent within it is important. Lastly, the connection 
between these two areas of solidarity and morality are explored. Durkheim, perhaps more 
than is appreciated in the secondary literature, is concerned with how society acts in moral 
terms. It is also not commonly recognised that for Durkheim solidarity is a moral phenomenon. 
The relationship is shown not to be a straightforward one and the implications for 
understanding solidarity in moral terms are likewise explored.  
Chapter 3: Durkheim: Solidarity and moral education 
The second chapter focuses on Durkheim’s educational writings. This is an area of Durkheim 
scholarship that is rarely brought together with his writing on solidarity. This chapter aims to 
show the benefits in doing so. Much of the current debate around solidarity does not approach 
the question of education at all, in contrast this chapter argues that this is a mistake and 
demonstrates its potential. Questions such as, can solidarity be taught? Or how might the 
family bonds of solidarity conflict with the social obligations of a society’s or nation’s 
solidarity? Equally as important, if solidarity is to be seen as containing the potential for radical 
change, how can forms of solidarity be transformed by the actors and authors of those forms, 
if not through education?  
The focus in this chapter on moral education also highlights the practical everydayness of 
solidarity in the classroom. The themes of liberty and authority are therefore examined initially 
as competing or contradictory aspirations, which are shown within Durkheim’s own writing to 
be consistent. However, when they are considered in broader terms it is finally argued that 
Durkheim’s theory of transformation is inadequate, although highly instructive in its failure.  
Taken together the two chapters broadly align, with the law and individuality mapping onto 
authority and liberty. They conclude by arguing that Durkheim’s theory of solidarity was 
inadequate, however its importance cannot be underestimated. His theory is historically 
situated nevertheless, it also is shown to set the rules for how solidarity is discussed 
thereafter. Finally Habermas, the subject of the next two chapters, is better understood given 
an appreciation of Durkheim’s influence, with him effectively setting down the rules for what a 
solidarity theory could consist of.  
Chapter 4: Habermas and the struggle for universal solidarity: Historically contingent solidarity 
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Habermas represents for the purpose of the argument put forward in this thesis the final 
expression of a form of solidarity that can be traced back to the French Revolution. The 
progression of solidarity theory first presented in a fully articulate way by Durkheim, is taken 
by Habermas to its logical conclusion. Although it is strongly argued that Habermas is a thinker 
who has solidarity running through most of his most important contributions to social and 
political theory and practice, this is not reflected in the secondary literature. Therefore one of 
the tasks of these chapters is to demonstrate the crucial role that solidarity plays in 
Habermas’s thought, including for some of his most celebrated ideas. However, Habermas was 
chosen because of what he represents, as much as for what he specifically argues about 
solidarity. He is the link between the sociological account of solidarity of Durkheim and the 
cosmopolitan solidarity that is becoming popular today. He probably does not offer the best 
account of either of these positions but in terms of the broader impact that solidarity can 
make outside of what is a very narrow band of scholars he is the most influential. He is also 
used to illustrate that what solidarity means and how it’s used correlates to changes in real 
world social and political realities. The changes and newer versions of solidarity that Habermas 
proposes over several decades can be in part explained through the changing circumstances of 
world events. Habermas, it will finally be argued is the thinker that runs solidarity through to 
its final form, given the tradition that it is stemming from. The inadequacies in Habermas’s 
models of solidarity in his most recent writings in particular, show that this type of solidarity 
thinking has reached its end point. The trajectory from the machinations of the French 
revolution and the birth of the nation state through the setting of the contours and boundaries 
of what it could be to, finally, this tradition’s answer to the problems of global capitalism, is 
fundamentally and perhaps irrevocably flawed and exhausted.  
Like for Durkheim, the two chapters build on each other. For the most part the chapters take a 
chronological examination of Habermas’s various different solidarity positions. Interestingly, 
what is revealed through doing this is an unexpected correlation between the trajectory of his 
writing on solidarity and the tense – past, present, future. The chapters therefore reflect 
progression through time as much as they do the evolution of Habermas’s writing. The first 
chapter Historically Contingent Solidarity focuses on the historical necessity of solidarity for 
Habermas, particularly in his early uses of the term. Therefore the chapter is split into two 
sections, the first History: the nation-state and Religious and Enlightenment Ideas indicates 
how important solidarity is for Habermas and justifies characterising him as a solidarity 
theorist. The section also explores how Habermas relates solidarity to historical 
transformation. This is performed through how he sees the development of the nation-state in 
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Europe and how it relies on notions of solidarity for it to do it. Equally the role of ideas working 
in parallel drawn from religion and the enlightenment are shown to be interlinked with his 
theory of solidarity. Finally, there are aspects of this critique that indicate a strong affinity to 
what is discussed in the Durkheim chapters.    
The second section Socialisation and Personal History explores the importance of history to 
two interlinked Habermasian ideas. In some ways echoing the discussion in the Durkheim 
chapters, the social community is placed alongside what it means to be an individual. It is 
argued that for Habermas, it is a combination of history, both in the longue durée and in the 
lived life span coupled with the mechanism of solidarity that makes these two phenomena 
possible.  
Chapter 5: Habermas and Solidarity exhausted 
The second Habermas chapter Solidarity Exhausted picks up where the first ends and proceeds 
through three sections; Theory and Practice, The normative foundations for solidarity, and 
Nation-States, Global Politics and Human Rights. A key contention of solidarity writing in this 
tradition is where the difference lies between its theory and its practice. This is shown to be 
particularly apparent in Habermas. It is demonstrated how often Habermas’s pronouncements 
about solidarity are unclear as to whether they are meant as descriptive or prescriptive 
statements. This difficulty is explored further, but it is argued that it is symptomatic of 
solidarity writing more generally and as such is something that other solidarity theories would 
have to address.  
The next section The Normative Foundations of Solidarity addresses one of the key concerns of 
solidarity theory, namely what gives it legitimacy. The normative foundations of Habermas’s 
more general project are brought together with his use of solidarity. This is important in 
philosophical terms as well as for social and political considerations. The discussion allows 
Habermas’s critique to be grounded philosophically but also to see how it relates to the 
important difference between ethics and morality. There is an attempt here to show that 
Habermas needs to be clearer as to which form of solidarity relates to ethics and which to 
morality. It is demonstrated that this confusion is a real one in Habermas’s work and that it has 
consequences for more general discussions about solidarity. Essentially, what is argued is at 
stake, is the location of the energy for the continuance of solidarity, both now and in the 
future.  
The last section Nation-States, Global Politics and Human Rights looks at the relationship 
between civic solidarity and cosmopolitan solidarity across a range of his writing. The 
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orientation of the discussion is towards the future, but is firmly rooted in contemporary 
concerns. It asks whether a theory like Habermas’s sufficiently grasps what solidarity is, going 
forward and whether it has a contribution to make in helping us to understand the various 
social, political, economic and environmental crises which are currently taking place.   
Conclusion: Cosmopolitan solidarity and the future  
The thesis concludes with an analysis of more contemporary versions of solidarity discourse. In 
particular what will be examined is cosmopolitan solidarity. This will be linked back to the 
Durkheim and Habermas parts of the thesis. The emphasis will be on indicating ways in which 
crisis is imbued in the makeup of solidarity. Additionally, critiques of these more contemporary 
ideas will be provided, before a short look at the prospects of solidarity moving forward.        
Theoretical Approach  
The methodology that is utilised in the following thesis will now be discussed, with reference 
to some key thinkers and schools of thought that influenced the general approach. From the 
beginning this was never meant as a straightforward intellectual history of the term solidarity, 
however, it is also clear that the tradition has much to offer and should not be ignored. 
Equally, perhaps more than most, intellectual history is a discipline or approach that is hotly 
debated within its own field, with repeated attempts by its practitioners to define itself. What 
appears to be at stake for these writers also bears on how solidarity has been written about in 
this thesis. It will be shown that how solidarity is approached is as important as how it comes 
to be understood. Therefore, first, a discussion of the main approaches of intellectual history 
will now be provided. This will be followed by indicating the ways in which this thesis differs 
from their methods.  
There are a few qualities, despite the heated nature of the debate that surrounds them, which 
epitomise an intellectual history methodology. There is a sense in which these words have a 
meaning that is only revealed through careful reconstruction of their time, place and intention 
of their author. In essence, it is about peeling away the layers of historical baggage that have 
been attached to the words to reach, as far as is possible, the original perspectives of the 
author(s) of those words. Crucially, it is the out-right rejection of any notion of a search for 
universal concepts that would be true at all times and in all places. Dateless wisdom has no 
relevance to the intellectual historian, except through how the ideal of dateless wisdom could 
be understood for the authors who produce it with such confidence.3 In particular, the first 
                                                     
3 Here I am most following: Whatmore, R. (2015) What Is Intellectual History?, ProQuest Ebook Central: Polity Press; 
Grafton, A. T. (2006) ‘The History of Ideas: Precept and Practice, 1950-2000 and Beyond’, Journal of the History of 
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chapter of this thesis grapples with examples of solidarity discourse that were reactions to 
specific historical circumstances and written for specific audiences. Therefore, more than is 
necessary with the latter chapters, which deal primarily with two writers, contextualisation is 
important to understanding the origins of solidarity discourse.  
It would be impossible to write anything about intellectual history without reference to 
Quentin Skinner, perhaps the most well-known of its proponents. Skinner’s main argument 
concerns the importance of context and the subjective quality of conceptual understanding. 
Words for Skinner expressed ideas whose meaning could not be simply gleaned through close 
study of the text alone. Words alter in meaning through, what Skinner understands to be, their 
ideological setting. The text itself cannot reveal what the intention of the author was any more 
than it can say what the contemporary audience would have understood, felt and realised 
about a given text. This is Skinner’s most important point, ideas do not remain constant over 
time. This was the mistake that was made by the earlier writers of the history of ideas. They 
believed that an idea could be identified in a listed fashion; that a particular idea could be 
traced across time and under different sets of circumstances. Skinner, and on this he is far 
from alone, argues that ideas, once set out in the form of words have a specificity of meaning 
that would be different (even in a general sense) to how they are perceived at different times 
and places.4  
The aim is therefore to ascertain the following four complementary areas, as suggested latterly 
by Richard Whatmore. The first is to try as far as possible to ascertain the intentions of the 
author of the text. Naturally this can prove difficult and can be seen as one of the key 
challenges to an intellectual historical approach in keeping with the Skinner school. One way to 
build up a better picture of an author’s intentions is through the second of Whatmore’s 
suggestions: to look at the texts that the author refers to. This can obviously help in placing the 
text, and author with it, into an intellectual lineage. It helps to make some of their ideas more 
understandable and can aid in the search for clues as to what the author was interested in. 
Importantly, this is not about criticising when an author has perhaps misunderstood another 
author or has failed to handle the work of others with due care. It is instead about identifying, 
analysing and revealing why it might be the case that they read a particular author in a 
particular way, or how they see themselves as differentiating or advancing similar ideas. Third, 
                                                     
Ideas, 16:1, pp. 1-32, and Lamb, R. (2009) ‘Quentin Skinner’s Revised Historical Contextualism: A Critique’, History of 
the Human Sciences, 22/3, pp. 51-73. 
4 A number of Intellectual Historians decided to attempt to define and to in some way defend the discipline in the 
following: Collini, S. et al. (1985) ‘What is Intellectual History?’, History Today, 35:10, pp. 46-49. An earlier attempt 
to do a similar thing can be found in the following: Dunn, J. (1968) ‘The Identity of the History of Ideas’, Philosophy, 
43, pp. 85-104.  
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and this has been touched on already, the practical context. It appears facile to argue that the 
authors of texts are influenced by practical context, but it is something that is often 
overlooked or relegated to the banal. A case in point is the writing on solidarity. Much of the 
early social and political writing on solidarity only makes sense as a response to its context. 
This is discussed in the first chapter, but is also true of the more theoretical discussions of the 
later chapters. Essentially, I would argue that each new context requires its own version of 
solidarity, but for solidarity to be understood it equally requires acknowledgement of its 
previous manifestations. This leads onto the last of the fundamental rules for this type of 
intellectual history; why did this text or idea take hold at the time, or why did it not? Why were 
particular ideas picked back up later? Why do some texts or authors go in and out of fashion? 
And what is it about the context of their popularity or obscurity that can help to explain that? 
It is this final approach that I find most compelling and one that I have attempted to use 
throughout the thesis. I simply do not think that it is a coincidence that the last ten years has 
seen a dramatic return of solidarity usage, given the financial, social and political crises that 
have been occurring. The other high points in the use of solidarity do not occur by accident 
and although this is not addressed in the thesis in general, it should be no surprise that 
solidarity scholarship wanes in some contexts and not in others.  
The final claim that intellectual history sometimes attempts to make is far more controversial. 
Skinner, although he sometimes appears to waiver slightly on this point, agues forcefully that 
his “method of linguistic contextualism” in the end, produces higher quality philosophy.5 
Whether or not he is right on this point is very hard to say, however, the slippage between 
historical investigation and philosophical exploration is something that is consciously played 
with in the following thesis. That is not to say that Skinner is right, but more to concede that 
neither position on either side can be fully sustainable, particularly if (as I wish it to be) it is 
also going to be a social and political discussion. I will now move on to explain how my 
methodology differs from that of intellectual history. It will also allow me to demonstrate in 
slightly more depth the importance that I place on the idea of crisis and its relationship to 
solidarity.  
Moving away from a theoretical approach consciously drawing upon the tradition of 
intellectual history, there are two contemporary thinkers which have a methodology closer to 
                                                     
5 This is discussed well in: Whatmore, R. (2015) What Is Intellectual History?, ProQuest Ebook Central: Polity Press, 
p.50.  
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the one employed in the following thesis, Axel Honneth and Hauke Brunkhorst.6 Honneth 
begins his study of socialism around 150 years ago and moves forward to the present. He 
argues that by re-examining, among other things, Utopian socialists and the early Marx these 
ideas can have relevance today. The basic idea is that industrialisation was responded to by 
socialism in a particular way, which is no longer applicable in contemporary post-industrial 
societies. Keeping in mind that Honneth’s ultimate aim is the realisation of freedom through 
solidarity, there is a need to have a different form of economic practice. The key to reaching 
this goal is to create a society where free communication occurs between equals, which would 
require the social sphere to be redefined. The argument powerfully made by Honneth is that 
the resources for understanding and realising this can be gleaned from a socialist tradition that 
has lost its contemporary appeal. This is clearly a methodology that draws upon historical 
ideas, takes their historical setting seriously, but nonetheless sees that they can be reimagined 
to furnish contemporary discussions. Whilst Honneth’s account was very useful, where the 
methodology differs is in the choice of where to locate solidarity ideas that are worth re-
examining. Importantly, I see that Durkheim, as well as the previous forms of socialism 
identified by Honneth and myself, as worthy of rehabilitation.    
Equally Brunkhorst, in his book on solidarity that attempts to give both a theoretical and 
historical account of democratic solidarity, has influenced the theoretical approach of the 
thesis. In particular, the way that solidarity as an idea changes and mutates given different 
historical circumstances. His broad investigation, moves from Greco-Roman roots of civic 
friendship, through the Judeo-Christian notion of brotherhood, onto modernisation and finally 
the contemporary globalised world. His argument is essentially that Western societies, through 
the machinations of modernisation, are forced to alter what solidarity means, moving it from 
hierarchically defined to more of a democratic version. Brunkhorst’s account ends with a 
discussion around solidarity’s possible role given the changes brought about through economic 
globalisation. His argument is both normative and sociological in its search for a democratic 
model capable of alleviating the conflicts that are so endemic in the contemporary world. 
Here, in a similar way to Honneth, the methodology is relying on a historical foundation, whilst 
also looking to argue for a different form of social critique interlinked with contemporary 
discourse. The use of periodisation and the complicated nature of the relationship between 
normative and sociological accounts is a theme that runs throughout the following thesis.  
                                                     
6 Honneth, A. ([2015] 2017) (Trans: J. Ganahl) The Idea of Socialism Towards a Renewal, Cambridge: Polity Press and 
Brunkhorst, H. ([2002] 2005) (Trans: J. Flynn) Solidarity – From Civic Friendship to Global Legal Community, 
Cambridge: MIT Press.    
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Finally, for the methodological ideas that influenced my approach, a second work by 
Brunkhorst will be summarised, before giving more concisely the method used for the thesis. 
In 2014, he published an influential critique of critical theory.7 Brunkhorst argues that critical 
theory should come to mean the theory of crisis. Building on the Frankfurt School, he argues 
that modern society is fundamentally imbued with crisis. This crisis is mediated between 
collective learning and social class conflict. This process produces results that become 
solidified in both public and constitutional law. The importance of law and the legal sphere is 
something that is addressed in both the Durkheim and Habermas chapters.  
Returning to Brunkhorst, as in his earlier work directly on solidarity, argues that a 
straightforward Marxist approach that sees the economy as the root of class antagonism as no 
longer applicable (if it ever was). Rather, for modern society, it is the crisis of legitimation, 
which causes the antagonism. Again, like in the solidarity volume, Brunkhorst uses a historical 
scope to demonstrate his argument. This time he focuses much more on the legal 
revolutionary or evolutionary results of the legitimation crises. His analysis rests on identifying 
these crises within social systems, particularly with regards to power and social inequalities. 
Brunkhorst’s approach and argument that crisis should be given a much more prominent 
position, at least within critical theory is something that this thesis is fully in agreement with. 
However, the evolution or close analysis of the law whilst touched upon in the thesis it is not a 
central concern. Equally, the thesis does not restrict itself to a critical theory lens.                      
One of the arguments that I wish to make throughout the thesis is that crisis and solidarity can 
be linked in various ways. It would be simplest, but perhaps misleading, to cite the multiple 
historical instances where solidarity discourse and ideology have blossomed in close proximity 
to various forms of crisis. However, that would not be to demonstrate a clear, convincing or 
helpful relationship. Nor is the claim that one will also lead to other or that where one is found 
so will the other be. For instance a social crisis as the one that will be partly described in the 
section on France, particularly in the 1840s, cannot be said to lead naturally to a need for 
something like solidarity to be articulated as a response. However, what is instead interesting 
is that the rhetoric around solidarity, the framing of its position and the way that it was 
weaponised by those who transformed its meaning, were consciously responding to a crisis 
that they identified in their contemporary reality. Theirs, of course is not the only response, 
but theirs has received far less attention by later historians or theorists of solidarity. That in 
itself is not a good enough justification, although not without its merit. What is justified is that 
                                                     
7 Brunkhorst, H. (2014) Critical Theory of Legal Relations – Evolutionary Perspectives, London: Bloomsbury.  
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there will be shown to be a new way to approach social and political crisis through the 
apparatus and lens of solidarity discourse. It can reveal a response to a crisis that can be macro 
and micro, which can be personal and intersubjective, objective, cold and distant; that can, 
when set against its specificity of context divulge answers that could help guide contemporary 
forms of crisis analysis.          
Crisis itself can come in many different forms and many of those will not have a bearing on  
forms of solidarity.8 However, throughout the thesis various forms of crisis are alluded to that 
operate on multiple levels. Solidarity as it is originally conceived in legal terms, is a mechanism 
for the recovery of financial loss. This is still part of legal statutes today in, for example, France 
and Spain (and England, although it operates slightly differently) in much the same way as it 
was understood when included in Napoleon’s Civil Code. It is understood in this context as an 
obligation to pay mutual debts either through being a member of a family or a 
company/business.9 On the level of mutual liability, crisis could be awaiting those who cannot 
or are not willing to pay their legally enforced debts. This could be a crisis on the level of the 
individual, one brought about through the mechanism of solidarity itself, a mechanism that 
was specifically designed to alleviate the chances of financial crisis. In this instance solidarity 
can be felt either as a burden or as enabling freedom through decreasing risk (all are 
responsible for a debt not just the individual, unless everyone else dies or absconds). To take 
this to a more general level, but still with financial debt in mind, it appears that something at 
least slightly akin is occurring with a national debt. Thus, when there is a financial crash that 
leads to a financial crisis, this previous illustration of solidarity could be useful. That solidarity 
from its inception is tied to financial matters, sounds to modern ears at least, surprising and is 
something that is looked at in more detail in the rest of the thesis.  
That solidarity operates on different levels and within different spheres is also something that 
is examined in the thesis. This is also something true of crisis. The interplay between the two is 
taken in the thesis as an opportunity to re-evaluate some of the previously held positions both 
in terms of theory based analysis of solidarity but also as it relates to historical narratives 
around crisis. Finally, as has been stressed already, the following thesis is not meant to be a 
straightforward intellectual history of the concept of solidarity. This is particularly true when 
the discussion moves onto the two main thinkers that are examined. The goal is to situate 
                                                     
8 The following presents arguments connecting the role of crisis stemming from an understanding of the 
Enlightenment. The breadth of the book indicates in a way that remains convincing that, the political elite have 
become divorced or set into separate spheres and that this has led to crisis and will continue to do so: Koselleck, R. 
([1959] 2000) Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society, Cambridge: MIT Press.    
9 The first chapter addresses this in more detail. 
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their ideas and arguments in their context and to allow their focus to be reflected through 
their own experiences. However, Durkheim and Habermas’s writings on solidarity and the links 
that they make to crisis are also analysed in and for themselves. What this means in terms of 
approach is that their ideas are not only rooted in their context, they are in addition treated as 
resources for building a theory of solidarity that can help in the present and moving forward. It 
is clear that we are currently living through an immense crisis that cuts across social, political, 
economic, moral and religious experience. It can also be seen that one of the ways that a 
growing number of scholars have sought to make sense of this, and in a way mitigate these 
various forms of crisis, is to begin to attempt to write a new an account or form of solidarity. 
This response reflects a spreading of the concept in popular forms of expression. The 
conclusion to this thesis will argue for the relevance of these older historical forms of solidarity 
and the debates that surrounded their creation, whilst placing them alongside the 
contemporary and emerging solidarity scholarship of the last few years. 
In conclusion, the aim of what follows is to indicate the complicated nature of solidarity and in 
so doing to attest to the need for it to be taken far more seriously. The importance of the term 
is argued for through a close engagement with its historical importance to social and political 
thought. The debt that solidarity has silently accumulated through being relied upon but left 
under-explained, has started to be paid in the last few years. This thesis hopes to add to the 
growing literature in what is an area that has tremendous untapped potential.            
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Chapter 1: The contested origins of modern solidarity 
The purpose of this chapter is to set out clearly the roots of the modern forms of solidarity that 
will be discussed later in the thesis. It will be argued that the early history of the social and 
political creation of solidarity post-French revolution was born out of crisis and conflict. 
Equally, it will be shown that current issues with solidarity scholarship today have their roots in 
the paradoxes produced through evocations of solidarity in the different intellectual traditions 
of this period. The content that will be covered will be firstly to outline the background to the 
arrival of solidarity into popular expression and to make note of the terms pre-social and 
political meaning. This will both enable an argument to begin to develop around the 
chameleon character of solidarity and how it adapts to the different contexts that it finds itself 
in. Equally, as important is that this background will not just be an intellectual linage of the 
term, it will also argue that the time just preceding solidarity’s popularisation was a time of 
social, economic, political and religious crisis. What will then follow will build on these two 
strands through paying close attention to two early protagonists of solidarity discourse, 
Charles Fourier (1772-1837) and Pierre Leroux (1797-1871). Both writers, broadly construed, 
are commonly understood to be a part of the movement known as French Social Romanticism. 
Therefore, a brief introduction to the movement will also be given that sets out why perhaps 
at this point in French history there was a need for such a movement and to illustrate in more 
general terms what the aims of the movement were. This will allow the later more detailed 
discussion of Fourier and Leroux to be framed within their historical reality. Finally, building on 
specifically the underappreciated influence of Leroux’s work there will be a discussion of 
Jewish solidarity in this period. This chapter as a whole serves the function of introducing not 
just the tangled history of the term solidarity, but also some of difficulties that it contains. The 
argument that will be made is that the issues that both Durkheim and later Habermas have 
with their own writings on solidarity have their seeds in this period. The choice to discuss 
Jewish uses and understanding of solidarity in this period highlights a number of difficulties 
that remain present in the later writings of Durkheim and Habermas, both of whom have a 
preoccupation with religion. Equally, they can both be seen to be still operating within the 
same tradition when it comes to ideas around humanity, universalism, nationalism, and 
charges of Eurocentrism. It is this final point that will be taken up again in the conclusion of the 
thesis, arguing that this specific tradition of solidarity, whilst hugely rich, critically 
sophisticated, and powerfully politically seductive, has not been able to rid itself of its 
problematic birth.  
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A background to the term solidarity 
Most scholars who have taken the time to look into the origins of solidarity agree that it is a 
Roman legal term. The context for solidarity’s development from its legal meaning to a social 
and political one occurs in France in the first half of the 19th century. It will be shown that in 
this French setting, the term solidarity becomes politically volatile and socially important at a 
time of great change in the dynamics of French society. Solidarity, as it appears in France 
between 1830 and 1850 is the fore-runner for much of its later philosophical and socio-
political manifestations. However, it is worth noting, in the words of the historian Steinar 
Stjernø that:  
Historically speaking, the phenomenon of solidarity existed before the idea was 
formulated. The idea existed before the term became widespread, and the term was 
in general use before its modern meaning developed.10 
However, this is disputed even by those who do point to a longer history, such as Hayward 
who would not go so far as to claim that it is a ‘given’ in society. This may be because he is not 
as concerned with ontological philosophical questions as he is primarily an intellectual 
historian. However the origin of the term, scholars appear to be unanimous about, arrives 
through and is instigated by Roman law. Hayward, in his influential essay of 1959 states that 
solidarity’s origin as a legal term is evidenced by the ‘Dictionnaire de l’Académie Française’ of 
1694 and Diderot’s 1765 ‘Encyclopédie ou Dictionaire Raisonné des Sciences, des Arts et des 
Métiers’. In both texts solidarity has the meaning contained in the indivisibility of “collective 
debt”.11 More recently Bayertz (albeit drawing on different sources) also makes this non-
contentious claim about solidarity, arguing that its genesis in Roman law can be recognised as 
stemming from the phrase obligation in solidum.12 These two examples show that solidarity is 
linked to paying debts, either as group liability, members’ liability to the group, or the group’s 
liability to its members. This is a point echoed by Metz, who to add to Hayward’s explanation, 
goes on to suggest that the inclusion of solidarity in the Civil Code of 1804 is an example of 
solidarity largely retaining its Roman meaning, therefore establishing a form of solidarity usage 
that extends back much further than is usually appreciated. 13 The substantiation and 
formalised continuity between the Roman law tradition and Napoleon’s Civil Code (Code civil 
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11 Hayward, J. E. S. (1959) ‘Solidarity: The Social History of an Idea in Nineteenth Century France’, International 
Review of Social History, 4:2, p.270. 
12 Bayertz, K. (1999) ‘Four Uses of “Solidarity”’, in Bayertz, K. (eds) (1999) Solidarity, Cornwall: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, p.3. 
13 Hayward further remarks that this was the moment in which “the juridical conception of a relationship of 
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fourth section (“Titre” three, Chapter four) of the Civil code entitled “Des Obligations Solidaires”” p.270. Metz, K. H. 
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des Français) is telling of the parallel retention of meaning between the two instances.  
Hayward offers this succinct definition of how solidarity was understood in the Civil Code and 
argues how similar the two meanings of solidarity remained:  
The principle of solidarity between creditors and between debtors is traced by the 
jurists to the co-proprietorial obligations of mutual assistance and collective 
responsibility within the Roman extended family or “Gens,” each member of which 
was held responsible for the payment of the whole of the debt contracted by any 
member, and had the right to receive payment of debts owed to the collectivity. 14  
The continuity between the Roman legal meaning of solidarity and its juridical meaning in the 
Civil Code appears certain.15 However, the construction, under Napoleon of this codified legal 
system sought to occlude and minimise the collective quality of solidarity. Hayward 
understands this as stemming from the authors’ (heavily guided by the prominent jurist 
Pothier) ideological motivations.16 According to Hayward, the Civil Code was created through 
the informed beliefs of the authors, that individualism was paramount and with that individual 
responsibility. The effect this had on the Civil Code in general and the solidarity clause 
specifically, was that it led to a favouring of liberty over equality, and consequently the 
creation of further inequality between worker and employer.17 Effectively solidarity came to 
be seen negatively as a constraint on individual liberty through enforced social bonds.   
It is additionally true that the Revolution had one important effect on the jurisprudence of 
solidarity, in that under the Old Regime if you were a member of a corporate body as legally 
recognised under the system of privileges then you were “treated as a single entity by the 
law.” In practice this meant that as a member you were held in solidarity or “collective 
responsibility for each others’ debts or wrongdoings.” It was this clause that was abolished 
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Review of Social History, 4:2, p.270. 
15 It appears certain for solidarity writers, however for legal historians it is less clear. See: Descheemaeker, E. (2009) 
The Division of Wrongs, New York: Oxford University Press. Although it does not deal directly with solidarity, it 
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17Hayward, J. E. S. (1959) ‘Solidarity: The Social History of an Idea in Nineteenth Century France’, International 
Review of Social History, 4:2, p.272.  
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along with the system of privileges after the Revolution. The meaning was retained more 
clearly in personal or familial relations, through for example marriage. Importantly and 
something that will be discussed at the close of this chapter, the Jews were understood to be a 
legal corporation under the Old Regime, however, unlike artisans’ corporations, this remained 
the case after the Revolution. This continuation of corporate solidarity for only Jews has 
consequences for the Jewish population in France, and it also has implications for thinking 
about solidarity more generally, in particular with regard to identity, integration and 
difference.18  
In general there was a favouring of legislation that supported individual freedom above social 
equality; something that can be better understood when considered through the perception 
and treatment of those living in poverty.19 It was not the government’s role at this time to 
interfere in matters concerned with the provision for the poor. Instead this role was the 
domain of the Church, specifically the Catholic Church, through its institution of charity. 
Church charity had long been embedded in French society and would have been widely 
recognised as the primary designator of aid to the poor. Charity, in the context in which the 
Civil Code was written, had developed a formal meaning with a codified form of its own. The 
act of giving was taken from the individual and placed in the hands of the Church. Metz 
summarises how charity was viewed at this time in France as follows:  
[T]he mundane reflection of the absolute love of God, denoted the Christian act of 
loving one’s neighbour as oneself, made permanent through the institution of the 
Church as beyond the spontaneity of individual giving.20 
The example of Church charity is important in two ways, firstly it was seen to be capable and 
right that the Church was responsible for those in poverty as opposed to the government and 
secondly, that the construction of Church Charity meant giving over personal responsibility to 
the institutionalised charity of the Church. It is significant to note that the laws created 
reflected a view that the government was not directly responsible, morally or practically, for 
the poor. The sphere of poor relief was governed largely through the Church. The governing 
and control of the organ of charity that the Church performed then led to a lessening of the 
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religiously motivated duty to aid those in need. The duty remained, although it became non-
direct and impersonal. The act of giving loses its immediacy in this context and becomes 
calculated rationality.21 
Equally, charitable giving, understood in rational terms, is discussed in detail by Marco 
Leevwen. He argues that “[t]he poor were not entirely without power, however: the problem 
of the poor was their poverty; the problem of the rich was the poor.”22 The point more 
generally that he wants to make is that in the course of many centuries in Europe, a system of 
rights with accompanying duties had arisen through this dichotomy between rich and poor. It 
is generally assumed in the literature that the poor were aware of their right to relief and that 
the rich likewise knew they had a duty to give it. The final point that Leevwen makes is that the 
system of relief was only maintained because it was in the interests of both parties. This it 
could be said is a form of solidarity, where one side has an obligation to pay their debts, i.e. 
the rich maintain being rich because they exploit the poor, therefore when the poor need 
some relief in hard times they must repay this debt. This is just a summation that would be 
difficult to prove. What is clear is that this system falls apart in France in the wake of the 
French Revolution, which coupled with the increasing need for charity at a time when it is least 
equipped to help, clearly creates fertile ground for a new model of social obligation and duty. 
However, Metz argues that the phasing out of ‘peasant society’ and the corresponding vast 
increase in beggary, brought about by the increase in casual labourers and coupled with 
population growth (among other factors), meant that Church directed charity simply became 
insufficiently capable of supporting the poor.23 Coupled with the unwillingness of the State to 
interfere and the incapability of Church charity to cope with the rise of poverty in France, for 
him did not lead to a social, moral and political theory such as solidarity, but to the rise of 
philanthropy.  
Philanthropy can be seen to be both a reaction to the state’s failure to act and the Church’s 
inability to do so. There is however an additional possible reason, initiated by the spread of 
Enlightenment ideas. Metz understands the rise of philanthropy as both bridging the gap left 
open by the two previous institutions, as well as specifically challenging the Church’s curtailing 
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of individual responsibility, both in the way that its giving of poverty relief and its removal of 
the receivers’ ability to help themselves, he writes:  
Philanthropy reacted to this as an active form of benevolence created within the 
critical, anti-clerical spirit of the Enlightenment. The human being itself became the 
normative basis, became the sole meaning of aid.24 
The shift from charity to philanthropy as articulated by Metz is set against broader 
transformations that were occurring across France, up to the French Revolution, particularly in 
regard to economic migrations from the countryside to the cities. The questioning of the 
institution of the church and the prevalence and increasing acceptance of some of the ideas of 
the Enlightenment can be understood and demonstrated by the changing understanding of the 
role of the individual within French society. It was also perhaps at this stage that an initial 
critical edge was given to the problem of poverty. Ideas began to circulate that challenged the 
assumptions of poverty; most importantly that the poor should be given the means to get 
themselves out of poverty, rather than being the mute receivers of aid.25 These ideas will be 
discussed in the next section, with reference to the Romantic Socialist movement. There is also 
a need to remain cautious about these ideas as they cannot be said to be widely held. 
Importantly, although some of the ideas of the Romantic Socialists did influence certain 
individual philanthropists, the two phenomena rarely informed each other and when analysed 
closely were largely in an antithetical relationship. 
Philanthropy emerged as a hierarchical phenomenon which was incapable of striving for 
equality but nonetheless revealed, through its insistence on self-help, the very clear 
inequalities that did exist within French society. It is under these intellectual developments 
that during and after the French Revolution the traditional view of poverty and how to care for 
the poor began to be transformed into a call for aid to become a human and civil right.26  
Nevertheless, Metz does not fully detail his causal chain (although I think that he is right) and 
some further explanation is needed. Hayward argues that the eighteenth century saw the 
concrete dominance of personal liberty and the juridical protection of individual rights through 
the legal justice system.27 The idea of a defensive state that had as its duty the role of 
protecting certain individual rights was made realisable in legal terms by the Civil Code. The 
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role of a legal right becomes, during and after the French Revolution, exposed or at least 
critically examined by liberty’s uncomfortable partner, equality. Economic justice became in 
some sense synonymous with social rights; this movement or oscillation between individual 
liberty protection and social equality rights marks for both Metz and Hayward the creation of 
the fertile ground that was needed for solidarity to enter.  
There has recently been an argument put forward by Katherine Lynch that relates to changes 
in social provision, during and after the Revolution. So whilst the Civil Code and a general 
propensity for ways of tackling social questions such as poverty were circulating, this should be 
understood against a background of what was actually being provided. Lynch builds her 
argument through a novel conception of what counts as the ‘public’. For her the public is:  
[L]iterally… civil society as a realm where individuals, both men and women, left a 
purely domestic or family sphere and entered into sustained, face-to-face relations 
with others who were not necessarily related by blood or marriage. It was the sphere 
in which programs for the relief of the poor and organizations for mutual assistance 
were formed.28 
In the centuries leading up to the Revolution in France, this direct form of sociability, informed 
through the ethical codes of medieval Christianity, created a series of entitlements for the 
poor.29 The responsibility for administering these entitlements in practice was organised on 
the local level of village and town. However, after the Revolution the National Constituent 
Assembly’s ‘Committee on Mendicity’ (1790) was set up to replace these seemingly ad-hoc 
arrangements. The major change that was brought in with the Committee was that 
responsibility for the administration of poor relief was now the nation, not village, town or 
city.30 So whilst some philanthropic or charitable organisations such as the Society for 
Maternal Charity, did manage to limp on for a few years, ultimately argues Lynch, these were 
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either voluntarily disbanded or forcibly so. This is interpreted as the Jacobin leadership’s fear 
of ‘private’ organisations that were seen as a threat to their “monopoly of authority in 
furnishing assistance”. This was important as aid at this time was tied to citizens who were 
seen to be deserving, such as soldiers, but also “unwed mothers (whose reputation they 
rehabilitated).” This system ultimately failed and in part explains why the early nineteenth 
century in particular was uncommonly catastrophic for the poor of France.31 In part it was this 
crisis for the poor that precipitated the later solidarity discussions that will be examined in this 
chapter.            
It is likewise common to assume that fraternity was part of the answer to this crisis as a fore-
runner of social solidarity in France. Undoubtedly there is a strong connection, however the 
trajectories are not always parallel, or to be taken without important considerations. 
Fraternity, as Munoz-Dardé states, has a somewhat metaphorical meaning. Like solidarity its 
roots protrude further than its invocation and widespread political usage. It stems from 
religious language as well as “the professional associations of the Ancien Régime”.32 Therefore, 
a link is established between fraternity and that of corporate interests, particularly through the 
aforementioned phenomenon of philanthropy.  
Associations or corporations of workers in some sense can be seen to operate with a degree of 
fraternal structure. Sewell argues that it was more likely that workers groups who had 
philanthropic orientation, would likewise contain stronger affiliation with the idea of fraternity 
or brotherhood. The corporate associations which Sewell cites as being most in keeping with 
this view are the ‘Fraternal Union of Workers in the Art of Carpentry’ established a little after 
1789 and the later ‘Society of Fraternal and Philanthropic Union’ prominent in the 1830s.33 
These organisations (for Sewell) are evidence that fraternity and philanthropy in combination 
were present between the French Revolution and at least the end of the 1830s. Indeed Sewell 
and Munoz-Dardé both make evident that fraternity was part of traditional corporate 
vocabulary. Sewell however, perhaps slightly underplays the role that fraternity had in political 
terms as a member of the revolutionary motto ‘Liberty, Equality, Fraternity.’ Stjernø instead 
understands fraternity as having a more politically active role, arguing that it became a 
placeholder or signifier for “a feeling of political community and the wish to emphasise what 
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was held in common”.34 Fraternity does appear to be a complex concept to articulate and it is 
possible that both Sewell and Stjernø are right in their characterisation of the term. The 
connection between philanthropy and fraternity does appear to be strong and would indicate 
that a worker’s understanding of the term would be informed by their relationship with 
workers of the same trade. Likewise it is undeniable that fraternity has just as strong a claim to 
the more universalising political manifestation that was engendered at the time of the French 
Revolution. The retraction of the meaning of fraternity from the universal during the French 
Revolution, a meaning that ignored the differences in occupation and financial means, to the 
specificity of the fraternity of the corporate associates is perhaps one reason why solidarity 
comes to occupy the territory previously held by fraternity.  
It is therefore this political streak, as contained within fraternity and its subsequent dilution by 
way of philanthropy, which has led many commentators (Stjernø, Gide, Rist, Munoz-Dardé) to 
argue that solidarity grows out of a need left by the transformation of fraternity. The two 
terms share many characteristics, perhaps most obviously in their similar allegorical function. 
Just as fraternity can be seen as a metaphor for the organisations of workers (or the later 
philanthropic version), solidarity also has a metaphorical power. Solidarity understood as 
metaphor is something which Gide and Rist argue for in their explanation for solidarity’s 
replacement of fraternity. Crucially, and in reference to the previous discussion, they also see 
solidarity replacing or at least challenging the institution of Church charity. This is how they 
describe this process of displacing fraternity and charity. The date that they cite is also 
significant:  
The new word [solidarity] performed one final service by usurping the functions of 
the term ‘charity,’ which no one was anxious to retain because of its religious 
connexion. The other term, ‘fraternity,’ which had done duty since the Revolution of 
1848, was somewhat antiquated by this time, and charged with a false kind of 
sentimentalism.35  
The claim here that fraternity had become maudlin, romantic and old-fashioned could be true; 
however Gide and Rist are mistaken when they assert that solidarity only came to replace the 
intellectual space of fraternity after 1848 and the implication that fraternity had only been 
popular since 1848. Munoz-Dardé points out that although fraternity was only officially 
adopted as part of the republican motto in 1848 it had been in widespread unofficial use since 
1789. Solidarity likewise had been used in political contexts since the late 18th century and was 
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used by Charles Fourier as early as 180836. It could be that Gide and Rist are arguing that it was 
not until after 1848 that solidarity begins to replace fraternity, but again this appears to be 
suspect, as fraternity continued to be used regularly until at least the turn of the 20th century. 
The importance of challenging Gide and Rist’s account of solidarity is that it remains highly 
influential in the literature on solidarity. Schmelter, who has written one of the most 
referenced recent works on solidarity (apparently), relies heavily on their account and as a 
consequence has perhaps reproduced some of the same mistakes.37 
Following this, even Andreas Wildt, who gives possibly the most recent dates for the arrival of 
solidarity in the contemporary literature, believes that solidarity was politicised during the 
1840s, thus before Gide and Rist’s 1848 date. The difficulty with Wildt’s argument however, as 
well as his conservative assertions surrounding the arrival of solidarity into the political sphere, 
is that he never makes clear what he means by politics; in this sense it is hard to analyse how 
he understands the function of solidarity in the 1840s. The exact dating of the term solidarity 
may appear to be insignificant to the arguments that will be made in the thesis to follow; 
however, its politicisation and separation from fraternity connects to a historical context that 
recurs in the promotion and popularity of the term.38 
France in the 18th century witnessed many dramatic changes in its social structure. The 
beginning of the end of the agrarian economy and the start of industrialisation created not 
only widespread poverty but also a new social dynamic. Coupled with the influence of the 
Enlightenment on a population that was becoming increasingly stratified, it was not surprising 
that citizens sought a political philosophy to complement their feelings of, at times, 
desperation. Solidarity, it appears was born from a crisis in society, one that was called upon 
and given importance at the most heightened moments of civil unrest. It is therefore the claim 
of this chapter and thesis in general that although an intellectual and linguistic history of 
solidarity can be told, the social conditions were what created and necessitated its arrival. That 
solidarity is a slippery and fungible concept that is perhaps as much reactive as it can be 
prescriptive is precisely because of the social, economic and political conditions through which 
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it is articulated. Hayward captures well what this comes to mean in the 19th century stating 
that:  
In the nineteenth century, the appeal to solidarity was made principally by the 
protagonists of the politically and economically downtrodden and the complacent 
assertion of “laisser faire” was voiced by the apologists of the political and economic 
upstarts who had successfully overthrown (in France) or transformed (in Britain) the 
old order.39  
The following chapter will combine philosophical and political theories of solidarity alongside 
their context, the reality of poverty, population growth and other social questions. The aim is 
to relate a theoretical debate to the impetus that created the need for there to be a debate in 
the first place.   
French Social Romanticism and its context 1830-1848  
France, it is sometimes claimed, was experiencing something of a golden age in the years 1830 
to 1848; in particular, the loosening of censorship and the creation of a new, emboldened 
literary middle class.40 Nevertheless, it was also a time of social frustration amongst many 
French citizens. Acceleration in population growth, increased mobility of the population and 
the on-going movement from an agrarian to an industrial society are often given as primary 
factors for this.41 The period 1830-48 saw France create for the first time a substantial 
transport network to support the new heavy industries. This sacrifice of capital would only give 
benefits to a later generation and imposed upon France a friction that in some places led to 
riots. Lyon, for example, experienced riots in both 1831 and 1834, with civil unrest being 
common elsewhere in France, particularly in the North.42  
Indeed, Spencer describes how widespread food shortages had led to perhaps as many as five 
food crises between 1800 and 1830, with unemployment and high inflation commonplace. For 
context in 1782, of a population of 135,000 in Lyon, 30,000 were without work; by 1811 this 
had grown to 50 percent, in northern France around 75 percent and up to 30 percent in 
Paris.43 These figures begin to illustrate that the period in France that proceeded the ‘golden 
age’ of the 1830s-1840s was one of dramatic social degradation, division and change.44  
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Intellectual historians such as Beecher, Spencer, Riasanovsky and Evans have argued that the 
general shifts in population and relative social degradation that accompanied it from 1789 to 
around 1830 created the ideal backdrop for the arrival of a philosophical movement such as 
social romanticism. This, coupled with the relaxation of the laws on censorship and increased 
prevalence of a ready-made educated audience, saw the subsequent period of 1830 to 1848 as 
ripe for a social philosophy to flourish. Trade unions had recently emigrated from their birth 
place in England and were becoming increasingly popular in France.45 Novel ideas were 
consciously being sought out and there began to be a reaction to the rationalised industry and 
the living conditions of workers, particularly in the big cities.46 There was also the emergence 
of civil society in industrialising towns, which was a negotiated process of non-elitist, at times 
painful, democratisation.47 Further to this Naomi Andrews has recently made a compelling 
argument; that this period is one of transition from eighteenth century universal ideas about 
humanity to one of “national, racial and sexual difference” related in part to the need for a 
rational basis for empire.48 
Social Romanticism was the theoretical articulation of these challenges and should be 
understood as a powerful intellectual movement in its own right. Social Romanticism was not 
(as it is commonly assumed by careless readers of Marx) simply a primitive or crude early form 
of Marxism.49 The context and therefore the targets of Social Romanticism were altogether 
different from that of Marx. Marx was writing about an already almost fully developed 
industrialism, whereas Social Romanticism was reacting to a not yet complete project of 
industrialisation. There are similarities between the two and certainly one influenced the other 
in terms of its critique of social, economic and political relations, however there are also major 
differences, not least of which is the question of religion.50 The Grandfather of the Social 
Romantic movement Saint Simon, writing mainly in the years leading up to the 1830s, placed 
religion in the centre of his philosophical writings. Saint Simon’s prescriptive philosophy, which 
was subsequently taken over by a number of his disciples, shared a belief that the 
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rationalisation that stemmed from the Enlightenment must be tethered to religious 
consideration. The new society to come would remain a religious, not an instrumentally 
scientific one. The combination of a belief in science and the ideals of the enlightenment, 
coupled with a strong faith in religion, is a distinctive feature of the Social Romantic movement 
in general. That is not to say that the religious element in their writings aimed to reinstate the 
pre-existing Catholic notion of Christianity. It was rather an attempt to redefine completely 
how Christianity should be understood.  Their Christianity would exist outside traditional 
institutions such as the church and would be in keeping with the spirit of the doctrine, not its 
practice.  
Another key difference between Marx and the Social Romantic movement is one of tactics. 
The Social Romantic movement was accompanied by an artistic expression that is rarely found 
in the writings of Marx. It is argued by Evans that many of the early, Saint Simon inspired Social 
Romantics, believed that the heart was more important than the head, when it came to 
pushing for social and political change. This is how Evans characterises the movement in 
somewhat presumptuous language:  
Human beings – the Saint-Simonians were right – will always be more amendable to 
reasoning when it is diluted with sentiment; and the arguments of the early socialists, 
might have been relatively futile without the appeal which the poet, the dramatist, 
and the novelist were able to make. To the credit of the Romantic movement should 
be laid the enormous contribution which it made to the sense of social solidarity.51  
The idea of instilling sentiment into a social philosophy can be viewed in two ways. The first is 
that to rely on an emotive tenor, alongside a continued faith in God is reactionary. Despite the 
critical nature that Christianity was subjected to, the underlying belief in God was never 
questioned. Equally, the reliance on the poets, authors and dramatists to articulate, guide or 
perhaps create a sense of collective belonging, appears to be reactionary, in the sense that it 
perhaps needed a mythical community to exist, for their philosophy to be plausible and 
persuasive. The latter claim is perhaps overly critical; it does not simply follow that the use of 
poems, novels and plays to communicate a political message is necessarily a form of bad faith. 
Creating class consciousness, for example, can take many forms and the illuminating of social 
conditions through literary means can have radical consequences, as Evans is eager to point 
out:  
No writer of the century rendered greater service than did Hugo to the cause of 
social justice. No one in any country strove with greater political independence and 
personal disinterestedness to create a consciousness of human solidarity.52  
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The overstatement and categorical nature of this piece should not detract from the more 
general point; the theories which carried the most weight in this period were indeed imbued 
with as a minimum a poetic flaire or at most an emotive strength. Human solidarity was not 
created by these authors; it was revealed, articulated and given a public voice across the newly 
forming working classes. What complicates this picture is the uncomfortable but significant 
issue of the Social Romantic movement’s attitude towards French colonialism. It appears that 
many of the main writers associated with the movement (Proudhon, Blanc, Leroux, 
Considerant, Fourier, Cabet, Pecqueur and Lamennais) were broadly in favour of 
colonialisation, in particular of Algeria.53 The promotion of colonial activity for these writers 
meant aligning the French nation with “universal civilization”, meaning that the French nation 
was equated with the universal nation. The consequence being that wellbeing of the French 
nation was “that of all humanity.”54 However, it is still unclear what possible damage this 
‘compromise’ with colonialism had (or continues to have) on the idea of human solidarity. 
What is clear is the motivation was one that stemmed from a Christian (European) version of 
universal humanity, one that was privileged over races and cultures of those colonised.55        
It is also important to realise that the period 1800 to perhaps as late as 1850 is understood by 
economic historians as a time of exception, when considered from a poor relief perspective.56 
Many studies have pointed out that this period in Europe sees a break down in established 
modes of poor relief and a general downturn in the fortunes of the least well off.57 Bavel and 
Rijpma argue that this, as has been alluded to already, was contributed to by poor relief not 
falling within any one fixed (and therefore accountable) realm. Governments, they argue 
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became somewhat responsible for the poor around 1800, or at the very least decisions around 
poor relief became political decisions. This Bavel and Rijpma argue is roughly the pattern 
across Western European counties. The specific consequence of this politicisation of poverty in 
France was that it was shot through with an amalgamation of the reality of French foreign 
exploits (colonialisation), Enlightenment ideals and liberal philosophical thought. This in unison 
led to “policies directed against corporations, the abolition of guilds and confraternities, 
secularization” which, as will be argued in the latter part of this chapter, led to a countervailing 
critique, one that the Romantic Socialists were at the forefront of.  
The Romantic Socialist movement which was far from being uniform will now be explored 
through just two of its lesser known exponents; Charles Fourier 1772-1837 and Pierre Leroux 
(1797-1871). The decision to discuss these two thinkers, rather than the more obvious choice 
of Saint Simon is because firstly he is not a writer that is directly connected with solidarity in its 
explicit sense, although his ideas should not be discounted altogether. Equally, given his fame 
outside of France, Saint Simon would seem a more fitting choice than these other lesser 
known writers however he is well covered in the literature, his most important writings are 
slightly earlier than the period and frankly he does not offer an interesting account of 
solidarity.58 However although Fourier, like Saint Simon, is not explicit in his references to 
solidarity, he does have an underappreciated but significant influence on the ideas that were 
being formed in radical circles in England, the United States and Russia.59 However, there has 
yet to be written any kind of detailed account of the contemporary influence of Fourier or 
Leroux, through either readership, newspaper articles, pamphlets or translations.60 Finally, the 
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selection of Leroux enables a further discussion of Jewish solidarity, something that has lasting 
implications for both the understanding of the position of Jews within European nations and 
for the development of solidarity in itself.   
Charles Fourier: 1772-1837     
Fourier is credited by some with the promotion of the cooperative movement in France. 61 He 
is also seen as laying the foundations for a later social and political articulation of solidarity 
that moves away from the legal sphere.62 It should be kept in mind that Fourier was little read 
in his own time and only later developed a following, firstly in France and then elsewhere. The 
following remarks indicate why, perhaps, he was little read and understood in France during 
his life-time. The case for a re-evaluation of his contribution as a social and political figure and 
why he is so important to understanding the genealogy of solidarity will then follow. Using 
Fourier presents in itself numerous difficulties from his unforgiving style, presentation and 
actually, his personal temperament, as Riasanovsky summarises:  
…his thought was all of a piece, organically united in a kind of overarching universal 
formula to the extent that it is impossible to do justice to a period, a part, or 
significant particular aspect of Fourier’s teaching without dealing with the whole. 
Moreover, this formula was essentially mad and encompassed mostly bizarre and 
eccentric elements.63 
All major works on Fourier begin in a similar vein with the degree of apologetic tone being the 
only variable. This is one reason Fourier made little impact amongst his peers, indeed it was 
not until the last few years of his life that a following of any kind was established. Fourier’s 
style was idiosyncratic in the extreme, as he wrote in complex systems, groupings and 
numerical orderings which baffled many first time readers of his work. There is also a 
fantastical quality to much of his writing; through his discussion of planetary destines, to 
ecological changes to the earth which included the transformation of all the oceans into 
lemonade and his notion that wars could be fought through meat pie making competitions.  64 
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This made Fourier an easy target for lampooning in the press and meant that it was difficult for 
Fourier’s philosophical thought to be taken seriously. The charge of being a buffoon and 
madman stuck, but it was perhaps his outspoken views on women which dented his 
aspirations the most.65 Fourier for all of his wild theories actually had a sophisticated, radical 
and challenging view of women, particularly given the time he was writing. It could be that his 
radical views on women were too threatening to the patriarchal structure of society.66 The 
following passage highlights these two tendencies in Fourier, when he writes:  
As a general proposition: Social progress and changes of historical period are brought 
about as a result of the progress of women towards liberty; and the decline of social 
orders is brought about as a result of the diminution of the liberty of women.  
Other events influence these political vicissitudes, but there is no other cause which 
produces such rapid social progress or decline as a change in the condition of 
women. I have already said that the mere adoption of closed harems would soon 
return us to the period of barbarism, and the act of opening the harems would be 
sufficient to transform barbarism into civilization. To sum up, the extension of the 
privileges of women is the basic principle of all social progress.67  
Fourier’s social and political critique is perhaps the element of his writing that can be seen to 
have had the greatest impact on subsequent socialist thought, including both Engels and Marx. 
Fourier’s view of women is one part of his thinking on the problems of Society, the State and 
Universal Humanity. Fourier believed strongly in the idea that civilisation progressed through 
stages; these stages had specific characteristics and could be identified historically. It could be 
said that Fourier was operating with a form of immanent critique, the state of things was 
interrogated against a list of normative prescriptions that were contained within each given 
stage/age of civilization. The technique of critiquing a given society or State was then placed 
within a grand narrative of historical progress. For Fourier it appears that the final stage of 
civilization would contain an end to scarcity, an equality of resources and the absolute 
freedom of individuals. The utopianism of Fourier’s thought appears to be fanciful and open to 
charges that it would be impossible to reconcile equality and freedom, whilst supporting a 
system of production that would be efficient enough to supply the satisfaction of all individuals 
according to their wants and needs. Fourier’s vision of this future state of unbridled happiness 
is hard to take seriously, there appears to be too many contingent factors involved and there is 
a question as to whether the seemingly intractable impasse between equality and freedom 
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could ever be bridged. Instead it is more worthwhile to investigate his less ambitious ideas that 
centre on his critique of his contemporary French society, a society he saw as in crisis.    
Fourier understands the economy, markets and capital accumulation in a way which neither 
mythologises the economy as an impenetrable sphere that cannot be understood nor one 
which is not created and maintained by individuals. Equally, Fourier sees that individuals 
operating within the economy cannot be held responsible for their role within it. He essentially 
provides a proto-structuralist critique and account of the economy, and more broadly the state 
and society of France in his period. To illustrate this he writes:  
Anyone who denounces the manoeuvrings of market-riggers, lawyers or anybody 
else might well be even more grasping if he were in their place; one should never 
blame the passions of individuals, only Civilisation which offers no path but vice for 
the satisfaction of the passions, and thus forces man to practice vices to obtain 
wealth, without which there is no happiness.68  
This passage reveals some additional important points concerning how Fourier understands 
the individual. When Fourier talks about passions he is invoking a very categorical claim as to 
the natural state of individuals; more specifically the passion of attraction, which Fourier 
argues stems directly from God. The individual is embroiled within civilization, the passions are 
unalterable and are teleological, and will only become expressed fully in the coming of the 
utopia. What keeps the passions from becoming realised or perhaps from acting contrary to 
happiness is the role played by duty; a man-made phenomenon. For Fourier, duty combines 
with reason, the manufactured enemy of the passions, stating:  
the progressive Series [the next which Fourier believes humanity is soon to enter] 
would ensure that everybody’s passions were fully developed, irrespective of sex, 
age or social class, and that in the new order these increased passions would bring 
with them commensurately greater health and strength, I conjectured that if god had 
given so much influence to passionate attraction and so little to its enemy, reason, it 
must be in order to lead us to the order of the progressive Series in which all aspects 
of attraction would be satisfied.69  
And again this time in even more explicit terms and in reference to duty:  
Duty is man-made, attraction comes from God; so if we want to understand God’s 
intentions we have to study attraction, in its natural state, with no reference to duty. 
Duty varies from one century to another and from place to place, but the nature of 
the passions has been and will remain unchangeable for all people.70  
There is a lot to analyse in these two passages. Firstly, Fourier clearly makes a great distinction 
between individuals, as they are all subject to the same passions. Secondly, passions need to 
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overcome their current state of being controlled and curtailed by reason as set out in 
civilization. Thirdly, duty for Fourier is the malevolent counter-weight to the passions. It blocks 
off the possibility of accessing God and is a malleable tool that changes to fit a given situation. 
Finally, the objective ownership of each individual to passions both challenges and seeks to re-
evaluate the dialectic between liberty and equality.  
It is the above passions that make Fourier’s contribution to solidarity scholarship noteworthy. 
This is because it is this background that in turn foregrounds the freeing of solidarity from its 
legal sphere. However, it must be noted that Fourier rarely uses the term directly and where 
he does use it, it is still used in its legal meaning. It may then seem strange to include Fourier in 
a discussion of solidarity at all. The argument is that Fourier’s thought had a tremendous 
illocutionary force in the realisation of a social, political and philosophical solidarity, in both 
France (which is well documented) and England (which has received virtually no critical 
appraisal) and elsewhere.71 What solidarity is for Fourier requires a degree of detective work 
and perhaps an amount of imaginative interpretation. Stjernø offers a positive description of 
what Fourier’s solidarity is in the following four strands:  
1. [T]here is the principle of insurance, the legacy of the code Napoleon concerning 
the common responsibility of a group of people for insurance and the repayment of 
debt. 
2. [T]he preparedness to share resources with people in need. 
3. [T]he more general application to describe a feeling of community – solidarities 
sociales and solidarities collectives.  
4. [T]he introduction of a guaranteed minimum income and for family support.72   
The first is solidarity as discussed above, in relation to the Civil Code. The other three begin the 
movement away from this strict legal meaning towards what is more recognisably a modern 
social and political version of solidarity. Stjernø unfortunately does not expand beyond simply 
(correctly) identifying these strands in Fourier.73 Two and three appear to be similar to some 
modern understandings of solidarity although with some caveats, this can been seen especially 
in subsequent socialist and Marxist traditions. Indeed as Engels writes in a passage praising 
Fourier:  
[W]e find in Fourier a criticism of the existing conditions of society, genuinely French 
and witty, but not upon that account any less thorough. Fourier takes the 
bourgeoisie, their inspired prophets before the Revolution, and their interested 
eulogists after it, at their own word. He lays bare remorselessly the material and 
                                                     
71 The exception to this is the following: Pankhurst, R. K. P. (1956) ‘Fourierism in Britain’, International Review of 
Social History, 1:3, pp.398-432. 
72 Stjernø, S. (2005) Solidarity in Europe – The History of an Idea, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.28. 
(numbers added) 
73 Although he does want to make clear that Fourier’s philosophy and understanding of solidarity did have a strong 
“illocutionary force”, particularly with its influence on Leroux, ibid p.29. 
39 
moral misery of the bourgeois world. He confronts it with the earlier philosophers’ 
dazzling promises of a society in which reason alone should reign, of a civilisation in 
which happiness should be universal, of an illimitable human perfectibility, and with 
the rose-coloured phraseology of the bourgeois ideologists of his time. He points out 
how everywhere the most pitiful reality corresponds with the most high-sounding 
phrases, and he overwhelms this hopeless fiasco of phrases with his mordant 
sarcasm.74  
This highlights two important points, one is that Fourier clearly had an important impact on 
significant later thinkers and two, that his influence was not always straightforward and that 
his specificity of thought can be hard to detect. However, it does seem probable that the 
second and third forms of solidarity as laid out by Stjernø, do appear to be similar to later 
conceptions of solidarity in the tradition of socialism and Marxism. This interpretation of 
Fourier’s solidarity however, would seek to conflate two and four as it appears that the later 
proceeds from the former. A look at how this progression works in Fourier is significant to 
showing the later influence of Fourier’s thought outside the socialist/Marxist tradition. A closer 
reading of Fourier’s writing will now be presented, one that will lead to a concluding 
examination of the third form of solidarity; community feeling. 
Stjernø’s stated “preparedness to share resources with people in need” could be seen as a call 
for greater equality. Again however, Fourier does not seek to align this claim with the already 
existing moral championing of equality as stemming from the French Revolution. He thinks 
that equality:  
[I]s another chimera, praiseworthy when considered in the abstract and ridiculous 
from the standpoint of the means employed to introduce it in civilization. The first 
right of men is the right to work and the right to a minimum.75 
Here it can already be seen that a share of resources is inseparable from a right to a minimum 
(a minimum here refers directly to income). It is therefore for Fourier inconceivable to have a 
legal or abstract right to equality without the guaranteed minimum being also in place. Read 
this way the aim to procure a society which shares its resources willingly must accept also the 
need for a minimum for all. Leaving aside the obvious question of how this would be enforced, 
particularly given that Fourier would disband the army, police and any presently existing 
government institutions, it is clear that to have one without the other would, to follow Fourier, 
be impossible. It should also be noted at this point that although Fourier talks of income he 
does not mean money, as that would likewise be abolished; he is more thinking of material 
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resources. A further passage that indicates the impossibility of a separation is in the following, 
when he attacks reason and again writes of sharing resources and a minimum:  
[R]eason has contributed nothing to happiness as long as it has not procured social 
man the fortune which is the object of all his wishes; by social fortune I mean a 
progressive degree of wealth which protects the least well-off from need and ensures 
them, as a minimum, the fate we currently call a bourgeois competence.76  
There is perhaps an argument, that instead of calling this ‘solidarity’, a term that Fourier used 
infrequently and unsystematically, it would be more appropriate to discuss fraternity. 
Fraternity is something which Fourier addresses directly and interestingly is given similar 
treatment as equality. Whilst Fourier is inclined to treat fraternity with a degree of scorn and 
irony, it is, nevertheless a concept that if (as has been noted with other ideas) enacted 
conversely to how it is performed currently would be part of his utopian model. This is how he 
initially introduces his thoughts on fraternity:  
Let’s turn to fraternity. Our discussion here will be amusing, at once loathsome and 
learned. It is amusing in view of the imbecility of the theories which have purported 
to establish fraternity. It is loathsome when one recalls the horrors that the ideal of 
fraternity has masked. But it is a problem which deserves particular attention from 
science; for societies will attain their goal, and man his dignity, only when universal 
fraternity has become an established fact. By universal fraternity we mean a degree 
of general intimacy which can only be realized if four conditions are satisfied.77  
In a sense this general feeling of intimacy could account for Stjernø’s third description of 
solidarity in Fourier; that of a feeling of community. Thus fraternity, if it is to be realised, relies 
on four conditions, these four conditions have to be for Fourier universal and absolute if 
universal fraternity is to be achieved. These conditions are:  
1. Comfort for the people and the assurance of a splendid minimum...  
2. The education and instruction of the lower classes...  
3. General truthfulness in work relations...  
4. The rendering of reciprocal services by unequal classes.78 
It could be seen that within Fourier’s program for universal fraternity lie all of the four forms of 
solidarity as interpreted by Stjernø. This is most probably the case, however, what needs to be 
stressed is the first of Fourier’s conditions, the splendid minimum. It seems clear that for 
Fourier’s system to work at all there has to be an agreement that everyone have access to 
guaranteed material existence. It would be inconceivable for the other conditions to be 
realised without the first. Perhaps then Fourier should be reconfigured in the following way: To 
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establish universal fraternity, it would be necessary firstly to have a concrete solidarity 
between individuals within society to hold to the view that everyone was entitled to a 
minimum to live, regardless of their position. This is solidarity rather than fraternity as it is 
clearly an obligation, a debt to all that is not dictated purely through proximity. In this sense it 
is in keeping with Fourier’s method of reversal and with his concrete legal understanding of 
solidarity. Here solidarity becomes the means and universal fraternity the ends. Fourier, 
although ever the optimist for the success of his own system sees very little hope of 
establishing this fraternity in the present, and this is because the prior instigation of solidarity 
cannot be performed. Here Fourier writes of the impossibility of fraternity in the present:  
As for the present, how could there be any fraternity between sybarites steeped in 
refinements and coarse, hungry peasants who are covered with rags and often with 
vermin and who carry contagious diseases like typhus, mange, plica and other fruits 
of civilized poverty? What sort of fraternity could ever be established between such 
heterogeneous classes of men?79  
Fourier’s theories are hard to disentangle and understand on their own, however, what has 
hopefully been shown is that Fourier was indeed a forerunner of later understandings of 
solidarity. The force with which he attacks the current system may have won him praise by 
Engels and Marx and, likewise, his original solutions to the problems that he exposes are not as 
fanciful as they first appear. There does appear to be an undercurrent of solidarity throughout 
his work which underpins many of his pronouncements concerning equality and freedom from 
necessity. Fourier believes that all individuals have a right to the best possible life and that 
each individual has a duty to every other individual to make that possible. It is this reciprocal 
relationship which can be seen as the germ of the later solidarity theories. Likewise, the 
evocation of a universal interconnection between all of humanity anticipates later models of 
solidarity. Crucially it thus also contains the same weaknesses that these later universal models 
of solidarity can be charged with.     
Pierre Leroux (1797-1871) 
Leroux was influenced by Fourier, but he was primarily a disciple of Saint Simon. In addition to 
introducing the term solidarity, he is also understood to have coined the term socialism and it 
is this that he is best known for.80 He can be seen to be a link between the utopian visions of 
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Fourier and Saint Simon and the later sociology of Comte and Durkheim.81 Although it can be 
claimed that Fourier is the original solidarity thinker in this period, it was really Leroux that 
makes the term solidarity explicitly part of his thought. He also plays a major role in 
popularising the term in French intellectual circles in the 1840s.  
Although Leroux is heavily indebted to other thinkers such as Saint Simon and Fourier, he 
differs from them in a number of important aspects. He heavily criticises Christian charity 
(which Fourier had only addressed sparingly), social contract theory and the idea that society 
could be understood as an organism. For Leroux, solidarity is a relationship between 
individuals and it is these relationships that make society possible. Leroux in a similar way to 
Fourier’s universal fraternity thought that solidarity would lead to socialism. The idea for 
Leroux was to increase relational solidarity to the point that would enable socialism to be 
possible. Crucially, he did not think that solidarity would be constituted through citizens’ legal 
rights or that it should have the utility to affect the running of the state.82 So whereas Fourier’s 
solidarity would only be realised within the confines of his utopia (or Phalanx), Leroux sought 
to place solidarity at the foundation of society and wished to open it up to become even more 
inclusive than Fourier had envisaged. Solidarity is meant to act as a balancing relationship 
between the individualism/libertarian notions of selfhood and the growing threat of an 
authoritarian state. However, this characterisation of his position could be challenged by 
Wildt, when he implies that his solidarity was characterised not by:  
[A] rightful claim but a “direct” and altruistic feeling, as opposed to an “exterior” 
duty. In my view, this concept of solidarity turns into a central concept of social 
reform program – also incipiently into a concept of rights which is, however, barely 
related to the state…83  
Wildt’s argument makes clear why Leroux would seek to distance solidarity from Christian 
charity. Leroux understood Christian charity as stemming from pity and an obligation to help 
those in need. However, he wanted to move conceptions of solidarity away from Christian 
charity and into the realm of equal loving relationships that would exist outside of the 
traditional Christian notion of love. The unity of society could then act as the binding 
recognition of the solidarity relations. As with species-being (Gattungswesen) in Marx, the idea 
is more that as an individual you come to a realisation that you have just as much cause to 
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promote other individuals’ happiness as you have to promote your own. To highlight this 
slightly ambiguous relation to solidarity in Leroux, the following quote is provided:  
…that true love [veritable charité] would be recognized, i.e. that love would be 
comprehended as life’s own law, as the law of mutually solidaristic creatures, as the 
law of the identity and hence, the identification of the ego with the non-ego, of man 
and his fellow human being; and each antinomy dissolves and egoism abases itself in 
the face of love, because, to the extent that it is legitimate and holy, it recognizes 
itself within love.84  
Love does appear to underpin solidarity for Leroux but it is not a straightforwardly Christian 
love of charity, pity or even compassion. It is perhaps closer to friendship.85 Although Leroux 
does appear to cement solidarity as a central political and social concern, his writing has not 
had anything like the circulation of his teacher Saint Simon or Fourier.86 Leroux can be seen as 
typical of an emerging movement of thought that aimed to retain a version of religion, whilst 
also looking to socially engineer a just and equal society. Leroux is perhaps who Hayward has 
in mind when he attempts to summarise the concerns of, and social motivations for 19th 
century French thought:  
Nineteenth century French social philosophers sought to base the principles of social 
reorganization upon a conciliation of social moralism and social scientism – 
associated with, but cutting across, the simultaneously attempted synthesis between 
individualism and collectivism – as the only… acceptable and viable foundation for 
social life. What gave their ambitious enterprise urgency was that the early 
nineteenth century was recognized by some of the more acute thinkers of the time 
as a period of crisis and convulsion in the realms of science and philosophy, religion 
and morality, economics and politics.87  
Leroux is perhaps a thinker of his time, traversing both the fallout and failed promise of the 
Revolution, and the need to think through a possible concrete solution to the crisis of 1830s-
1840s. Leroux’s work was less ambitious in scope than either Saint Simon’s or Fourier’s and 
this may be a reason why his ideas and writings are rarely considered as influential. This at 
least is how Leroux has been commonly characterised. However, there is another side to his 
influence, one that is often overlooked in discussions around the genealogy of solidarity; 
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namely, Leroux’s influence on the French Jewish notions of solidarity. It is worth exploring why 
this is the case because it stands to show clearly the conflictual nature of this tradition of 
solidarity thinking, the same one that Durkheim and Habermas (it will be argued) inherit. The 
visibility of Jewish solidarity is low in general discussions of solidarity’s development. However, 
the work of Lisa Leff has sought to illuminate this underrepresented element of the history of 
western European notions of solidarity. It will now be argued using Leff’s work that some of 
what remains problematic in later discussions of solidarity can be seen as having, in part, its 
genesis here.  
Leff begins her study on Jewish solidarity in the following revealing way, stating that, “Jewish 
solidarity has become so integral to Jewish identity it is usually assumed to be a natural, 
unchanging part of what it means to be Jewish.”88 However, whilst Jewish collective identity 
and responsibility has a long history, they only adopted the term solidarity in the second half 
of the nineteenth century. The history of the Jews in Europe is a complex, vast and important 
one, therefore this discussion aims merely to focus on specific uses of solidarity by French Jews 
in this period.89 What should be kept in mind throughout this discussion is the significance of 
integration, the idea of a nation and the navigation of religious difference, civic congruity and 
self-identity, to the adoption of the term solidarity.90 What makes the case of the Jewish 
adoption of solidarity significant is the conceptual changes it has to go through for it to be 
something that they would choose for themselves. Before the French revolution Jewish 
communities in France were a small but significant part of legal, social, economic and political 
life. The argument that Leff makes convincingly is that Jewish identity is transformed in the 
aftermath of the French Revolution, with the process gaining ground particularly after the 
1840s.91The idea is that what it comes to mean to be Jewish changes through (obviously 
amongst many other things) partly the adoption of a version of solidarity that played on its 
legal meaning but sought to undermine it with the intellectual frameworks offered through 
Romantic Socialists, in particular Leroux.  
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The unexpected adoption of solidarity by French Jews owes much to how solidarity was 
presented in Napoleon’s Civil Code, as mentioned above, and the way that the solidarity clause 
in particular was interpreted when in reference to the position of Jews. In very simplified 
terms French society undertook a secularisation process in the wake of the revolution. This 
should (and did in some ways) mean that the position of the Jews changed accordingly. In legal 
terms the alterations that took place in terms of the Jew as a legal entity for citizenship and as 
a defined social-religious group are what is important to this discussion of solidarity.92 There is 
a sense the revolution was to symbolise a new beginning, a line in the sand, however, for the 
Jewish population the collective debt that they owed was not necessarily cancelled and indeed 
was very much carried over. Solidarity, in the Civil Code meaning, of the obligation to pay 
mutual debts, applied to Jews in a specific way that was both historically constituted, 
materially real and exposed the difficulty of the doubling of identity now that Jews were 
granted citizenship.93 It is therefore surprising that the term solidarity was adopted at all by 
the Jewish community. It is this unexpected turn to solidarity that Leff seeks to explain. In 
general, this unlikely alignment will give further weight to one of the main threads that run 
throughout this thesis, namely, the chameleon quality of solidarity, its pliable nature and 
ultimately its refusal to be adequately defined.  
Firstly then in terms of legal ramifications, there was an on-going and highly significant 
attachment made between debts incurred by the “Old Regime Jewish communauté or nation” 
and Jews who were now recognised citizens.94 One of the difficulties that Jews faced was that 
in legal terms they were still counted as being members of formally foreign corporations, not 
French ones. This meant that even as late as the 1820s, when much of this legal wrangling was 
taking place, the question remained how could newly granted Jewish citizenship be a 
guarantee for debts incurred? Further, on what basis could debts that were incurred in the Old 
Regime through corporations be written off? The answer to these questions is complicated 
and hotly contested, with more than just monetary matters at stake. For instance, what 
becomes of the Jewish identity in general if their legal status is formally equalised? What 
happened in reality is that they were not freed from the debts incurred through the former 
corporations in fact because of a version of Jewish solidarity. It was argued in the end that 
Jews were only given loans/credit in the first place because “Jewish “solidarity” had been 
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understood to be perpetual” and that in a similar way to other foreigners, “had no guarantee 
to offer but the eternal tie binding the community.”95 Consequently, this meant that although 
Jews were now granted citizenship their ‘eternal’ solidarity to pay their ancestors’ debts was 
superior under the law. Jewish leaders therefore attempted in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century to transform dramatically what Jewish solidarity meant.  
It is this transformation where Leroux’s influence can be most obviously felt, in a number of 
noteworthy ways. Firstly, as the first writer to really define and build a theory around the 
concept of solidarity, in a move away from the Roman law tradition, he instigates a way of 
using solidarity which was largely without precedent. This stemmed from a Saint-Simonian 
apprenticeship that aimed to sit somewhere between the Catholic right and the liberal left, 
and that wished to mesh new forms of social, economic and religious systems of thinking.96 
What was to be retained was therefore hierarchy and religion per se coupled with the new 
liberal denunciation of feudalism, as “a new order would respect the fundamental and unity of 
all people.”97 It was seen by Leroux, in particular, that social ties had been eroded through the 
dramatic changes brought on by the Revolution and its aftermath. The response to this was an 
attempt to articulate a conception of humanity that would grant the necessary essential 
character of human life as being one of interconnection.98 
Leroux was so appealing to some Jewish leaders particularly after 1848 because he did not 
draw a clear distinction between the religious nature of Christianity and that of Judaism. 
Crucially, he argued that solidarity was something that has its origin in the Hebrew bible, in the 
story of Adam’s sin. The collective sin of Adam is seen by Leroux as part of the same trajectory 
that is next witnessed in the Christian moment of solidarity that is the sacrifice of Jesus. Finally 
the end point is the French Revolution that is seen as a form of revelation, with the slogan 
liberty, equality and fraternity, being the perfection of these other instances of the same 
eternal truth. What is important here to realise is that it was this understanding or rather lack 
of antagonism between Christianity and Judaism that could, according to Leff, allow Jews to 
adopt the more general theory of solidarity.99 What Leroux was able to do was to perform an 
impressive balancing act between those that wanted their social and political theory and 
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practice to be rooted in non-Catholic and therefore in an anti-clerical form of Christianity (as 
the word itself was not part of that tradition at all), and those that wanted to push for the 
French Revolution to be infused with religious signification. This meant that solidarity could 
hold within it the energy and power of traditional religion, without its Catholic and clerical 
elements (that were coming under such sustained critique at the time), whilst simultaneously 
harnessing the ideology of the French Revolution, itself in part a demand for a more rigorous 
system of socially enforced obligation. This construction of solidarity, although originally 
containing some conservative tendencies was largely abandoned by them, vacating the ground 
more assuredly to firstly the republicans and later the socialists.  
What Leff and others have argued is that it is this movement away from its juridical roots that 
makes solidarity so appealing to the Jewish community.100 Here Leff states what it came to 
mean for them in the 1850s at the point at which they first fully embraced it: 
As a republican and socialist term, “solidarity” designated a strong, activist notion of 
social responsibility. The term was the product of a mediation between protosocialist 
religious thought, liberalism, and the republicanism of ancient Rome, 1789 and 1848. 
“Solidarity” implied order, hierarchy, and religiosity; at the same time, it implied 
fraternity, equality, and connectedness between segments of society.101  
Jewish solidarity would go on to form part of their political vocabularies in the second half of 
the nineteenth century. This can been seen most prevalently with its use by the influential 
Alliance Israélite Universelle formed around 1860 to partly fuse the protection of the Jewish 
people with the civic ideals and virtues of the 1789 and 1848 revolutions.102 This meant 
translating the traditional obligation to the community (which had set them apart whilst held 
within antagonistic nations) into a new version of Jewish solidarity. This new version was one 
that sought to maintain bonds of obligation not just between Jews but also with others, both 
domestically and theoretically everyone in the world.  
There is of course much more that can be said about how Jewish communities in Europe and 
elsewhere sought to protect themselves from persecution as well to establish more equal 
relations with other peoples. However, what has been described above is enough to 
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demonstrate some important aspects of solidarity that will bear on the rest of this thesis and 
solidarity discussions more generally. That Jewish solidarity can be traced in part to the 
writings of Leroux, a religious thinker certainly, but not in a way that is obviously conducive to 
Judaism in its mainstream forms shows that solidarity developed in unexpected ways. The final 
description of how the Alliance comes to incorporate solidarity into their rhetoric could just as 
easily be the way in which workers come to use the term, thus opening up a broader discourse 
on solidarity.103  
This discussion of Leroux also raises some other more general questions as follows: To whom 
does a particular group owe solidarity? On what basis does one belong to a given community? 
What role does a national identity have as it interacts with religious, legal and racial 
communities? And finally, once solidarity is claimed, what is the individual obligated to 
provide? Answers to some of these questions will be attempted through analysis of Durkheim 
and Habermas in the next chapters.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has aimed to place the arrival of solidarity in context. It has given 
historiographical explanations, descriptions and analysis from a range of disciplines, which go 
beyond a simple intellectual chronological exposition of the development of solidarity from its 
legal origins to its social and political meanings and uses. The argument made has been that 
solidarity was a product of a series of conditions that created multiple crises across French 
society. There was a political crisis after the Revolution, which sought to promote liberty at the 
cost of the other two key demands, equality and fraternity. Legally, there was conflict that had 
to be resolved given the administration of the nation’s poor relief and citizenship. Citizenship 
which was shown to be particularly important to the Jewish community. Spiritually there was a 
crisis, given the weakening of the authority of the Catholic Church (although not religion). The 
formal structures of the Church, once weakened, had to be taken into the hands of national 
administration that was not capable of countering the food shortages that were sweeping 
France in this period. The argument is not that any one crisis leads to the reason why solidarity 
becomes, by the end of nineteenth century, such a powerful concept, but that the general 
melee of the period helped create the ideal conditions for it.  
The picture that emerges from this period is one that is multi-layered, fungible, complex and 
diverse which gives solidarity this very same characterisation, one that it continues to carry 
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with it. The contention of this thesis is that solidarity takes on and reflects the social, political 
and historical reality from which it is drawn. It is only by reading solidarity from within this 
context that its meaning can be reached, if at all, with any exactitude. For example Leroux’s 
version of solidarity as given above would simply not make any sense without the 
accompanying historical details. Therefore, solidarity can be both a reflection of the thinking, 
concerns, and emotions of a particular time, but also as a form of critique. Fourier certainly 
was using a form of critique where his model of solidarity was placed against the world as he 
interpreted it and saw that it did not live up to his theory of it. This again is a quality of 
solidarity that stays with it into later manifestations, certainly with how it is used at times by 
Habermas.  
Part of the motivation behind this chapter and how it fits into the thesis as a whole was to 
highlight and determine some of the important questions that any theory of solidarity has to 
address. One of the key questions revolves around the issue of choice, either personally, or as 
a group/community/nation etc. When solidarity is understood in its legal setting as an 
obligation to pay mutual debts, there it appears that choice is at a minimum. However, as was 
shown by the example of the Jews, it is not always straightforward where that obligation 
should stop, particularly when it could involve a long history. The choice as to who to include 
with the obligation to provide solidarity either materially, politically or socially, was and 
remains a contentious issue. What was noted above was that poor relief at times could be tied 
to perceived good character of one who was to receive it. Here the ethical quality of an 
individual matters as to whether they are worthy of the solidarity of others. The question as to 
who gets to decide that is obviously problematic. Equally, if solidarity is going to be something 
that is formally articulated and regulated in society, or by and through a nation, the question 
of belonging comes to the fore. 
Similarly, the idea of a group dynamic that has solidarity play the role of patroller of its 
boundaries, implies that there are others to whom solidarity is not extended. It is genuinely 
not obvious whether solidarity ultimately implies (in theory at least) that it should be extended 
to everyone in the world, as Leroux would have it. Or whether solidarity itself requires that 
there be something outside it; a common enemy or threat, as demonstrated by the position of 
the Jews or equally that of the working class. Finally, there is the way that solidarity can work 
in its relational structure as being hierarchical. The blurred distinction between charity and 
philanthropy as discussed above, opens up the question as to whether a relationship of 
solidarity is horizontal, whereby the bond of solidarity is maintained through a sameness (all 
members of the same trade) or whether it is about holding those who owe debts and 
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obligations to others to account. These are all open questions that will be explored in more 
detail in the rest of the thesis.  
Lastly, the seemingly simple question ‘what does solidarity mean?’ remains inconclusive at the 
end of the nineteenth century, in France, its birth place. The next chapter is on Durkheim, who 
it will be argued takes the melee of contrary and conflicting meanings of solidarity and at least 
presents it back in a cogent fashion, for the first time. However, the question will still remain 
to a certain extent an intractable one. 
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Chapter 2: Durkheim and solidarity as a wholly moral phenomenon 
Emile Durkheim’s status as the originator of modern solidarity theory is fairly well assured, 
with most academic work on solidarity at least referencing Durkheim’s The Division of Labour 
in Society (1894) in their bibliographies.104 However, commonly, the text is often only referred 
to in opening excursus in articles that note its position as the first major attempt to write 
seriously and at length about solidarity, before moving on to what they see as more relevant 
writers and texts.105 It has become only necessary to acknowledge Durkheim, but not to give 
his ideas full treatment, and certainly not used for building a new social and political theory of 
solidarity. An explanation for why this is the case will be given in the body of this chapter. 
Needless to say, it will be argued strongly that Durkheim’s absence is detrimental to the study 
of solidarity. Any thesis on solidarity could not omit Durkheim. However, this chapter is not 
included arbitrarily. It will be shown that Durkheim, far from having an antiquated theory of 
solidarity, has a complex, at times prophetic and ultimately telling contribution to make to an 
area of study currently trying to find its bearings. Further, as will be seen in later discussion of 
Habermas, Durkheim’s legacy is telling, although it remains unacknowledged. This is not to 
argue that Durkheim does not in his own right have an important contribution to make to the 
current ways that solidarity is being discussed. In particular, it will be shown that Durkheim not 
only anticipates, but helps to initiate a particular understanding of solidarity as a reaction to 
crisis. The importance of this argument to the thesis but also solidarity discourse more 
generally, is what solutions to crisis (or anomie in his terminology) he articulates. The solution 
that is argued for in what follows is found in his understanding of the role of moral education, 
a connection that is virtually never made in the broader scholarship on Durkheim and 
solidarity.        
Although general trends of scholarship on solidarity have seen little sustained interaction with 
Durkheim’s ideas, studies of Durkheim are numerous and varied. Durkheim until fairly recently 
has been labelled a conservative thinker; this in part could help to explain his dips in 
popularity. Reception of Durkheim outside of France has been coloured strongly by the 
interpretations of Talcott Parsons and to a lesser extent Robert Nisbet, who both leant heavily 
on the conservative dimensions of Durkheim’s work.106 Read as a defender of the status quo 
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and as an advocate for a functionalist conception of society, the writings of Parsons and Nisbet 
became from the 1930s onwards the standard means of understanding Durkheim.107 This in 
part explains why Durkheim loses favour and continued to be somewhat miscategorised until 
the mid-1980s. Seen as a conservative thinker, his theories appeared inadequate when placed 
alongside the more obviously critical voices of Foucault and the Frankfurt School. Such a 
prominent reading of Durkheim, even if it can be defended to a certain extent, meant that his 
socialist and more radical thinking was left unexplored. Therefore, it is one of the contentions 
of this chapter to argue that when Durkheim is taken seriously as a thinker employed to 
answer current social and political questions, he can offer a novel critical vantage point. It is 
these two positions that are argued for over the course of this chapter.  
This builds on the small renaissance in Durkheim scholarship of the past few decades. Partly 
this can be seen in response to, firstly Steven Lukes’ intellectual biography published in 1973, a 
point at which Durkheim was at his least popular, and republished again in 1985 where it 
found a much more receptive audience.108 Since its publication in 1985 there has been a 
steady increase of work on Durkheim, not just in sociology, but also in political theory and 
philosophy. The growing interest in Durkheim can also be partly attributed to another 
intellectual biography by Marcel Fournier published in French in 2007 and translated into 
English in 2013.109Fournier’s book appears to have been a catalyst for increased attention in 
Durkheim.110 However speculative the following claim may be it does appear to be something 
more than just a coincidence that Durkheim’s popularity correlates, at least in the English 
speaking world, with social and political worries around society’s function and in real terms to 
economic, social and political crisis. Durkheim’s initial questions about how society was 
possible, and attempts to diagnose what might be problematic in a given society, appear to 
chime with many contemporary concerns over cosmopolitanism, the role of the state and how 
individualism interacts with the moral norms of society. 
The radical implications of Durkheim’s writing have also more recently been explored; the 
most successful of which have sought to integrate Durkheim into contemporary socialist 
criticism.111 It is now not unusual to read Durkheim as belonging to a loose tradition of critical 
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theory, as the recent work by Dawson and Rawls indicate.112 Similarly, there have been new 
imaginative approaches to Durkheim that have seen him paired with some unexpected 
thinkers, ideas and non-western contexts. Traditionally paired with Herbert Spencer113 and 
Marcel Mauss, he is now discussed with Max Scheler,114 Zygmunt Bauman,115 Thomas 
Sellars,116 Emmanuel Levinas,117 Axel Honneth,118 Michel Foucault119 and Niklas Luhmann120, 
which are evidently an eclectic mix of writers. It has also recently been argued that he is both 
the founder of phenomenological sociology121 and one of the initiators of collective 
intentionality. Durkheim scholarship is equally not just confined to Western Europe and North 
America as witnessed by a resurgence in Turkey and Latin America122. This shows that 
Durkheim is not, as is commonly assumed, a thinker confined to his time, place and discipline. 
Durkheim is a writer who has great contemporary relevance; it is perhaps surprising that more 
of the recent scholarship has not sought to investigate more thoroughly his solidarity writings. 
The contemporary relevance is something that will be argued for in this chapter, as well the 
conclusion to the thesis.   
Finally, there has been a great deal of scholarship on specific aspects of Durkheim’s work, 
particularly on his three major works The Division, The Elementary forms of the Religious Life, 
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and Suicide – A Study of Sociology.123 There has also been some fantastic work that has 
developed links between these studies. Most notably, the attempts to convey the collieries 
between his understanding of solidarity in The Division and what he says about how groups are 
maintained in The Elementary forms usefully clarifies Durkheim’s position on mechanical 
solidarity.124 Equally, there has been sustained treatment of the role of anomie put forward 
initially in The Division, and how it operates in Suicide.125 However, what has not been 
discussed in any great detail is the relationship between his theory of solidarity in The Division 
and how it relates to his work on morality and education; this is something this chapter aims to 
address.  
Durkheim’s most sustained treatment of morality and education are found firstly in a relatively 
unknown set of lectures, titled Moral Education: A Study in the theory and Application of the 
Sociology of Education and second in Education and Sociology.126 Durkheim is rightly known for 
being a pioneer of sociology, but he actually spent a great deal of his professional life working 
on pedagogy. In fact when he finally arrived at the Sorbonne in 1902 he took over the chair of 
Education.127 Despite Durkheim’s long and committed interactions with education both in 
terms of actually teaching students who were training to be teachers and through his writings, 
he is rarely seen in this light. Equally he is not often considered a moral philosopher even 
though, as will be shown, morality is at the heart of his ideas. Indeed, the last thing that he 
planned to write was a book on morality of which he only managed the introduction.128   
However, it is not the purpose of this chapter to prove that he should been seen as a 
pedagogical thinker or as a moral philosopher, although he was both. It is rather to show the 
potential of reading his moral and educational writings alongside The Division, something that 
has not been done in a sustained way before. This will allow certain contours and elements of 
solidarity to be brought to light that are not emphasised or are assumed in later discussions of 
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solidarity and will indicate aspects of solidarity that are uncomfortable, contradictory and 
problematic.  
The discussion of Durkheim is made up of two chapters. The main line of argument that will 
run through both chapters centres on Durkheim’s claim in The Division, that solidarity is a 
wholly moral phenomenon. Chapter one examines how solidarity is understood in The 
Division, this being the place where he sets out most clearly his theory of solidarity. It will be 
demonstrated that morality grounds his theory and that everything can be traced back to it. 
This is a controversial claim, in a sense, as it is more common to assume that sociological 
categorisation is the underlying motivation. However, by examining how law and individuality 
relate to his theory of solidarity and how that relates to morality, this is shown to not be the 
case. This is initially performed through utilising Durkheim’s famous mechanical and organic 
solidarity types. The argument is that morality is at the root of solidarity for Durkheim, but 
crucially he does not adequately explain what he means by morality. Additionally, his two 
types of solidarity should be seen as falling under one model, social solidarity. These two 
aspects are important for the more general considerations of this thesis. The importance of 
morality (or ethics in some cases) to the underpinning of how and why solidarity is directed 
under differing and highly demanding circumstances, requires a robust articulation of what 
that morality consists of. This was partly what was being discussed in the last chapter, that at 
times of social distress or crisis, the rules of who to hold within your sphere of solidarity 
become very important. This will be shown in the conclusion to the thesis to be equally as 
important in terms of understanding any interaction between solidarity and crisis. This chapter 
will also introduce what this thesis argues is Durkheim’s version of crisis, namely anomie. This 
is not a straightforward synonym interchange here, but it will be argued that there are enough 
similarities between the two for a productive discussion.   
Chapter two builds on the need to better ascertain what morality is for Durkheim by turning to 
his work on moral education. The thought is that if his theory of solidarity relies on his 
understanding of morality then only by understanding his theory of morality can there be an 
understanding of his theory of solidarity. A similar structure is used in chapter two, as in 
chapter one, with an examination of authority and liberty. It will show that these two concepts 
map onto law and individuality in The Division and that they raise similar issues concerning 
solidarity. The aim is to be able to show with more clarity what Durkheim means by morality 
and therefore to be able to return to one of the initial threads running through the chapters, 
that solidarity is a moral phenomenon. The reason that this is so potentially important to the 
more general trends and discussions in solidarity theory is that it could exclude economic 
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accounts. Additionally, if solidarity is morality then it perhaps energises it to be more of a 
command than a choice. This could have ramifications for solidarity theories that do not 
acknowledge an obligatory character for solidarity as discussed in the previous chapters. The 
implications of Durkheim’s theory will be discussed in the conclusion to this chapter with 
specific reference as to how it relates to crisis and broader considerations for solidarity theory.       
Chapter 1: Solidarity in The Division of Labour in Society  
Durkheim distinguishes two types of solidarity; mechanical and organic. Mechanical solidarity 
is associated with primitive, small-scale societies that have high levels of homogeneity.129 
Durkheim understands solidarity in this case as deriving only from the common bond of 
sentiment and of a shared morality. Therefore individuals are not held together in societies of 
this sort through mutual independence or reciprocal relations. Anthony Giddens describes this 
simple form of society as held together through “an aggregate” not dependent unity.130 This 
means that one part of the unity can be lost without losing the unity itself, as each individual 
part is not required for the whole to function. This form of solidarity has social relations and 
customs regulated through a rigid adherence to values, beliefs and morality that are shared by 
all. This is why mechanical solidarity is often used by Durkheim and his commentators 
interchangeably with the conscious collective.131 The solidarity of this type of society is a form 
of domination of the individual, as Giddens notes, “there is only a rudimentary development of 
individual self-consciousness”.132   
Organic solidarity is characterised as encompassing high levels of individuality, and a well-
developed division of labour. Despite the rise of individuality the division of labour acts as a 
surrogate for the loss of bonds maintained through likeness. Through working in ever more 
differentiated occupations the individual also comes to see how much their autonomy rests on 
a dependency on others, through the division of labour.133 The reciprocal nature of the bonds 
that are formed initially for material need also, according to Hawkins, “generate moral bonds 
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which are primarily concerned with the coordination of social functions rather than with the 
control of individual behaviour.”134  
Mechanical and organic solidarity are both described through what type of law is operative, 
what the relationship between the individual and society is, noting levels of social control and 
autonomy and finally through what sources of morality there are and how shared morality is 
maintained. There are other elements that make up the definitions such as religion, the family, 
occupational groups and the State, however, law, autonomy and morality are the most 
relevant for the purposes of this chapter as they also play a prominent role in his moral 
educational philosophy. There will obviously be some overlap between these elements and 
where necessary these will be noted. Firstly the role of law will be discussed for both 
mechanical and organic solidarity, this will be followed by autonomy. In each case the 
relationship with morality will be explored. There will also be a discussion of anomie, the term 
Durkheim uses to denote when either of the types of solidarity or the elements within them 
are not running as they should be. It will be argued that anomie is inseparable from an 
understanding of solidarity and that it can help to inform solidarity debates outside of the 
confines of Durkheimian scholarship. Equally, although not in a straightforward sense, anomie 
could be seen as a form of crisis. Anomie understood in this way as forming part of a 
descriptive criteria that links in the strongest sense crisis and solidarity, is something that will 
be returned to later in the thesis.   
The Law, the individual and morality  
What can be objectively examined as the facts of the social structure stem from studying the 
judiciary, with its rules and judgements; these support and co-create social solidarity. 
Durkheim, in a way that anticipates Habermas, states this position clearly in the Preface from 
the first Edition: 
In particular, it will be seen how we have studied social solidarity through the system 
of juridical rules, how in the search for causes, we have laid aside everything that too 
readily lends itself to personal judgements and subjective appraisal – this so as to 
penetrate certain facts of social structure profound enough to objects of the 
understanding, and consequently of science.135  
By juridical rules Durkheim is really referring to what he will at length discuss throughout the 
book, namely, law. Durkheim uses law in ambiguous ways that are difficult to translate into 
English, the word he uses is ‘droit’ that sits somewhere between law and morality. Lukes and 
                                                     
134 Hawkins, M. J. (1979) ‘Continuity and Change in Durkheim’s Theory of Social Solidarity’ The Sociological 
Quarterly, 20:1, p. 157; Durkheim, E. (Trans: W. D. Halls) ([1894] 1984) The Division of Labour in Society, Hong Kong 
MacMillan Education, pp. 84-85. 
135 Ibid. pp. xxix. 
58 
Scull point out that Durkheim “tended to see law as derivative from and expressive of a 
society’s morality.”136 Morality for Durkheim is a social fact, one that can be expressed through 
examination of the law, taken to mean both retributive and restorative law and moral norms 
or oughts (meant in the Kantian way). Thus, for Durkheim law becomes of central importance 
to much of his project and crucial for understanding his version(s) of solidarity. 
In mechanical solidarity, the law is almost exclusively that of repressive criminal law. Crime and 
punishment are the main devices of this form of law and are enacted on individuals who 
transgress the collectivity; who challenge the way of life of the whole or infringe the shared 
beliefs and values of the society. The consequence of this as already stated is that the 
individual must be fully integrated inside the community; the law prevents the community of 
likeness from disintegrating. Mechanical solidarity as a bond can therefore be witnessed in 
terms of repressive law, but only when the law is broken. Additionally, the act of breaking the 
law must be seen to be a crime, a crime that has a punishment. It is a moment when collective 
consciousness is affronted. It is the going against the collective that is a crime, the act itself is 
not a crime.137 The condemnation and the actual realisation that there has been a violation at 
all, is the place where the bond of solidarity can be located. Durkheim writes, clearly linking 
solidarity, law and crime when he states that: “[t]he bond of social solidarity to which 
repressive law corresponds is one the breaking of which constitutes the crime.”138 Equally, 
later in the same passage he highlights the importance of recognition to his understanding, 
stating: “[u]ndoubtedly essential resemblances exist not only among all crimes provided for in 
the legislation of a single society, but among all crimes recognised as such and punished in 
different types of society.”139 Punishment is then the means by which the violation or violator 
can be confronted. The affronted feeling (e.g. anger/hurt/fear) is channelled appropriately 
through the mediating institution of repressive law. Durkheim summarises this as follows:  
Thus punishment constitutes essentially a reaction of passionate feeling, graduated 
in intensity, which society exerts through the mediation of an organised body over 
those of its members who have violated certain rules of conduct.140  
This furthers Durkheim’s case that mechanical solidarity is an expression of the similarity to be 
found within the community. This is what is happening when someone transgresses a 
particular law, one that is a direct challenge to collective consciousness; meaning that most 
                                                     
136 Lukes, S. and A. Scull, (eds) (1983) Durkheim and the Law, Oxford: Martin Robertson, p.3.  
137 Durkheim, E. (Trans: W. D. Halls) ([1894] 1984) The Division of Labour in Society, Hong Kong: MacMillan 
Education, p. 39-40.  
138 Ibid, p. 31. 
139 Ibid, p. 31. 
140 Ibid, p. 52. 
59 
individuals in a given group agree that it is a breaking of a rule, one that is commonly 
recognised by most, if not by all. It is what is held in common, that can be seen in the other, 
which has been challenged. Therefore a punishment (which is really also an acknowledgment 
that a law has been broken) is given out to, in effect, retain the sameness that holds the 
society together. Where punishment is not debatable or discussion as to whether a law has 
been broken are minimal, this indicates that there is a strong common notion and 
understanding of mechanical solidarity. In methodological terms, the law and the extent to 
which it maps onto the moral sentiments of a society indicates the relative strength of 
solidarity. Hart, in an influential and much discussed article, states this in the following way:  
According to Durkheim the law presents a faithful mirror of both forms of solidarity, 
and can be used as a gauge of the relative importance at any time of the two forms 
[mechanical and organic solidarity]. The criminal law, with its repressive sanctions, 
reflects mechanical solidarity; the civil law reflects organic solidarity, since it upholds 
the typical instruments of interdependence...141   
This is the orthodox understanding of mechanical solidarity, that it is formed through small 
undifferentiated groups that share a rigid common set of beliefs or common conscious that is 
held together through adherence to repressive law. Durkheim notes that this is often 
undergirded by adherence to a particular religious hegemony. This is something that is 
discussed at length in the Elementary Forms but is touched on only sparingly in The Division.142 
Durkheim’s account can be expanded further by turning to how he understands rights. 
Durkheim claims that there are two kinds of juridical rights, the first ‘real’, the second 
‘personal’. Property and mortgage are real, the credit to buy the property is personal. Real 
rights then, give “preference and succession”, essentially it makes possible the, ‘that is mine’ 
statement. This for Durkheim is solidarity that is real i.e. tangible, it is the relationship or bond 
between an individual and some object.143  
What is interesting about Durkheim’s analysis here is that he uses ‘real’ rights to indicate what 
is going on in the division of labour, in part at least. This gives weight to the claim being made 
that mechanical and organic solidarity are not exclusive forms of solidarity. It also helps give a 
partial explanation for how Durkheim sees change occurring between these two poles of 
solidarity. When personal relationships are formed through ‘real’ rights the outcome is not a 
unified social whole, it does not bring together different elements, rather it separates them. 
Durkheim goes as far as to say that they act as a wall between different elements in society. 
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The point he is making is that ‘real’ rights are or contain the negative qualities of solidarity, 
although strictly speaking this is not the exact inverse of solidarity. Instead, it is that they 
exhibit what is negative in all manifestations of solidarity. Therefore Durkheim is able to claim 
that justice as in repressive law is not only a part of mechanical solidarity, it is instead a 
“necessary accompaniment to every kind of solidarity.”144 Durkheim makes the further claim 
built on this conclusion that justice is “necessarily encountered everywhere men live a life in 
common” through the division of labour “or from attraction of like to like.”145 Understood in 
this way solidarity, at either end of the spectrum, involves justice.  
The transformation from these earlier societies towards the complex societies that developed 
thereafter was for Durkheim the result of the observable law of the division of labour, made 
necessary mainly due to increased population size and larger geographical territory. This is 
accompanied by increasing interactions between individuals that helps to create the possibility 
for there to be a division of labour. The division of labour that arises seemingly as a general 
movement has at the same time to keep step with the moral consciousness of the collective 
that the individual belongs to. Durkheim thinks there is a choice between resisting the general 
development of the division of labour and therefore to be “only a part of the whole” or to 
think that the moral duty of the individual is to become a “complete creature, a whole 
sufficient unto itself.”146 Durkheim responds to this choice is in the following way:  
In short, whilst the division of labour is a law of nature, is it also a moral rule for 
human conduct and, if it possesses this last characteristic, through what causes and 
to what extent? There is no need to demonstrate the serious nature of this practical 
problem: whatever assessment we make of the division of labour, we all sense that it 
is, and increasingly so, one of the fundamental bases of the social order.147   
Whatever the broader implications of this slightly tautological statement, it is clear for 
Durkheim that moral law and the division of labour are crucial for organic solidarity, and as 
such, for maintaining society. Whereas in mechanical solidarity there was no division of labour, 
only the law supported by shared morality, when a society advances into a stage where there 
is a division of labour the moral law must be realigned. As Lukes and Prabhat point out, 
“organic solidarity, when functioning ‘normally,’ is supposed to render capital – labor relations 
more just.”148   
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It is a stage in between that contains conflict and social distress because the division of labour 
outstrips the moral consciousness. The term Durkheim uses to describe this stage is anomie. 
Anomie occurs at the moment of transformation as an expression of, to use Mϋller’s 
formulation; 
economic crises - the antagonism between capital and labor, and anarchy in science – 
arises at times of rapid change, during which new organs and functions develop 
without a corresponding development of rules of cooperation, and therefore of 
social ties.149  
What is important to realise however, is that this moment of anomie is not a crisis of the 
system itself, it is rather that adaptation to the new forms and functions present within the 
system have yet to be realised. Essentially, at the moment of transformation the bond of 
interdependence has yet to be reached, something which can and will be overcome through 
incessant interactions. It is through these interactions that morally constituted law will be 
produced that will form the counterweight to the new divisions of labour. It is at this moment 
that organic solidarity becomes substantiated as a “new functional equilibrium” one that can 
balance the now differentiated functions and as such guarantee social integration.150  
Durkheim’s anomie as set out in The Division is vastly underrepresented and under-
appreciated in the secondary literature, with some notable exceptions.151 Much of the 
literature tends to subsume the anomie condition either into organic or mechanical solidarity 
or derives it from his work Suicide.152 However, it is possible to detect some important points 
of disagreement on how anomie is interpreted. What is at stake is how a society moves from 
one type of society to another, why it does this, what part or parts are retained or are 
necessary for the latter and which factors are really doing the work. Understanding the 
movement of change stemming from the newly arrived division of labour, Hawkins writes the 
following of the transition:  
Shared values and repressive penal sanctions do not disappear completely, but they 
play a relatively minor role in the maintenance of solidarity in advanced societies, 
where the division of labor itself becomes a source of cohesion. As work becomes 
increasingly specialized, so do individuals become more dependent upon one 
another for the satisfaction of their needs. Under normal circumstances these 
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relations of reciprocal dependence generate moral bonds which are primarily 
concerned with the coordination of social functions rather than with the control of 
individual behaviour. This normative order is upheld by a system of cooperative laws 
with restitutive sanctions which act to ensure continuity and equilibrium.153  
This is how Hawkins explains what he calls the direction of social evolution, whereby the 
division of labour creates the conditions for there to be moral bonds of solidarity exhibited in 
organic solidarity. This interpretation implies an economic dependence that leads to a moral 
one, it is an idea that relies on the presumption that the satisfaction of needs (material needs) 
is what drives the uniting force of the division of labour. Although Hawkins does not address 
anomie directly on this point, it appears that it arises in the gap between the arrival of the 
division and the as yet to arrive symmetrical morality. The tensions in society stem from a loss 
of shared identity, as the collective bonds of mechanical solidarity are yet to be replaced with 
new forms that correspond to the division of labour. Repressive law wedded to moral 
similitude assures that the common conscience is maintained. Once this grounding is 
weakened, as happens apparently with the rise of the division of labour, law becomes 
something removed, even oppressive to the individuals of the given society. Etzioni 
exemplifies this position when he states that:  
Without bonds, people’s profound need for social attachments are frustrated and 
they are open to demagogic appeals. Without a shared moral culture, ordering life 
will have to rely on laws not undergirded by moral commitments, which is both 
highly ineffectual and has numerous ill consequences as we learned during the 
Prohibition and from the current war on drugs.154  
Etzioni’s key concern is how “social moral order [can] be regained.”155 Like Hawkins there is a 
presumption that morality is lost somehow and that it needs to be found again. Following this 
is the further assumption that what makes society possible is commonly held morality that 
must be given agency in law. Although this is certainly in keeping with a partial reading of 
Durkheim’s own view, it is far from actually being convincing. For example, the material needs 
that Hawkins takes to be leading to moral counterparts are not according Durkheim at least 
the source of the morality, as “they correspond to needs, but these needs are not moral 
ones.”156 Equally, Durkheim writes that “if the division of labour does not produce solidarity it 
is because the relationships between the organs are not regulated; it is because they are in a 
state of anomie.”157   
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Anomie is given a slightly different perspective by Meštrović and Brown, who point out that 
rather than the above characterisation of anomie as meaning something like normlessness, 
deregulation or normative confusion, it should be thought about as a form of derangement.158 
They also want to make clear that it is felt individually as well as societally as “a painful state or 
condition.”159 They argue, that actually far from being a stop-gap between two positions that 
of mechanical and organic solidarity in the trajectory of The Division, a necessary explanatory 
linking device, anomie could or should be understood as the theme of the whole book. 
Anomie, they write “is the obverse of justice and that “Durkheim considers anomie evil 
because it causes suffering.”160 Their point is that The Division can be read as being “highly 
critical of Western culture as a whole” and that the anomie ‘stage’ is more reflective of how 
Durkheim understands his contemporary world and, I would add, it is how he comes to 
comprehend solidarity in its negative form.161  
The readings of anomie as just presented both have merits, however comparing them is 
somewhat problematic as there is divergence in their original positions. This divergence stems 
from their understanding of the function of law for Durkheim. Law can be seen as the concrete 
way to discern the current level of progress in a given society, a way of identifying what point 
has been reached. This is the teleological version of Durkheim’s project and one that can be 
identified in his work, inviting the interpretation that there is a natural path that is followed; 
one that can go wrong, but nevertheless a yardstick for comparison. This view rests mainly on 
the assumption that Durkheim is giving an actual history of societies, albeit a partial one, and 
that more or less the current status quo is near enough the final stage. In a similar vein morally 
constituted law will, if it has not already, catch up to the new demands of the division of labour 
and equilibrium will be restored. The other view would have law with its two ideal forms; one 
mechanical and one organic, as a rhetorical device used by Durkheim as a form of critique. This 
critique model relies on a notion that Durkheim required a recognisable object to extol about, 
one that his readers would identify. It also sees the ideal forms of law as representations that 
allow the actual state of affairs to be understood. The pure forms of the types of law that he 
discusses have no precedent historically; they have always been and will always be a mixture. 
This gives additional reason to think that likewise mechanical and organic solidarity are also 
inseparable.  
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Greenhouse, in a recent article, sets out additional possible ways to understand the role of law 
in The Division, in a similar vein as the second of the above interpretations. She argues that the 
battleground over law in Durkheim is highly important as she writes:  
Law features prominently (if not always explicitly) among current critical projects, as 
debates over Durkheim’s contributions to sociology overall hinge to a large extent on 
what scholars take to be the legal implications of his ideas of solidarity and collective 
consciousness, or conscience.162   
Greenhouse sees that the conventional reading of Durkheim is the functionalist one that 
assumes that the point of law is to give social structure agency. Law therefore is “social 
coordination, mediation, and [the] institutionalization of norms wherever these are 
manifest.”163 Instead she argues that the: 
“[L]aw is his literal pretext for distinguishing between meaning and function and for 
committing sociology to the science of relations among meaning-making subjects in 
spaces made visible by law’s absence, failure, and moral dubiousness.”164  
Greenhouse sees law acting as a placeholder both for Durkheim’s purposes and in society. It is 
a way to make the bonds that do bind people together visible and comprehensible. 
Acknowledgement of law as performing this revealing mechanism works with any formulation 
of law. As Greenhouse points out, “Retribution and restitution are hallmarks by which 
mechanical and organic solidarity become recognizable to readers.” Additionally, law is 
essential as “it provides people with the assurance that they do not live for themselves 
alone.”165 Thus law should actually be read as a sign that allows access to the two types of 
solidarity. Organic solidarity in particular is something that is a “logical inference” that fails the 
evidential test, it is something that can be felt, not seen.166 Organic solidarity is a change in 
self-knowledge connected with identity and the widening of diversity. The diversity that occurs 
through the division of labour acts to enable greater levels of personhood, through the self-
realisation that the meaning of difference is what creates the individual, not changes in the 
organisation of work. Greenhouse points out that:  
One observation that follows from understanding identity as shifting with the form of 
solidarity is the recognition that the phrase “division of labor” is not a metaphor for 
industrial work organization, but a literary foil that ironizes modernity by discounting 
industrial work organization as the source of its advancement.167      
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Greenhouse’s argument here clearly contradicts what has been said previously in this chapter, 
which sees the division of labour being the source of organic solidarity. It also challenges the 
teleological assumption about the projection of society. What is perhaps the most telling 
contribution that Greenhouse makes is what she takes to be Durkheim’s concern with origins. 
She argues that Durkheim’s interest in origins stems from an understanding of possible 
“emergence and… contradiction” not “with a particular evolutionary sequence.”168 Organic 
solidarity therefore does not originate in time, “but in the imagination”, through the possibility 
of self-knowledge/identity.169  
Returning to law and with Greenhouse’s formulation in mind, what Durkheim wants to know is 
what links any individuals with any form of solidarity, what it is that binds them together. Here, 
morality and its expression in law are given this propensity, as Durkheim states:  
Law and morality represent the totality of bonds that bind us to one another and to 
society, which shape the mass of individuals into a cohesive aggregate. We may say 
that what is moral is everything that is a source of solidarity, everything that forces 
man to take account of other people, to regulate his actions by something other than 
the promptings of his own egoism, and the more numerous and strong these ties are, 
the more solid is the morality.170   
Following what has been said, it does not make sense to continue with a strict division 
between mechanical and organic solidarity, although it will be helpful at times to continue to 
refer to them for points of clarity. Instead, understanding Durkheim’s methodology as one that 
is utilising certain rhetorical devices as indicated by the above quote; it is more productive to 
think of them as encompassing one elastic form – social solidarity. His two forms of solidarity 
are taken to be representations of ideal forms that are used as exemplars enabling him to 
isolate key components of solidarity.171  
The argument will now move on to discuss law alongside individual autonomy and its 
relationship with morality. Durkheim thinks that individuals in a certain sense gain more and 
more autonomy, whilst curiously becoming ever more dependent on society. What can solve 
this conundrum, for Durkheim, is to understand that the balance within social solidarity has 
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been radically altered by the division of labour. Hence to understand the question ‘how is 
society possible?’ is to understand how the division of labour works with the individual and 
morality. Durkheim reveals his starting point in the following way:  
The question that has been the starting point for our study has been that of the 
connection between the individual personality and social solidarity. How does it 
come about that the individual, whilst becoming more autonomous, depends ever 
more closely upon society? How can he become at the same time more of an 
individual and yet more linked to society? For it is indisputable that these two 
movements, however contradictory they appear to be, are carried on in tandem. 
Such is the nature of the problem that we have set ourselves. It has seemed to us 
that what resolved this apparent antimony was the transformation of social solidarity 
which arises from the ever-increasing division of labour. This is how we have been 
led to make this subject of our study.172  
So what is the problem for Durkheim? He takes the division of labour, like other phenomena, 
to be a law of nature whilst also being a moral rule, governing human interactions and 
conduct.173 How can it be both and how much control can it exert? The way Durkheim 
addresses this question is in his methodological approach. The division of labour even as a 
literary foil should be analysed, examined and explained in terms of how it functions in 
correlation to specific needs.174 These needs, however, could be seen as firstly economic needs 
as discussed, for example industrial employment requires both the inventor and the toilet 
cleaner (or think of Adam Smith’s tiresome pin factory, where presumably the addition of 
people who would like or feel that they need pins is also required). This however is still not 
corresponding or actualising moral needs.175 Therefore it is not yet an explanation of “social 
solidarity [as] a wholly moral phenomenon.”176  
However, taken in a slightly different direction, there is also the question for Durkheim as to 
whether social solidarity arises only when one individual can see themselves in the other. 
Simply stated, is social solidarity born of similarity or even sameness? Part of what Durkheim is 
attempting is to see whether this latter claim is an essential characteristic for contemporary 
society’s social solidarity. However, again, as social solidarity is a “wholly moral phenomenon” 
being able to observe and evaluate it is very difficult even when morality is understood as a 
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social fact.177 Durkheim thinks that he has found a placeholder in the form of the law, as 
representing symbolically the moral essence of social solidarity.178  
Locating the individual from this picture is reached through a similar strategy. It is important to 
stress that the idea is not to look at individuals directly as that would be to become muddled 
up with psychological manifestations of social solidarity. Individual psychology cannot for 
Durkheim free itself from becoming fungible, contaminated by subjective experience and 
ultimately obscure to an observer. What can be studied or at least viewed is what is external to 
the individual, the outcomes or consequences that occur in the realm of the social.179 To get a 
clearer understanding of the individual and its accompanying autonomy it is necessary to 
return to the trajectory of societal development. This is because the individuals’ social 
position, is where the law, autonomy and morality intersect to form social solidarity. Overall, 
one of the key things that Durkheim is attempting throughout The Division is to account for 
changes over time in the moral outlook or collective consciousness of societies. Durkheim 
defines the collective consciousness in the following way:  
The totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average members of a society 
forms a determinate system with a life of its own. It can be termed the collective or 
common consciousness. Undoubtedly the substratum of this consciousness does not 
consist of a single organ. By definition it is diffused over society as a whole, but 
nonetheless possesses specific characteristics that make it a distinctive reality. In fact 
it is independent of the particular conditions in which individuals find themselves. 
Individuals pass on, but it abides.180 
The collective consciousness has often been seen as synonymous with mechanical solidarity.181 
A simplistic reading of Durkheim that collapses the collective consciousness into mechanical 
solidarity argues that when mechanical solidarity subsides and is replaced with organic 
solidarity (more closely associated with modern nation states), that the collective 
consciousness also disappears. There tends to be an acceptance that it continues for a time 
(not stated specifically either by simplistic readers or by Durkheim) where there is a lag 
between the rigid totalising beliefs of the previous society and their inevitable evaporation in 
the eventual society to come.  
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Durkheim contends that the collective conscience and the individual tends towards ever 
greater rationality, which conversely acts as a challenge to the already existing collective 
beliefs. For as collective consciousness becomes more rational it seeks to be able to 
accommodate new levels of individuality. In some ways this anticipates the way in which 
Habermas articulates sociability as rational justice and more generally his well-known theory 
of the rationalisation of the lifeworld. More will be said about this connection in the Habermas 
chapters. It is not simply the case that the historically categorical judgments of repressive law 
are completely abandoned as a new form of rationality comes in. Rather, a process of 
acknowledgement of the procession of the past and its legacy to the present is both realised, 
critiqued and to degrees accommodated.182 Alternatively, in the transition phase, anomie leads 
to a questioning of some of the moral judgements of a given society; the morality of the 
previous society cannot accommodate all that is new in the changing development of social, 
economic and political relationships. However, it is through building upon the traditional 
morality the collective consciousness of a society, that it is re-evaluated and altered and 
ultimately settled again. It is a process, not a replacement; this is not a revolution.183 How the 
moral landscape is altered, how individuals substantiate and negotiate new forms of 
interactions and how solidarity can be seen as the bond that keeps the whole thing from falling 
apart, is what Durkheim is looking for. Durkheim is (partly) a sociologist, so this is not 
necessarily a metaphysical debate about morality; stating that:  
Moral facts are phenomena like any others. They consist of rules for action that are 
recognisable by certain distinctive characteristics. It should thus be possible to 
observe, describe and classify them, as well as to seek out the laws that explain 
them.184  
Morality for Durkheim is also context specific, it can be read through the social structure of 
society. Durkheim is attempting to learn and present the rule book of his present society, what 
makes the present society possible and to what extent a critique of the present society could 
be utilised to create a better future, although in the main not in programmatic way. As 
Merton, an early and highly influential commentator on The Division, comments that “[t]he 
inviolate unity of a group becomes imperative during inter-societal conflicts, and this unity is 
largely achieved through appeals to common sentiments.”185  
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Thus, after the period of transformation or anomie (or crisis) that must occur after leaving the 
community of mechanical solidarity there is what Durkheim identifies as organic solidarity. 
Organic solidarity is based upon economic exchange relations, however, unlike Spencer for 
example, this is not to be understood as stemming from self-interest. Durkheim’s 
characterisation of organic solidarity must be put in context, although it is never fully clear 
whether he is being descriptive or slips (perhaps inadvertently) in a prescriptive account. The 
period in France that was described in the first chapter of this thesis was the backdrop for 
Durkheim’s writing. That a transformation had taken place in France that was neither a 
categorical break with the past nor settled without a demanding set of altercations, perhaps 
required Durkheim to bring forth a version of society’s function that had cognisance of the 
requirement to see other people as demanding moral agents. The question of morality is ever 
present in Durkheim’s description of organic solidarity, thus self-interest understood as the 
pure freedom to pursue individual aims misses a fundamental element as Durkheim states in a 
forceful passage:  
We may say that what is moral is everything that is a source of solidarity, everything 
that forces man to take account of other people, to regulate his actions by something 
other than the promptings of his own egoism, and the more numerous and strong 
these ties are, the more solid is the morality.186   
Therefore the necessary specialisation of production that is driving the division of labour is 
only made possible through the relationships with others based on commonly held beliefs and 
norms. Durkheim does not see this as a check on freedom but rather as a way of enabling 
freedom. Giddens describes this argument succinctly by stating that: 
Freedom consists, not in escape from social forces and social bonds, but in the 
autonomy of action that membership of society makes possible. In the simple 
societies, the dominance of the conscience collective limits the scope of individual 
action: this situation is transformed by the process of social development, not 
however by destroying moral authority, but by altering its form.187   
The question for Durkheim is how to maintain the individuality of the individual within the 
complexity of modern societies. His answer appears to be that individuality is firstly expressed 
through the specialisation of the division of labour and then maintained through the moral law 
of social interchange or organic solidarity. Durkheim thinks that the ability to specialise and 
thus to differentiate oneself from the whole, something that is impossible in mechanical 
solidarity, is predicated on belonging to and maintaining social bonds that are the moral glue 
that holds the conditions for such specialisation together. Ever increasing division of labour 
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creates even greater need for solidarity as specialisation of function can only operate if it is 
one part of a collective whole; the specialisation on its own would have no function as it could 
not be utilised in its own right, only when put in relation to the other specialised divisions. In a 
long passage Durkheim articulates perhaps what an ideal form of the division of labour would 
look like under organic solidarity:  
The division of labour supposes that the worker, far from remaining bent over his 
task, does not lose sight of those co-operating with him, but acts upon them and is 
acted upon by them. He is not therefore a machine who repeats movements the 
sense of which he does not perceive, but he knows that they are tending in a certain 
direction, towards a goal that he can conceive of more or less distinctly. He feels that 
he is of some use. For this he has no need to take in very vast areas of the social 
horizon; it is enough for him to perceive enough of it to understand that his actions 
have a goal beyond themselves. Thenceforth, however specialised, however uniform 
his activity may be, it is that of an intelligent being, for he knows that his activity has 
a meaning. The economists would not have left this essential characteristic of the 
division of labour unclarified and as a result would not have lain it open to this 
undeserved reproach, if they had not reduced it to being only a way of increasing the 
efficiency of the social forces, but had seen it above all as a source of solidarity.188  
Durkheim uses the analogy of the family to bolster his claims round the nature of the division 
of labour. The argument runs in the following manner: The family has, over time, become 
more and more dissociated, in terms of function. In early forms of the family, tasks would be 
performed in a unified manner, however, they (the tasks) are now performed in a unitary way, 
assigned through gender, age and dependency. This movement according to Durkheim creates 
a specialisation of the domestic sphere, a division of labour that has in his eyes, come to 
dominate “the whole of development of the family.”189 Durkheim uses the example of the 
family to make clearer his more important argument relating to cooperation. Once 
cooperation operates as a division of labour then that relationship, supported by restorative 
repressive law, expresses relations of solidarity that can be seen to arise directly from the 
social division of labour.190  
Durkheim seeks to present two aspects of a positive solidarity that arise from the division of 
labour. In the first the solidarity is the link formed between a person and the society without 
remainder. The second is a dependency relationship whereby the person relies on the 
segmented parts that make up the society.191  
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Taken a step further, what the two aspects are in essence are different perspectives on 
society. The first type stems from the collective unity of a society that holds to common beliefs 
and sentiments. The second type is that society is seen to be held together through a series of 
specific relationships born of specific functions. The relationships are concrete and come to be 
identifiable through the division of labour. The point Durkheim is attempting to make is that 
aspect one and two of positive solidarity belong to the same society, two sides of the same 
coin.192 The aim for Durkheim is to distinguish between the two, given that they are part of the 
same real society, understood as a kind of oscillation between the two aspects. Aspect one, 
the collective type, at its most extreme or “maximum” is when the conscience of the group 
coincides completely with the individual.193 This makes individuality impossible, there is only us 
the “collective being”.194 Although Durkheim does have some empirical data to back up this 
claim, it is clear that it is more a possible or even illustrative example than an actual reality. 
This is mechanical solidarity in its most robust formulation.  
In type two, or organic solidarity, ‘real’ rights that regulate the relationship between the 
individual and society are to be understood as the same as that between the individual and an 
object of property, for example. The individual belongs completely to society and moves in 
step with it. The individual is practically an inanimate object in the hands of society. The 
progressive linear element of Durkheim’s theory is that historically societies have high levels, if 
not complete, homogeneity but that over time the disintegration of the homogeneity occurs, 
thanks to the increasing division of labour.  
The division of labour is to replace the lost bond that existed in mechanical solidarity. 
Essentially it takes the place of collective consciousness and with that its moral authority; 
particularly, the movement away from a totalising religious world view. Again it is important to 
note that this is not strictly speaking an economic explanation, it is above all a moral one.  
In organic solidarity the homogenous nature of functional tasks gives way to specialist roles, 
which become ever more divided. The solidarity that existed in the previous undifferentiated 
model is transferred to the essentialism of differentiation of the division of labour. What is 
significant about this shift, is that society is bound no longer by shared beliefs, history etc. but 
instead by work or more correctly professionalism. Solidarity, when the professional division of 
labour comes in its most maximal state (according to Durkheim), comes to be the social and 
political organisation of the society. Much of what has been discussed thus far can be 
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illustrated in the following quote, the relationship between the individual and society and 
indeed what it means to be an individual is explored:  
Social life is derived from a dual source, the similarity of individual consciousnesses 
and the social division of labour. In the first case the individual is socialised because, 
lacking any individuality of his own, he is mixed up with his fellows in the same 
collective type. In the second case it is because, whilst his physiognomy and his 
activities are personal to him, distinguishing him from others, he depends upon them 
to the extent that he is distinguished from them, and consequently upon the society 
that is the result of their combining together.195  
As discussed already this description allows the individual to establish its individuality, whilst at 
the same time becoming even more tied to the collective. A person’s individuality is only made 
possible through the performance of the social division of labour which is the society: Division 
of labour as society. Durkheim’s discussions tend to move in the margins beyond what could 
feasibly actually happen as a tactic to illustrate his arguments. Therefore the above situation 
for example, he goes on to qualify, requires something as yet not mentioned, the State.  
The State’s role is to encapsulate the individual contacts, to give it a shape or limit to operate 
within, crucially guaranteeing recourse to repressive measures. There then is the return of an 
element of mechanical solidarity. The State on behalf of society performs punishment. It 
upholds community; the solidarity of sameness. As such “it is charged with reminding us of the 
sentiment of our common solidarity.”196 The State also has another crucial role and that is to 
ensure that education is provided for all. It is this aspect of the State that will be discussed 
further in the next chapter.   
This chapter has been a discussion of how Durkheim understands solidarity working in The 
Division. What has been made clear is that Durkheim sees there being various tensions existing 
within society, between the individual and society, between morality and law and between 
pure forms of solidarity and concrete reality. Arguments have also been presented that seek to 
show the more radical ways that Durkheim can be understood. As such it has been suggested 
that Durkheim’s use of the mechanical and organic distinction be understood as an allegorical 
device. The consequence of this interpretation is that it collapses the two types of solidarity 
into one elastic form. This is important if solidarity is going to be used as a critical tool for 
investigating contemporary social and political questions, i.e. whether it is mechanical or 
organic has consequences. If, as has been argued here, it is nearly always going to be a 
combination of both, in fact, that they could be considered symbiotic; this is going to impact 
what kind of analysis can be done using a solidarity framework. What will be explored in the 
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next chapter is moral education, which it will be argued is a substantiation of the tension that 
exists within this definition of solidarity; the tension between the mechanical and organic 
strands with their ongoing relationship to anomie or crisis.   
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Chapter 3: Durkheim: Solidarity and moral education 
Locating and analysing the role of morality has been the task of the last chapter. This part aims 
to interrogate further what morality means, how it is maintained for the purposes of solidarity 
within society and how it may be altered. The way in which law and the individual will map 
onto a similar two part analysis, that will examine authority and liberty will reveal a very 
similar set of conditions as to law and individuality. Reflections on this continuity, along with 
the added clarity that will be given to morality will enable a more adequate understanding of 
solidarity as a wholly moral phenomenon, than has previously been possible by looking only at 
The Division. The conclusion of this second chapter will go on to indicate ways in which this 
could impact on solidarity theories more generally.   
Beginning from how he understands the tension that exists within individuality, Durkheim 
states the following dualistic approach and purpose of education:  
In each of us, it may be said, there exists two beings which, while inseparable except 
by abstraction, remains distinct. One is made up of all the mental states that apply 
only to ourselves and to the events of our personal lives: this is what might be called 
the individual being. The other is a system of ideas, sentiments and practices which 
express in us, not our personality, but the group or different groups of which we are 
apart; these are religious beliefs, moral beliefs and practices, national or professional 
traditions, collective opinions of every kind. Their totality forms the social being. To 
constitute this being in each of us is the end of education.197    
This passage reveals Durkheim’s construction of the problem as witnessed (although not 
stated in these terms) in organic solidarity. When Durkheim abandons the terminology of 
mechanical and organic solidarity after The Division, it has been argued he abandons the ideas 
that support their characterisation. I will argue that this is wrong. It is true that he no longer 
refers to the two types of solidarity, however, as was indicated at the close of the last chapter, 
mechanical and organic solidarity can be thought of rather as making up one social solidarity. 
Equally, the concerns that he has regarding how society is possible, the concerns that he 
addresses through his discussion of solidarity, are (it will be shown) very similar to the 
concerns that he articulates in his discussions on moral education. Likewise, although 
discussions of solidarity using the term are rare, most if not all of his elements, conditions and 
consequences of solidarity are very much of central importance. Why Durkheim decides to 
drop the aforementioned formulation of solidarity is not clear, however, it may be that he saw 
that he had drawn too distinctive a line between the two, one that had led to 
misinterpretation of his work. It could also simply be that the technical language and 
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explicatory work that would be needed to accompany references to those types of solidarity 
were unsuitable for the different audience of his moral education, namely trainee teachers.  
This chapter will be structured in the following way; firstly a summary of Durkheim’s position 
will be given, paying close attention to how his ideas about education and morality relate to 
questions of law and individuality. Durkheim’s position will then be mapped back onto the 
discussion above, indicating areas where a combined reading can yield a clearer understanding 
of how to understand his solidarity position. This fuller picture of solidarity will then be 
discussed in conclusion alongside the key questions of the thesis, most importantly, how it can 
be used as a critical tool in contemporary social and political debates and how it relates to 
crisis. In particular the inclusion of education within the solidarity construction raises new, 
difficult and potentially significant questions. 
Turning now to Paul Fauconnet, in his introduction to Durkheim’s Education and Sociology, he 
writes the following, looking back on The Division:  
His first work, The Division of Labor in Society, offers a whole philosophy of history in 
which the genesis, the differentiation, and the freeing of the individual appear as the 
dominant trait of the progress of civilization, the exaltation of the human person, as 
its actual limit.198  
History and knowing how one comes to arrive at a certain point in the development of a 
society was important in The Division and remains an important theme throughout his writing 
on education. Right at the start of Education and Sociology Durkheim claims “that to establish 
the preliminary notion of education, to determine what is so called, historical observation is 
indispensable.”199 This is because Durkheim thinks that individuals themselves cannot say to 
what education aims, as it must involve tradition and customs over which they have little to no 
control. Education has many functions in society for Durkheim, equality of opportunity, 
maintenance of a certain amount of necessary homogeneity, preparation for a diverse 
specialised society200 and finally; “Education is, then, only the means by which society 
prepares, within the children, the essential conditions of its very existence.”201 Durkheim 
addresses these functions through three main themes, liberty, authority and morality. Like the 
previous discussion on solidarity in The Division this chapter will firstly look at the individual as 
linked this time with liberty, then authority that is coupled with discipline and ultimately with 
law. In each case it will be shown that it is morality that regulates the relationship between 
these two sometimes opposed themes. It will be shown that morality is the way that Durkheim 
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understands society and with that a way to make sense of the claim that solidarity is a wholly 
moral phenomenon.  
Liberty and Authority  
Liberty and authority have sometimes been opposed, as if these two factors of 
education contradicted and limited each other. But this opposition is factitious. In 
reality these two terms imply, rather than exclude, each other. Liberty is the 
daughter of authority properly understood. For to be free is not to do what one 
pleases; it is to be master of oneself, it is to know how to act with reason and to do 
one’s duty. Now, it is precisely to endow the child with this self-mastery that the 
authority of the teacher should be employed.202 
Intuitively it does appear that liberty is at odds with authority in their purest forms. However, 
as was seen in terms of the discussion with individuality in the last chapter, Durkheim is apt to 
present the conditions for the possibility of one thing in the realisation of its apparent 
opposite. In the aforementioned case, you are an individual because you are in society, there is 
no individual without submitting to sociality. In this case, something very similar is going on, 
whereby to really experience what liberty is in its fullest sense, requires submitting firstly to an 
authority, in this instance the teacher. This is what at first sight appears to be highly 
problematic in Durkheim’s account. It sounds initially like it is forcing the individual to submit 
to authority and the consequences for free action that that entails, whilst arguing that this 
makes the individual free. It will be argued that Durkheim is able to make the two work 
together in the way that he envisions them, however, in the final analysis it will be shown that 
by doing that solidarity itself becomes, potentially, highly problematic.  
Authority, which is closely associated for Durkheim with discipline, is a requirement and part of 
morality as shown by the following statement: “Morality… constitutes a category of rules 
where the idea of authority plays an absolutely preponderant role.”203 As should be clear by 
now, Durkheim is entrenched as a moral thinker and thus authority which, he sees as an 
essential and real social fact, could not be anything other than an expression of morality. As 
Nisbet remarks, “Authority not only buttresses morality; in a real sense authority is 
morality.”204 One of the purposes of this chapter is to find out what Durkheim means by 
morality, to therefore be able to address what solidarity as a wholly moral phenomenon 
means. If then authority is morality as Nisbet suggests, then would solidarity also be authority? 
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Seeing whether this is actually the case will require presenting how Durkheim expresses 
authority and how it works in conjunction with other key Durkheimian concepts.  
There are two dualist constructions in Durkheim that will help to illustrate his position on 
authority. The first is one that maps clearly back onto his work in The Division, that presents 
two forms of society; mechanical and organic solidarity. The other is with his notion of the 
Homo duplex, the dualism that is contained within each individual, exemplified by the quote 
that opened this chapter. This sees there being an on-going struggle between the ego of the 
individual and their moral responsibilities as part of a society. On the question of the first 
dualism, Giddens writes that; “Durkheim quite clearly intended his general account of morality 
to be both compatible with, and read in the light of, the transformation of moral standards 
that has been brought about by the transition from mechanical to organic solidarity.”205 As 
seen in the previous chapter the movement from mechanical to organic solidarity involves 
changes in the way that morality operates. The challenge that Durkheim sets himself in his 
writing on moral education is a way to smooth the transition, to retain an awareness of the 
historicity of morality, whilst allowing for new forms of morality to emerge out of the older 
conceptions. As Durkheim writes:  
We must discover, in the old system, moral forces hidden in it, hidden under forms 
that concealed their intrinsic nature. We must make their true reality appear; and we 
must find what comes of them under present conditions, where even they 
themselves could not remain immutable.206  
And slightly earlier in the same chapter and with shades of Marx: “To orient them in that 
direction it is not enough for him to conserve the past; he must prepare the future.”207   
One of the problems for Durkheim is locating a viable replacement for the erosion of religious 
authority, without throwing out what he sees as the still requisite moral elements that make 
society possible in the first place: “In a word, we must discover the rational substitutes for 
those religious notions that for a long time have served as the vehicle for the most essential 
moral ideas”208 as “there is nothing in reality that one is justified in considering as 
fundamentally beyond the scope of human reason.”209 And again that “[t]here is no people 
without morality. However, the morality of undeveloped societies is not ours.”210 It is this 
oscillation between the morality that is part of mechanical solidarity and the morality 
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operative in organic solidarity as an ever moving object that Durkheim is attempting to give 
structure and rational understanding.  
It is in moral education that part of the answer lies, although, it should be noted that 
education exists because society exists and that it is in a very real sense a reflection of a 
particular society. Durkheim believes this very strongly and states that his “aim is not to 
formulate moral education for man in general; but for men of our time in this country.”211 This 
position has led some commentators, such as Mitchell, to argue that Durkheim wished “to 
maintain … [and] strengthen the French nation” and that his nationalism tended towards a 
defence of the uniqueness of the French people marking a jingoistic quality to his thought.212 
Giving weight to this argument is a statement that Durkheim makes in the first draft of his 
unfinished book on ethics:  
The morality which a nation subscribes to expresses its temperament, its mentality 
and the conditions in which it lives. It is a product of its history and an integral 
element of all civilizations. Yet, whereas all civilizations have a common basis, they 
resemble one another only in their most general features. Each has its own particular 
character and therefore depends only in part upon human faculties in general. The 
same may be said of morality.213  
Durkheim certainly sees that what he is doing, particularly with regards to morality, as context 
specific. In contextual terms Durkheim was fighting for what he saw as a French republicanism 
under threat from both the church and a particular strain of traditional conservativism that 
wished to restore France’s pre-revolution character. Through his educational thought he thinks 
that he has found a way to combat these tendencies and additionally, to move France into a 
more rational moral equilibrium. However, precisely because Durkheim offers a particularistic 
non-transcendental version of morality, one that “is not immutable: despite the respect with 
which it is vested, it is alive, constantly changing and evolving. The future will have a different 
ideal from that which obtains now.”214 Durkheim is able to offer a way of examining and 
thinking about morality as a social fact, one that changes over time and is historically 
grounded. It is Durkheim’s methodology or rather his moral philosophy that retains interest 
outside of his intended target. Likewise, although Durkheim claims to be merely addressing the 
French context he slips into more general positions so often in his writing that it is hard to 
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collaborate his initial motive. Take the following statement for example, where he brings in 
authority, of which we will now return:  
Indeed, history records no crisis as serious as that in which European societies have 
been involved for more than a century. Collective discipline in its traditional form has 
lost its authority, as the resulting general anxiety demonstrate.215  
Or here, where he moves from the nation to humanity in a statement that foreshadows latter 
discussions of human rights:  
If one loves his country, or humanity in general, he cannot see the suffering of his 
compatriots – or, more generally, of any human being – without suffering himself 
and without demonstrating, consequently, the impulse to relieve it.216  
It will be demonstrated in what follows that Durkheim does offer a non-context specific way of 
thinking about morality. It is important to show this as it adds weight to the idea that 
Durkheim retains relevance beyond traditional context. Keeping that in mind and returning to 
authority, Durkheim in a chapter titled The First Element of Morality: The Spirit of Discipline 
says the following two things about the nature of morality and subsequently the role of 
authority, from this it will be possible to build up a picture of how he understands authority (as 
expressed through discipline) and how it can be thought as moral. Firstly, Durkheim states:  
[O]ne can inquire what morality ought to be only if one has first determined the 
complex of things that goes under this rubric, what its nature is, what ends it serves. 
Let us begin, then, by looking at morality as a fact, and let us see what we are 
actually able to understand by it.217  
Secondly,  
Thus, we can say that morality consists of system of rules of action that predetermine 
conduct. They state how one must act in given situations; and to behave properly is 
to obey conscientiously.218  
Durkheim chooses his words carefully here, so when he uses the term conscientiously he is 
referring to “moral conscience” that “is so often envisaged as a kind of voice which is heard 
within us, even though we are for the most part unable to say what it is or whence it derives 
its authority.”219 Durkheim describes this feeling in different terms when he writes that: “When 
a normally constituted man tries to behave in a way repugnant to morality, he feels something 
that stops him just as clearly as when he tries to lift a weight too heavy for him.” What 
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Durkheim needs to demonstrate is that the authority that is created through education is what 
creates this feeling or conscience.   
It is important to note again that Durkheim understands education as a part of society or 
indeed perhaps an ideal community. So when he states that, “[w]hen our conscience speaks, it 
is society speaking within us. The tone with which it speaks is the best demonstration of its 
remarkable authority.”220 The way that society breaks into the individual is through education 
or at least it should be. Durkheim recognises that the family plays a part, although he thinks 
that it should be kept to a minimum and that religion and other social groups equally can infer 
moral consciousness on individuals. However, the best way that Durkheim sees as having a just 
society is when education is taken out of the aforementioned hands.221 Education is a way to 
preserve the unity of a society that comes with acknowledgement of a shared history, 
traditions and moral laws, yet it also must be a vehicle for equality and give rise to individuals 
who can mould out of pre-existing moral norms, new and fairer laws. About equality Durkheim 
writes that, “[i]t is evident that the education of our children should not depend upon the 
chance of their having been born here or there, of some parents rather than others.”222 The 
second point is more complex, Durkheim sees that there must be a degree of preservation of 
past generations whilst at the same time allowing for there to be the possibility to develop 
new moral standards, with each passing generation having the ability to leave their mark on 
the development of their society. The following two passages highlight this tension and open 
up the role that authority will play in the discussion:  
For in order that the legacy of each generation may be able to be preserved and 
added to others, it is necessary that there be a moral personality which last beyond 
the generations that pass, which binds them to one another: it is society. Thus the 
antagonism that has too often been admitted between society and individual 
corresponds to nothing in the facts. Indeed, far from these two terms being in 
opposition and being able to develop only each at the expense of the other, they 
imply each other. The individual, in willing society, wills himself.223  
Here, Durkheim can be seen to be invoking a similar argument to the one that he gives in The 
Division. The balancing act between mechanical and organic solidarity is tied to tradition and 
individuality. As noted above it is clear that there is a requirement that both types of solidarity 
are present. The second passage refers directly to the role of education:  
The influence that it [society] exerts on him, notably through education, does not at 
all have as its object and its effect to repress him, to diminish him, to denature him, 
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but, on the contrary, to make him grow and to make of him a truly human being. No 
doubt, he can grow thus only by making an effort. But this is precisely because this 
power to put forth voluntary effort is one of the most essential characteristics of 
man.224  
The rejoinder to this passage is that, “[n]ow, it is precisely to endow the child with this self-
mastery that the authority of the teacher should be employed.”225 Therefore it is not just the 
authority to impose a rule for that amounts to simply the power to force submission. The 
individual or child in this case must also acknowledge the superiority of the authority: “By 
authority, we must understand that influence which imposes upon us all the moral power that 
we acknowledge as superior to us.”226 The particular moral rule, is not what is important, it is 
moral rules in themselves that are important. Moral rules are equivalent to a command and as 
such “permits no equivocation.”227 They are also regular in their application and as such work 
as a guide for conduct. Repetitive conduct requires the addition of what is central to his 
account of authority in the Moral Education, discipline:  
Discipline in effect regularizes conduct. It implies repetitive behaviour under 
determinate conditions. But discipline does not emerge without authority – a 
regulating authority… we can say that the fundamental element of morality is the 
spirit of discipline.228  
This has a practical purpose as well as purely moral ends as it takes some of the hard work 
away from the individual; they do not need to in each case that calls for an ought, work it out 
for themselves. This is a part of daily life and not tied to metaphysical or transcendental 
thought. Here, Durkheim is concerned with the proper running of an effective society. It can 
also be read as defending the individual both against his own desires as in the homo duplex 
and the smooth running of society. As he writes:  
At each point in time, it is necessary that the functioning of familial, vocational, and 
civic life be assured; to this end, it is altogether necessary that the person be free 
from an incessant search for appropriate conduct. Norms must be established which 
determine what proper relationships are, and to which people conform. Deference to 
established norms is the stuff of our daily duties.229   
On the one hand authority and discipline have a regularising function that creates a society for 
the individual with predictability as well as the assurance of a shared moral community. On the 
other hand discipline, in particular, has the further function that it helps to moderate the 
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desires of the individual and to promote morality.230 Durkheim thinks that when an individual 
does not have checks on their goals, or does not have achievable goals, that they will become 
deeply unhappy and will be less able to act morally. This can be through the lack of financially 
imposed restraint:  
Through the power wealth confers on us, it actually diminishes the power of things to 
oppose us. Consequently, it lends an increment of strength to our desires, which 
makes it harder to hold them in check. Under such conditions, moral equilibrium is 
unstable: it requires but a slight blow to disrupt it.231  
Or through an excess in the society itself that acquires an aspirant environment that is 
unachievable for most individuals. This would be a society where individual desires, the ego 
side of the homo duplex, were not kept in check through moral discipline. What Durkheim 
means by this is that individuals come to have unrealisable goals and that as these goals 
cannot be reached the individual therefore lacks a determinate object for its energy. This is 
why a wealthy individual can feel the distress of this as well as someone of lesser means. The 
removal of self-discipline also takes away a pathway for the individual robbing them of the 
satisfaction of completing projects and so on. The wealthy person who has more obvious 
means for attaining what they want is tied, according to Durkheim to ever increasing desires, 
as there is not a determinate end point:  
A need, a desire freed of all restraints, and all rules, no longer geared to some 
determinate objective and, through this same connection, limited and contained, can 
be nothing but a source of constant anguish for the person experiencing it.232  
The problem of “infinite aspiration” is what creates the malady that has afflicted Durkheim’s 
own society, and perhaps is the characteristic of his historical age.233 As Durkheim does in The 
Division, there is indicated a normal and an abnormal state of affairs. The above is the 
abnormal whereby, individual desires take control but yet cannot be satisfied leading to the 
state of anomie as described earlier. The normally functioning way that things should work is 
the following:  
Morality is a comprehensive system of prohibitions. That is to say, its objective is to 
limit the range within which individual behaviour should and must normally occur.234   
And:  
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Morality, we have said, is basically a discipline. All discipline has a double objective: 
to promote a certain regularity in people’s conduct, and to provide them with 
determinate goals that at the same time limit their horizons.235  
Through these two forms of discipline, regulation and limited horizons, it is possible to have 
liberty: “Through the practice of moral rules we develop the capacity to govern and regulate 
ourselves, which is the whole reality of liberty.” It is the function therefore of the school to 
instil in the individual this discipline so that when they enter society as an adult they have the 
ability to feel actual liberty. Hookway remarks that morality unlike in the Kantian sense, “must 
come from something higher than the self; the self cannot be a source of morality.”236 
Hookway is evoking more general social structures and does not refer directly to education, 
however, it seems clear that Durkheim sees the school and the teacher as embodying this 
higher authority. Cladis, in a very influential piece, argues that what is important about 
education is that it enables individuals to know about the traditional, beliefs, values and moral 
laws as they are a part of the society that they belong to. It is not however, according to Cladis, 
that these children are indoctrinated into submitting but that they come to see rational 
reasons for their existence. Equally, having a knowledge of a wide range of competing 
deontological schemas allows a society to exist that is pluralistic and democratic. As Cladis 
writes:  
Autonomous agents are those who are aware of the social and historical warrants for 
moral beliefs and practices, and who are thereby free to embrace and criticize them. 
Autonomy, then, is an important virtue to inculcate in young citizens of modern, 
pluralistic democracies, for these societies benefit from an active citizenry that 
explores present social practices, asks for reasons and pursues just reforms.237   
The picture that emerges is one that Durkheim thinks is paramount to the continuance of his 
society and those like it across Europe. The loss of traditional authority rooted in religion and 
other forms of mechanical solidarity has been severely loosened at the same time as 
unchecked individualism has increased incessantly, something Hookway labels ‘cultural 
pessimism’.238 Durkheim needs to find a way to replace this loss of traditional authority as well 
as nurturing a non-destructive individualism. This is something that he thinks that he has found 
in his moral education and as seen earlier with the replacement of religion with the supra-
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individual. The following two passages both highlight what is at stake for Durkheim and what 
he sees as the solution:  
For we are living precisely in one of those critical, revolutionary periods when 
authority is usually weakened through the loss of traditional discipline – a time that 
may easily give rise to a spirit of anarchy. This is the source of the anarchic 
aspirations that, whether consciously or not, are emerging today, not only in the 
particular sects bearing the name, but in the very doctrines that, although opposed 
on other points, join in a common aversion to anything smacking of regulation.239  
And the solution:  
Moral action pursues impersonal objectives. But the impersonal goals of moral action 
cannot be either those of a person other than the actor, or those of many others. 
Hence, it follows that they must necessarily involve something other than individuals. 
They are supra-individual.240  
The supra-individual is society for Durkheim and as such is the object of, and generator of, 
morality. The authority and discipline that the individual requires and that society sets up as a 
duty and obligation stems from society, which is what gives it its force. So whereas it might 
appear that discipline is something individual, as Cladis argues, when he likens it to 
“Nietzsche’s will-to-power, that is, the will to master one’s life”241 it is actually a means of 
asserting the community:  
Discipline seems to be one thing, and the collective ideal to which we are committed 
another, quite different thing. As a matter of fact, however, there is a close 
connection between the two. They are only two aspects of the same, single reality.242  
Morality is the resource that only a society can use and as such the individuals’ existence 
within that society is held in place through morality. There is however an element of the 
construction of morality and authority which could be seen as a necessary illusion. With the 
replacement of religious/traditional authority there is a void left that must be filled, as 
described in the above manner. However, it is hard to reconcile morality and with that 
authority as a social fact, with how he characterises it in the following passage, although it 
does appear to retain its concrete manifestation:  
[A]uthority is a quality with which a being, either actual or imaginary, is invested 
through his relationship with given individuals, and it is because of this alone that he 
is thought by the latter to be endowed with powers superior to those they find in 
themselves. It is of no importance, as a matter of fact, whether these powers are real 
or imaginary. It is enough that they exist as real in people’s minds. The sorcerer is an 
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authority for those who believe in him. This is why authority is called moral: it is 
because it exists in minds, not in things.243  
This does not give the individual the compelling rational reasons to submit to discipline and 
authority yet. That comes through the realisation that is instilled in children through school 
that they are obligated in a very strong and actual way to the society that they are a part of. 
Society, with its history and its hard won self-determination, and cultural and material 
accomplishments, creates a debt for the individual:  
For it is society that is the repository of all the wealth of civilization; it is society that 
accumulates and preserves these treasures transmitting them from age to age; it is 
through society that those riches reach us. Thus it is that we are obligated to society, 
since it is from society that we receive these things…One can understand, therefore, 
how a powerful morality, of which our conscience is merely a partial embodiment, 
must be invested with such authority.244  
Therefore it is what society gives to the individual that both binds it to society and the other 
individuals occupied within it. The need for a moral restraint that is charged with the authority 
of societies’ gifts to the individual has “a double aspect: on the one hand, as imperative law, 
which demands complete obedience of us; on the other hand, as a splendid ideal, to which we 
spontaneously aspire.”245 There is a threat to this state of affairs and one that can been seen as 
Durkheim’s critique and explanation of what he sees as anomie type society, to which he 
belongs. This critique mirrors the former critique (as discussed in the previous chapter) that as 
mechanical solidarity with its collective discipline breaks down, and with the as yet unrealised 
organic solidarity of diversity, there is a period where there is only the ideal. The means for 
striving for the ideal, the duty to obey moral law is too weak and as such the ideal can never be 
reached. Durkheim is not calling for a rigid imposition of moral law, he instead thinks that this 
time of anomie has the potential for developing new forms of morality that better reflect the 
changing conditions of society. This is always a risk for Durkheim and is why he thinks that 
through moral education, the adults of the society to come must be instilled with a belief in 
the authority of society: “We ourselves noted that it was especially essential to feel the 
necessity of moral rules at the time when one was working to change them.”246  
The transition out of anomie and into organic solidarity is problematic for Durkheim especially 
if only The Division is taken into account. If it is the case that society becomes the determiner 
of change and holder of authority, the individual, albeit with increased self-determinism and 
freedom, must surely be incapable of realising the ideal. However, what Durkheim argues in 
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Moral Education is that individuals that have received the appropriate schooling, whilst 
understanding the importance of historically constituted moral law, will also be able to, 
through knowing the moral law as co-created through society, see that it can also be altered 
by individuals working within society. This is why Durkheim can say that: “New ideas of justice 
and solidarity are now developing and sooner or later, will prompt the establishment of 
appropriate institutions.”247   
Certain conditions have to be met before this can occur; the old authority of religion has to be 
replaced with adherence to the idea that society represents the supra-individual. The human 
being has to become sacred rather than profane. Humanity must become the ideal end of the 
way that a society can express itself as “the raison d'être of the nation.”248 Durkheim makes 
clear that it is not enough to simply have discipline as in mechanical solidarity, there is also a 
requirement that individuals understand why they should submit to authority. Knowledge of 
the moral laws of a given society is the prerequisite for organic solidarity. Knowing that moral 
laws are the product of human hands, gives a “clear and complete an awareness as possible of 
the reasons for our conduct.” It is “[t]his consciousness [that] confers on our behavior the 
autonomy that the public conscience from now on requires of every genuinely and complete 
moral being.” Therefore, in its most well developed formulation “morality is the understanding 
of it.”249           
This chapter has argued that moral education and solidarity in Durkheim can be read together 
in a productive way. There has been an attempt made, which is rarely done in the solidarity 
literature on Durkheim, to understand what he means by morality in non-sociological ways. It 
has been shown how his construction of morality, how it is maintained and possibly altered 
relates to the previous discussion of solidarity. This chapter has also demonstrated the 
importance of morality to understanding solidarity, raising important questions that any 
theory of solidarity would have to answer, relating to the legitimacy of authority and recourse 
to tradition. It has also highlighted an underdeveloped, interesting and significant question 
relating to how solidarity is instilled in an individual. Is the classroom the right setting? What 
other communities within a given society can lay claim to this authority, such as family or 
religious association? At what point can there be a legitimate challenging of the morality that 
underpins solidarity in a given society? And finally, what role does education have to play 
within that?        
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Conclusion  
In conclusion these chapters set out to present, in a new way, Durkheim’s theory of solidarity. 
It has been shown that law, individuality, authority and liberty create the possibility for both 
the creation and maintenance of solidarity as well as allowing access to it. It has been argued 
strongly that they are manifestations of a broader grounding in morality, one that becomes 
visible in these social constructions. It has also been argued that morality remains an elusive 
concept when analysed in The Division; something that is rectified through analysis of 
Durkheim’s moral education project. The final conclusion, that to know what morality consists 
of, is essential to being moral, logically means as solidarity is a wholly moral phenomenon that 
it is essential to have understanding of solidarity to be in solidarity. Having an awareness of 
solidarity, even not named directly, appears to be a high bar to its realisation, just as becoming 
a ‘complete moral being’ does. Likewise, the argument that has been made that Durkheim 
does not actually think that there are two separate types of solidarity, rather two aspects 
contained within one form, raises important questions about the status of solidarity more 
generally.  
What was discussed in the last chapter was the birth of modern solidarity in France and its 
development into an array of competing meanings. Therefore the problem is that, although 
solidarity is invoked in many different contexts, genres of thought and political, economic and 
religious praxis, the term is rarely clarified. The consequence of which is that it becomes hard 
to at times compare, contrast and critique, evocations of solidarity. Therefore if Durkheim’s 
formula, as articulated above, has merit then it indicates that rather than there being a simple 
contradiction in appropriation of solidarity, that perhaps instead they can be held within the 
same broad conceptual framework. That there are some things that pertain to most if not all 
forms of solidarity and that their variety is more in terms of degree than outright 
incompatibility. This will be a problem that will be returned to later in the thesis.  
Other potentially significant implications that follow from the investigation into Durkheim’s 
solidarity theory are the following. Firstly, if solidarity is to be used as part of an explanation of 
how society is possible, how it functions and recreates itself and interacts with other societies, 
then it must take into account the role of law, individuality, liberty and authority. As how 
would talking about solidarity and society make sense without them or something close to 
them being part of the discussion? Further, and this would apply to all forms of solidarity, is 
morality an essential part of what solidarity is? Could it be conceived in non-moral terms? Also, 
is Durkheim’s need (however well argued) for discipline and obedience stemming from 
adhence to the traditions and historical progress of a given society/nation, something that is 
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compatible with solidarity theories that seek to overthrow existing power structures? Equally, 
is the moral relativism implied by Durkheim, strong enough in the long run to support a form 
of solidarity capable of holding a complex modern society together? 
These are the key questions that Durkheim raises and ones that will inform the discussions in 
the coming chapters on Habermas. If nothing else, Durkheim offers a well worked out, 
defensible definition and explanation of solidarity that can be used as a yardstick against which 




Chapter 4: Habermas and the struggle for universal solidarity: Historically contingent 
solidarity 
Jürgen Habermas, perhaps more than any contemporary writer, has solidarity at the centre of 
his thinking. It is, as Max Pensky has written, “the golden thread that connects the range of 
projects grouped together in what has come to be known as “discourse theory”.”250 From at 
least his mature work on communicative action in the late 1980s Habermas has been 
attempting through various schemas to articulate what solidarity is and what its role has been, 
is now, and could look like under altered social and political conditions. As with Durkheim in 
the previous chapter, solidarity comes to be both a crucial part of the explanation of how 
premodern states become modern nation-states, as well as the basis for Habermas’s vision of 
a post-national theory.  
However, despite the importance of solidarity to Habermas’s project, except for Pensky, 
William Outhwaite and William Rehg, there has been little sustained scholarship in the area.251 
Many of the most influential commentaries on Habermas fail to acknowledge the central 
position of solidarity, or ignore it altogether. This is made all the more surprising when it can 
clearly be shown to be tied to some of his most over-analysed ideas.252 For example, he 
frequently writes that solidarity is the reverse side of justice; justice being essential to an 
understanding of Habermas’s discourse ethics. Elsewhere, it is one of the “three major forces” 
that hold a state together, the other two being money and administrative power. Finally, it is 
clearly fundamental to perhaps his most famous theory, that of communicative action. There 
could be a number of reasons why solidarity has had this lack of attention. It could be that, as 
is being argued throughout this thesis, it is the nature of solidarity itself as a seemingly chaotic, 
inarticulate and chameleon concept that its understood (if it is addressed at all) as not equal 
with other more established concepts, such as freedom, justice, equality etc. Another reason 
could be that Habermas is not forthcoming with a detailed account of solidarity. So although it 
appears (fleetingly) at times throughout his work post- Theory of Communicative Action, there 
are only a few instances of sustained treatment. Likewise, it is rarely the sole focus of a text 
and in nearly all cases where he uses the concept, there is not a clear definition given. This last 
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consideration would not matter, if it was not the case that he does give lengthy and careful 
definitions of other concepts. Whatever the reasons may be, and it is probably a combination 
of the above, there has been far too little attention paid to solidarity in the secondary 
literature. Therefore one of the aims of this chapter is to argue that Habermas should be 
considered a solidarity thinker, in much the same way as Durkheim is often characterised. 
However, Habermas will be shown to be a solidarity thinker more through implication, as the 
main aim of this and all the chapters is to try to illustrate and understand what solidarity is, or 
what it’s possible meanings could be. The aim ultimately is to explore solidarity through a close 
engagement with Habermas’s writing.  
It would be impossible to do justice to the entirety of Habermas’s engagement with solidarity. 
Instead this chapter will attempt to indicate the major positions that Habermas has on 
solidarity. There is also not a straightforward way of structuring Habermas’s positions on 
solidarity, as shifts in his position are not clearly marked. They vary in relation to the broader 
object of study, the discipline that a debate is being situated in or the addressee of his 
comments. For instance when the object of study is the European Union he emphasises 
different qualities of solidarity than when he is presenting his theory of communicative action. 
Likewise, when Habermas is discussing solidarity in relation to law, in, for example, Between 
Facts and Norms, this is a discussion that is situated within a particular legal discourse one that 
does not lead to easy comparison with for instance, his writing on Kohlberg in Justice and 
Solidarity.253 Finally, there are the sometimes overplayed differences between his public 
writing and speeches, and his academic writing. Highlighted in the case of solidarity, with the 
comments in a speech given in 2013 Democracy, Solidarity and the European Union, in which 
he says that solidarity should not be thought of as “synonymous with “justice” ” something 
that is clearly implied by numerous comments elsewhere.254 The problem of squaring public 
with academic pronouncements notwithstanding, it is nevertheless hard to form a 
straightforward development in Habermas’s various uses of solidarity. One option would be to 
chart solidarity through his work whilst citing the various ways in which the term alters. This 
would certainly reveal that solidarity undergoes many important changes in Habermas’s work. 
However, this is not meant to be an intellectual history of Habermas’s treatment of solidarity. 
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Rather, the various manifestations of solidarity act as representative of more broadly held 
positions. The different positions of Habermas fall under three headings. They reflect 
progression through time but are not tied to Habermas’s own writing chronology. Therefore, 
the first chapter will focus on how Habermas understands solidarity historically. This will have 
several different strands. First, there are the grand historical narratives that involve the 
creation of nation-states at the end of the 18th century, the development of modern capitalism 
and latterly welfare-capitalism. This is in keeping with classical sociological and historical 
questions, culminating in the question of ‘how is society possible?’ Parallel, although often 
discussed separately, is the role of personal history; or socialisation. This is key for 
understanding Habermas’s thinking on solidarity, the interplay between the grand historical 
schemes and the very personal lived history of individuals. This dialectic can be seen in many 
of his most well-known ideas: for example in the interaction between lifeworld and system. 
Taking a historical stance on Habermas’s approach to solidarity will allow for both a greater 
understanding of how his thinking on solidarity evolves through and is grounded in historical 
reality and historically lived experience. And this will reveal the tensions that exist in his 
treatment and presentation of solidarity, something that will ultimately give greater clarity to 
more fundamental questions of solidarity itself. The question of historical scale both in terms 
of time and individual lived experience is very important to the ways that solidarity are 
thought about. In particular for the questions being raised by this thesis, if solidarity (as I 
contend) is partnered with crisis, on what level does this operate? Does it describe a structural 
crisis that would derive its explanatory power from its ability to help to explain how a 
particular society can be understood to be in ‘crisis’? Could it make sense to explain a personal 
crisis as deriving from a lack of solidarity? In a sense it will be shown that solidarity is used on 
both of these levels, albeit in divergent ways. Therefore, when it comes to addressing the 
broader argument of the thesis, which is that solidarity accompanies crisis and yet is too ill-
defined, within this tradition, to be the route out of it; it matters where solidarity is situated.   
Chapter 5 approaches solidarity in Habermas from a presentist or theoretical stance. Here, 
what is examined is how Habermas describes and analyses solidarity in relation to his 
contemporary reality. What his contemporary reality is, changes of course, and this can be 
seen to lead to changes in how he writes about solidarity. There is a clear difference between 
the pre- and post- worlds of divided and then united Germany. Likewise, a more integrated, 
less economically dependent European Union alters how he conceives of the role of solidarity. 
The difficulty that will be explored in these chapters is how to identify, what for Habermas is 
the case for, solidarity ‘now’ i.e. a descriptive account of what solidarity does in his 
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contemporary understanding of (in particular) welfare capitalist societies of which he is a part. 
And conversely, what solidarity should be i.e. a prescriptive account of what solidarity should 
be doing, but is not. The line between these two positions is at times blurred and unpicking the 
descriptive from the prescriptive in his writings on solidarity will be the main part of this 
section. Through this analysis we get a clearer sense of what Habermas’s distinctive idea of 
solidarity is. The section builds on the previous one by indicating the historical nature of 
Habermas’s solidarity. Again, it will be argued that Habermas’s use of solidarity in this setting, 
to address contemporary social and political reality, is most useful when viewed as a critical 
tool. To clarify, it will be shown that Habermas uses solidarity to replace the need for a 
normative critical position that would rely on metaphysical or religious justification. This 
second Habermas chapter can be seen to be the end point of the project that was initiated by 
Durkheim that was discussed in the previous two chapters.  
The third section is more firmly centred in a future oriented perspective. It is in this section 
that the culmination of the previous two sections will be brought to bear on what Habermas 
wants solidarity to become. The setting for the discussion is how he attempts to address 
concerns around multicultural societies but more crucially how he envisions a post-national 
globalised world, one that would have solidarity as a crucial component. Ultimately what will 
be argued in this section is that when Habermas attempts to move beyond the national or 
European setting for the possibility of a more global solidarity, his theory becomes 
unsuccessful. This will be shown through an analysis that confronts his own historical narrative 
of solidarity formation with that of a post-national one. The latter relies on an understanding 
of human rights and a certain strain of universalism that it will be argued is not sustainable, 
either theoretically within his own thinking, or as a practical program to be developed with 
some slight amendments that would be broadly in keeping with his framework, as some have 
tried to do.255 The conclusion of this section, however, is not intended to be negative, as with 
the rest of the thesis, it will be argued that precisely at those points at which solidarity reaches 
its limits is where it is at its most instructive in terms of what it can offer by way of social and 
political critique. It will also be hoped that by the end of this section on Habermas it will be 
shown that solidarity as articulated within this dominant European tradition has reached its 
end point. Although Pensky and others have argued that his version of solidarity is the end 
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point but, that it can still be salvaged, the proposal that will be made is that it cannot. This 
ultimate exhaustion of the possibilities of even the constellation of solidarity, has 
consequences for the contemporary welfare state as well as a crisis in the lifeworld.       
Chapter 1: Historically contingent solidarity  
Habermas uses history in various different ways when discussing solidarity. Firstly, he 
understands the origins and creation of nation-states, as coupled with the influence of prior 
religious and enlightenment ideas. The rise of the nation-state is a history of conscious or 
semi-conscious transformation. It involves the territorial transformation from early modern 
states in Europe to, at the end of the 18th century, what could be identified as the modern 
nation-state. This transformation Habermas argues has coercive and conflict driven 
characteristics. Nevertheless the birth of the modern nation-state coincides for Habermas with 
the creation of a particular form of solidarity, one that is a necessary part of the process. The 
other long-term historical narrative that Habermas relies on for his explanation of the role of 
solidarity in nation-state formation, is the intellectual effects of religion and the 
Enlightenment. The basic idea that will be explored below is that Habermas sees solidarity 
stemming from a particular grounding in a Judaeo-Christian tradition that is then overlaid by 
certain ideas of the Enlightenment. In both cases the political and intellectual history that 
Habermas draws upon is almost exclusively the history of Europe.256  
The second way in which solidarity is historically contingent is in his theory of socialisation. In 
some ways his theory is similar to prior thinkers such as Hegel and Durkheim, but in other 
ways, such as how the individual can act contrary to some forms of socialisation, he is marking 
out different territory. Socialisation, as was seen in the previous chapter in Durkheim’s 
prescriptive analysis of education, is the place where the individual learns the norms of a 
particular society or community. As such, it is through socialisation or the history of individual 
lived experience that solidarity is formed, reformed, acted upon, transgressed and enforced. 
How the process of socialisation, or lifeworld, interacts with the long durée of historical 
change, helps Habermas to make important claims about how solidarity is created, maintained 
and (as will been seen near the end of this chapter) transformed in the future.  
History: the nation-state and Religious and Enlightenment ideas  
The moment of nation-state building that occurs around the time of the French Revolution in 
Europe coincides for Habermas with the arrival of a new form of solidarity. On the timing he is 
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correct, as shown in the first chapter. However, what his emphasis or explanation is tied to is 
his own theoretical framework, as he writes in a very recent lecture addressing concerns 
around the European Union in 2013:  
The concept of solidarity first appeared in a situation in which revolutionaries were 
suing for solidarity in the sense of a redemptive reconstruction of relations of 
reciprocal support that were familiar but had become hollowed out by the surpassing 
processes of modernization.257  
The transformation towards nation-states requires for Habermas a form of solidarity that can 
answer the longstanding problem of social order, perhaps most famously articulated by 
Hobbes. Habermas understands solidarity as having to contend with some of the same 
problems that Hobbes identifies, such as that of the free rider and why laws are obeyed when 
punishment is unlikely. The drive towards modernisation identified in the above quote creates 
additional concerns. The history of modernisation is difficult to track, even when viewed only 
in European terms. Rates of modernisation and the establishment of nation-states are uneven 
across Europe, with some places such as England and Holland experiencing early forms of 
industrialisation (often seen as a necessary element of modernisation) much earlier than 
elsewhere, in France for example.258 Likewise, the now fairly stable nation-states of Europe 
were secured relatively recently, with perhaps the most important example being the creation 
of Germany as late as 1871.259 The uneven progression of modernisation that occurs in Europe 
should be kept in mind, however many historians reluctantly utilise the French Revolution of 
1789 to mark the end of early modern Europe and the beginning of modern Europe. 
Habermas’s remarks roughly follow this latter demarcation.260  
In Habermas’s early writing, and to lesser degree in Communicative Action, he is fairly close to 
a Durkheimian understanding of this transformative process of modern nation-state building. 
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This can be seen in the following passage that is in reference to Durkheim’s critique of 
Spencer, that cooperative money ties would not be enough without moral norms to hold 
together organic solidarity. However Habermas offers a decisive critique to Durkheim’s 
position:  
On this account, there would have to be a causal connection between the growing 
differentiation of the social system and the development of an independent morality 
effective for integration. But there is scarcely any empirical evidence for this thesis. 
Modern societies present us with a different picture. The differentiation of a highly 
complex market system destroys traditional forms of solidarity without at the same 
time producing normative orientations capable of securing an organic form of 
solidarity. On Durkheim’s own diagnosis, democratic forms of political will-formation 
and universalistic morality are too weak to counter the disintegrating effects of the 
division of labor. He sees industrial capitalist societies driving toward a state of 
anomie. And he traces this anomie back to the same processes of differentiation 
from which a new morality is supposed to arise “as if by a law of nature.261  
Aside from highlighting the well-known empirical deficiencies of Durkheim’s account, 
Habermas sees a further problem with his argument, stemming from the possible origin of a 
new morality. Habermas does however concede that there is a need for a new normative 
moral basis to support the new form of solidarity. His criticism of Durkheim, although relying 
on a fairly traditional interpretation of his work262, does raise an important consideration. If it 
is the case that differentiation is the site where the new morality is to be generated, and if that 
proves to be inadequate on Habermas’s reading, then where does it arise from? Importantly, 
Habermas does think that a new form of morality is produced, however, he argues that it 
stems from a pre-existing cultural base.  
In the nineteenth century, the peoples of Europe – each on its own, of course – were 
faced with a structurally similar problem. A European identity, which today has to be 
created from a communicative context stretching over national public spheres, was 
at that time the product of national consciousness. Of course, the idea of the nation 
in its populist version led to devastating acts of exclusion, to the expulsion of 
enemies of the state – and to the annihilation of Jews. But in its culturalistic version, 
the idea of the nation also contributed to the creation of a mode of solidarity 
between persons who had until then remained strangers to one another. The 
universalistic reformulation of inherited loyalties to village and clan, landscape and 
dynasty was a difficult and protracted process, and it did not permeate the entire 
population until well into the twentieth century, even in the classical nation-states of 
the West.263  
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This lengthy passage summarises much of how Habermas understands the creation of this new 
form of solidarity, one that is fit for the more complex, differentiated and populous modern 
nation-state.264 The key aspects of Habermas’s explanation build from an already existing 
cultural basis stemming from and informing a national consciousness. The basic move that 
Habermas articulates is that the solidarity that was present in the loyalty of traditional forms 
of bonding between people becomes capable of expanding to incorporate strangers and 
potentially foreigners. The idea of the stranger or foreigner is very important throughout 
nearly all the various manifestations of solidarity that Habermas writes about. This is because 
the universal aspect of solidarity only makes sense if it can be applied beyond the personal 
lived experience of any one individual. Habermas has to be able to show that solidarity 
operates at a level beyond immediate interpersonal interactions, otherwise, his assertions 
about how nation-states work and with that solidarity as a generalizable moral norm will not 
work.  
The other key element that comes out of this passage is the necessity, but also the danger, of 
the idea of a nation premised along populist lines. Although Habermas certainly flags the 
danger of populism, in this case with regards to the Holocaust, it appears to also be an 
essential ingredient in forming a coherent nation-state. More will be said about this later in the 
chapter exploring whether Habermas underplays the real danger involved. For now, what is 
important is that the universalism that allows for a solidarity to stretch across and beyond its 
traditional areas, implicitly and at times explicitly requires exclusion. On Habermas’s reading 
and one that certainly is in keeping with many others on this subject, the nation-state is 
grounded on the premise that there are those for whom membership is not allowed. It is so 
created against what it is not, along the cultural traditions that Habermas highlights in the 
passage that follows:           
Democratic self-determinism can only come about if the population of a state is 
transformed into a nation of citizens who take their political destiny into their own 
hands. The political mobilization of “subjects,” however, depends on a prior cultural 
integration of what is initially a number of people who have been thrown together 
with each other. This desideratum is fulfilled by the idea of the nation, with whose 
help the members of a state construct a new form of collective identity beyond their 
inherited loyalties to village, family, place, or clan. The cultural symbolism of 
“people” secures its own particular character, its “spirit of the people,” in the 
presumed commonalities of descent, language, and history, and in this way 
generates a unity, even if only an imaginary one. It hereby makes the residents of a 
single state-controlled territory aware of a collective belonging that, until then, had 
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been merely abstract and legal. Only the symbolic construction of “a people” makes 
the modern state into a nation-state.265  
Here Habermas is invoking in part something very similar to the argument that is found in 
Anderson’s famous Imagined Communities (1983).266 On one level this is important as it de-
naturalises the idea of the nation-state and affirms its arbitrary construction. On another level, 
and perhaps more significantly for the way in which Habermas will premise his idea of post-
national cosmopolitan solidarity, the nation is created by and through its members.267 The 
extent to which agency can be attached to such an undertaking is hard to discern. Habermas is 
clearly arguing that it stems through interactions (communicatively) between firstly subjects 
and then citizens. The direction that these interactions take, when thought of through 
structures of power that existed before and after the creation of the modern nation-state 
remain largely underdeveloped in Habermas. It is clear however, that for a nation or people to 
be realised, a certain degree of willingness on the part of the individuals concerned will have 
had to be expressed. The amount of consent involved is an open question, but once 
established, if only symbolically, it is for Habermas a powerful and ideologically successful 
social and political reality. The question that is then raised by Habermas is how these new 
nation-states can be kept stable and how they can reproduce themselves without the need for 
the conflict that created them. One of the solutions that could explain this would be that the 
solidarity that was initially activated through the struggle to form a coherent people or nation 
becomes substantiated in a system of laws.268 In the following passage Habermas sets out this 
part of his solution:    
Constructed through the medium of modern law, the modern territorial state thus 
depends on the development of a national consciousness to provide it with the 
cultural substrate for civil solidarity. With this solidarity, the bonds that had formed 
between members of a concrete community on the basis of personal relationships 
now change into a new, more abstract form. While remaining strangers to one 
another, members of the same “nation” feel responsible enough for one another 
that they are prepared to make “sacrifices” – as in military service or the burden of 
redistributive taxation. In the Federal Republic of Germany, financial redistribution 
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between federal states is an example of the willingness of citizens to stand up for one 
another; a willingness that an egalitarian, universalistic legal order expects from its 
citizens.269   
The movement that Habermas detects is one that takes what he is now calling civil solidarity 
(presumably because it involves citizens rather than subjects) to be demanding a form of law 
that reflects the new abstract universal bonds. This is in contrast to what will be discussed in 
the next chapter, namely ‘moral’ solidarity. It is important to realise that this universalism is 
actually only nationally manifested, in practice at least. Habermas, however, argues that this 
initial convergence between a civic solidarity that is capable of supporting a normatively 
prescriptive abstract universal consideration for strangers and foreigners as equals (within the 
defined nation-state) and its legal institutionalisation, becomes corrupted. The corruption or 
undermining of the universal aspect of civil solidarity occurs in two ways; firstly through classic 
liberalism and secondly through republicanism. The relative success of these two rival ideas is 
affirmed by Habermas, however, they also erode the underlying basis of civic solidarity. He 
writes the following in terms of classic liberalism:     
[C]lassic liberalism threatened to reduce the meaning of equal ethical liberties to a 
possessive-individualist reading of subjective rights, misunderstood in instrumentalist 
terms. In so doing, it missed an important normative intuition, which ought to be 
recovered even under conditions of modern societies – an intuition about forms of 
solidarity that link not only relatives, friends and neighbors within private spheres of 
life, but also unite citizens as members of a political community beyond merely legal 
relations.270  
The transformation of solidarity from one that is based on proximity and traditional forms of 
bonding, as stated above, to one that does not give priority to those bonds but any other 
individual that falls within the confines of the nation-state is crucial for Habermas. Therefore, 
if, according to Habermas, classic liberalism takes the law to be responding to individual 
property rights for example, it too quickly transfers the energy that forms civic solidarity into 
instrumental relations.271 Understood a different way, the normative basis falls away, in effect 
civic solidarity is not transformed but replaced by legal structures. Habermas, however, 
counters that there is a way to save civic solidarity, but only if the remaining traditional 
threads of solidarity are cut off. Basically, Habermas thinks that civic solidarity in some sense is 
an extension of the traditional bonds, family, friends, etc. that now includes all members of a 
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larger defined group, usually along racial or ethnic lines. This in effect is a contradiction of the 
impulse towards a universal form of civic solidarity. Habermas highlights this in the following 
passage, which also introduces ideas of human rights and democracy:          
These problems [classic liberalism] can be solved only within a framework that, from 
the perspective of egalitarian universalism, disconnects the mobilization of civic 
solidarity from ethnic nationality and radicalizes it toward a solidarity among 
“others.” In binding itself to universalistic constitutional principles and to “human” 
rights, the sovereign will-formation of democratic citizens is only acting according to 
the necessary presuppositions of a legitimate legal institutionalization of its own 
practice.272  
There is a sense here that there needs to be a process of recognition or at least that the 
citizens feel that they contribute to the creation of the legal system. Reflecting on this in terms 
of human rights, that by definition have to apply to all others, and the input (however weak) of 
a democratic system, even when tied to a national setting frees solidarity to apply to all others. 
Habermas argues that this position can operate between the poles of classic liberalism and 
republicanism. The republican aspect is the active will formation stemming from the practice 
of popular sovereignty combined with a rights based discourse more closely aligned with 
classic liberalism, this can be seen when Habermas states that:  
Historically-evolved forms of solidarity are transformed, but not destroyed, by the 
intersecting of the republican idea of popular sovereignty with the idea of a rule 
spelled out in terms of basic rights. According to this third reading, which mediates 
between liberalism and republicanism, citizens understand the political ethos that 
keeps them together as a nation as the intentional outcome of the democratic will-
formation of a populace accustomed to political freedom. The internal relation 
between the private autonomy of the individual member of society and the 
commonly-exercised political autonomy of citizens has been progressively worked 
out; the historical experience of this fact is eventually expressed in the national pride 
of an acquired, intersubjectively shared consciousness of freedom.273 
In summary the above passage could have two interpretations. Firstly, it could be the actual 
culmination of a negotiated stage of the nation-state, underpinned albeit seemingly in a non-
obvious way by solidarity, which roughly equates with modern (western) democratic states, 
since the late 19th century to around the 1980s. Alternatively this could be a model for how 
Habermas wants nation-states to be. Some of the elements are present but perhaps they are 
either not fully formed yet, or are being held back or eroded in some way. It can be seen as 
simultaneously an explanation for how modern nation-states are held together and as a set of 
criteria for a theory of democracy. In either case the role of solidarity, even in a transformed 
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manner, appears essential. This may have important implications for Habermas’s more general 
theory of democracy, but it does not give a clear enough account of solidarity itself. By 
‘solidarity itself’ is meant the active parts of solidarity, the bit of solidarity that motivates 
people and causes and creates changes in society. Therefore Habermas can state that:    
The legacy of the Judeo-Christian ethics of fraternity was fused, in the concept of 
solidarity, with the republicanism of Roman origin. The orientation toward salvation 
or emancipation became amalgamated with that toward legal and political 
freedom.274  
This statement encapsulates the above trajectory of solidarity in terms of its intellectual 
development (more will be said about the Judeo-Christian legacy later), although it misses the 
material history of everyday life, which finds ultimate expression in class antagonism. 
Habermas, in perhaps, his most materially historically relevant way, describes the role that 
solidarity played in practical terms. How solidarity forced through the transformation that is 
largely left unexplored in his other historical writing about solidarity, can be seen in the 
following passage:  
By the midst of the 19th century, an accelerated functional differentiation of society 
gave rise to extensive interdependencies behind the back of a paternalistic, still 
largely corporative and occupationally stratified every-day-world. Under the pressure 
of these reciprocal functional dependencies the older forms of social integration 
broke down and led to the rise of class antagonisms which were finally contained 
only with the extended forms of political integration of the nation state. The appeals 
to “solidarity” had their historical origin in the dynamic of the new class struggles. 
The organizations of the workers movement with their well-founded appeals to 
solidarity reacted to the occasion provided by the fact that the systemic, mainly 
economic constraints had outstripped the old relations of solidarity. The socially 
uprooted journeymen, workers, employees, and day laborers were supposed to form 
an alliance beyond the systemically generated competitive relations on the labor 
market. The opposition between the social classes of industrial capitalism was finally 
institutionalized within the framework of the democratically constituted nation 
states.275   
This long passage is one that is largely in agreement with how Durkheim describes the 
transformation of society, brought about through occupational differentiation. As this passage 
comes from a public lecture, perhaps some degree of charity needs to be applied to what he 
says. However, there does appear to be a contradiction between saying, “[t]he socially 
uprooted journeymen, workers, employees, and day laborers were supposed to form an 
alliance”, and that the oppositions were institutionalised through the democratic process; 
presumably through an expansion in the voting franchise. Is it that the alliances or goal 
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orientated solidarity networks failed and the antagonism present in the creation of nation-
states gets sublimated through democratic means, as in they lost? Alternatively is it that the 
alliances forced through a demand to become part of a will-formation that could act in such a 
way as to attend to their grievances? Again it is unclear whether Habermas wants to see 
earlier forms of traditional solidarity (that were replaced by later forms of solidarity that were 
ultimately unsuccessful) as reenergising the impetus behind such a movement. Or whether 
Habermas is arguing that the workers’ social movements are in fact the precursors to a form of 
democracy that can “eventually [be] expressed in the national pride of an acquired, 
intersubjectively shared consciousness of freedom.” Elsewhere Habermas makes this point in a 
clearer way, citing the work of Schulze:  
Interpreted in light of their results, the complex and long-running processes of the 
“invention of the nation” (Schulze) played the role of a catalyst in the transformation 
of the early modern state into a democratic republic. Popular national self-
consciousness provided the cultural background against which “subjects” could 
become politically active “citizens.” Belonging to the “nation” made possible for the 
first time a relation of solidarity between persons who had previously been strangers 
to one another. Thus the achievement of the nation-state consisted in solving two 
problems at once: it made possible a new mode of legitimation based on a new, 
more abstract form of social integration.276  
It is clear in this passage that Habermas thinks that the project of the nation-state has been 
successful, as it has as its core an answer to the disintegration that occurs as the traditional 
states become torn apart through economic expansion and diversity, leading to demographic 
increases in population size and the geographical uprooting of people. This integration 
understood as a form of civic solidarity leads to, and is then maintained by, legitimate 
governance. Legitimate, as the citizenry can now recognise their contribution in its creation 
through the process of communicative action. What is important to note is that there remains 
a tension in solidarity between its pre-modern and nation-state presentation. Essentially, what 
appears to remain is the willingness on the part of individuals to act in a sacrificing capacity 
which appears to go beyond simply custom or habit; the element of sacrifice that is required 
for universal legal formations, legitimate governance and its accompanying social integration. 
It is a movement between the particular and the universal or the subjective and the objective 
that occurs, as Habermas writes:           
As a component of a universalistic morality, of course, solidarity loses its merely 
particular meaning, in which it is limited to the internal relationships of a collectivity 
that is ethnocentrically isolated from other groups that character of forced 
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willingness to sacrifice oneself for a collective system of self-assertion that is always 
present in premodern forms of solidarity.277  
This final part of the historical progression of solidarity can be seen here to take on the 
language of a Judeo-Christian tradition. Although Habermas is not explicit on this point, it 
appears to follow that the use of sacrifice based terminology stems from its basis in 
Europeans’ long involvement with a certain kind of religious thought. This is the other strand 
of the explanation that Habermas wants to present: that ideas that are present in the Judeo-
Christian tradition form part of the basis for practiced solidarity. In the pre-modern case it 
provides a doctrine for action towards others that both gives a rhetorical meaning to inter-
personal forms of kinship and also licence for a justifiable sacrificial worldview with regards to 
the needs of others.  
What follows is an examination of how Habermas sees religious worldviews, in relation to 
forms of solidarity. In the final analysis it will be argued that Habermas thinks solidarity is 
innate and prelinguistic, but is carried through the symbolic language of the sacred, which 
even in modern (supposedly secular) societies cannot be fully translated into the profane. This 
aspect of Habermas’s thinking has been touched on by commentators and their analysis will 
therefore be looked at. However, it will be shown that they have not gone far enough in 
exposing the important consequences of this aspect of Habermas’s theory with respect to 
solidarity. To begin with it will be useful to see where Habermas wishes to end up. The 
following passage indicates the trajectory that he wishes society to follow:       
In traditional societies, moral norms are indeed so closely bound up with religious 
worldviews and shared forms of life that individuals learn what it means to enjoy the 
status of membership in a community thus founded through identification with the 
contents of this established concrete ethical life. But in modern societies, moral 
norms must detach themselves from the concrete contents of the plurality of 
attitudes toward life that now manifest themselves; they are grounded solely in an 
abstract social identity that is henceforth circumscribed only by the status of 
membership in some society, not in this or that particular society. This explains the 
two salient features of a secularized morality that has transcended the context of an 
over-arching social ethos. A morality that rests only on the normative content of 
universal conditions of coexistence in a society (founded on mutual respect for 
persons) in general must be universalistic and egalitarian in respect of the validity 
and sphere of application of its norms; at the same time, it is formal and empty in the 
content of its norms.278   
There are many important points raised here by Habermas. Firstly, there is the relationship 
between a given community and religiously justified moral norms. The implication is that 
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religion is an essential ingredient to maintaining a community, but that when the leap is made 
towards a society the religiously enforceable ethical values have to undergo a secularisation 
process.279 Secularisation promotes a new worldview which removes the particular directed 
moral code and instead has the ability to be universally applicable. In this particular passage 
Habermas is arguing further that it is the universal and egalitarian quality of moral norms that 
must be respected, not the normative content in and for itself. Interestingly, at this point 
Habermas is arguing that therefore norms must remain empty, implying that they are properly 
detached from religious worldviews. The point is that instead of religion telling us what to do 
and how to behave, it gives us principles by which we can determine this for ‘ourselves’. In 
searching for a clearer understanding of Habermas’s position of how religion relates to 
solidarity, it is necessary to present some of the ways that he understands religion in terms of 
the development of communication. The importance of this can be seen when Habermas 
states:   
Religious symbolism represents one of three prelinguistic [in the sense of 
propositionally differentiated language] roots of communicative action. Only in and 
through communicative action can the energies of social solidarity attached to 
religious symbolism branch out and be imparted, in the form of moral authority, both 
to institutions and to persons.280  
This statement appears to be unequivocal in tying religious thought to what he here calls social 
solidarity (social solidarity as in this instance in Communicative Action where he is still heavily 
reliant on Durkheimian sociology). It also seems reasonable to assume that solidarity comes 
out of religious symbolism that is prelinguistic. The question then is, does that mean that 
solidarity should be considered to be prelinguistic? Before being able to answer this question it 
is worth examining how Habermas understands the different stages of the disengagement of 
the sacred and the profane in the development of communication.  
First, Habermas claims that “instinctual residues” is the ground the symbolic (religious) is built 
upon (or reflected in). Second, it is from this religious symbolism with its ability to make 
concrete the instinctual residues that enables the common ground for communal relations of 
cooperation that pertains even after the split between the sacred and the profane, or symbolic 
and propositional forms of communication. The final part, Habermas argues that religious 
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symbols still concurrently and after their disengagement from epistemological uses in terms of 
explaining, using and understanding the perceptible world, still possess an instinctive basis. 281  
Articulated in a slightly different way Melissa Yates notes that the religious element has 
“perhaps [an] irreplaceable role to play in public deliberation” and that “[h]e takes for granted 
that religious language sometimes conceals deep, universal moral truths that have not yet 
been adequately understood in secular terms.”282 On this reading Yates is not committing 
Habermas to saying that solidarity is one of the ‘universal moral truths’ that cannot be 
translated through secularisation. However, if the above reading is correct in linking instincts 
to religious symbolism as fused to solidarity, then it would fall under this rubric. Equally, it 
could be that the religious symbolism is circumvented by the secularisation program and that 
it links directly to instinctual solidarity. One possible consequence of this line of thought is that 
communicative action is really about solidarity and solidarity is drawn from the ‘community of 
believers’. Habermas’s discussion of Horkheimer and solidarity can help to make this point 
more understandable as it links moral ideas and secularisation. In the following passage 
Habermas appears to be arguing that once rationalisation becomes ubiquitous then ideas or 
sentiments of the religious worldviews are superseded:  
Once the rationality of the remorse experienced by a religiously tutored conscience is 
rejected by a secularized world, its place is taken by the moral sentiment of 
compassion. When Horkheimer expressly defines the good tautologically as the 
attempt to abolish evil, he has in view a solidarity with the suffering of vulnerable 
and forsaken creatures provoked by outrage against concrete injustices. The 
reconciling power of compassion does not stand in opposition to the galvanizing 
power of rebellion against a world devoid of atonement and reparation for injustice. 
Solidarity and justice are two sides of the same coin: hence, the ethics of compassion 
does not dispute the legitimacy of morality or justice but merely frees it from the 
rigidity of the ethics of conscience.283   
In this telling passage Habermas argues that religiously minded individuals learn to become 
secular. They undergo almost a process of active realignment where they readjust the 
direction of their sentiments from one that is an individual concern to one that is universally 
verifiable. Likewise, it also brings into play a recurring theme for Habermas, that solidarity and 
justice are indelibly linked. They not only reinforce each other but they cannot be understood 
apart, once rationalisation/secularisation has taken place. Habermas changes his mind 
somewhat on how religious ideas relate to solidarity before and after modern nation-states 
are substantiated through the duel aspects of rationalisation and secularisation. He offers at 
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least three different ways that it can be understood. First, that solidarity is an aspect of 
Christian Europe that remains even in the modern sense as a remnant of the religious heritage 
that has gone before, that it is something that in a sense cannot be fully articulated in rational 
terms. Second, it does in fact become rationalised when it becomes fused to universal notions 
of morality stemming from the enlightenment and felt most keenly when considered with 
justice. Third, it could be that solidarity is part of the instinctual make-up of human beings 
from the start and that first religion and then later rational discourse finds differing ways of 
using and explaining this basic instinct. There are probably other ways still that this can be 
thought of along with Habermas, but just on this reading it indicates some very important 
aspects of solidarity more generally.284 Can solidarity be fully rationalised? Are we 
programmed towards solidarity? Is solidarity best articulated through sacred or profane 
language, whatever its underlying reality? Habermas could be interpreted as having a 
contradictory history of solidarity something that goes to prove again the difficulty of defining 
solidarity. Equally, it could be that Habermas fundamentally changes his mind as his thought 
develops from a rationalist secularisation thesis (similar to Weber) in TCA to his reflections on 
post-secular society and modernisation in TIO. In Habermas’s defence it should be made clear 
that the passages chosen are taken out of sequence and with little consideration for their 
context. Certainly, Habermas does change his mind on this topic, however, but that is not what 
is being criticised. More precisely, the divergence and the difficulties that Habermas reveals 
are really uncovering what this thesis is attempting to show about the nature of solidarity. As a 
last thought on the role of history, religion and solidarity Eduardo Mendieta perhaps comes 
closest to articulating the situation that Habermas is trying to explain:       
[T]he horizontal relationship among believers and the vertical relationship between 
each believer and God shapes the two corresponding aspects: that of solidarity and 
that of justice (IO:10). Here the grammar of one’s religious relationship to God and 
the corresponding community of believers are like the exoskeleton of a magnificent 
species, which once the religious worldviews contained in them have desiccated 
under the impact of the forces of secularization leave behind a casing to be used as a 
structuring shape for other contents.285  
Socialisation and personal history  
The last chapter on Durkheim argued that the way that solidarity is generated and passed on, 
in and through communities, is through a process of socialisation. The above section on ‘the 
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big picture’ with regards to solidarity and history, fails to explain how individuals become 
enmeshed with solidarity and how they come to shape solidarity themselves through 
socialisation. The other aspect often overlooked, is that individuals or persons have their own 
history or story and that this has important consequences for how solidarity can be 
understood. The discussion in the following section centres on, how communicative action 
replaces the sacred in terms of the everyday considerations of solidarity, how this impacts on 
individual human agency and the function of solidarity as a form of social integration.  
Socialisation appears to be something that Habermas thinks is a different type of phenomenon 
to coordination. As outlined above coordination belongs to pre-modern states and 
socialisation emerges out of the stresses put on individuals through the processes of 
modernisation. The difference could seem trivial, as one wonders how different the everyday 
interactions really became. However, Habermas argues that a significant switch does take 
place, one that can be detected through language.286 In the following complicated passage 
Habermas returns to the theme of the sacred and religiously enforced qualities of human 
intersubjective experiences and argues that the mechanism of language itself alters these 
experiences as secularisation or rationalisation takes place:       
At the same time, this transposition of cognitions, obligations, and expressions onto a 
linguistic basis makes it possible in turn for the means of communication to take on 
new functions – in addition to the function of reaching understanding, those of 
coordinating action and socializing actors as well. Under the aspect of reaching 
understanding, communicative acts serve the transmission of culturally stored 
knowledge – as shown above, cultural tradition reproduces itself through the 
medium of action oriented to reaching understanding. Under the aspect of 
coordinating action, the same communicative acts serve the fulfilment of norms 
appropriate to a given context; social integration also takes place via this medium. 
Under the aspect of socialization, finally, communicative acts serve the construction 
of internal controls on behaviour, in general, the formation of personality structures; 
one of Meads’s fundamental insights is that socialization processes take place via 
linguistically mediated interaction.287  
The important thing to realise about this passage is that Habermas thinks that cultural 
knowledge (which might include religious knowledge) is passed onto to each new individual 
through the mechanism and power of the way that language functions. That language comes 
to be the medium through which action is coordinated also has the quality of an obligation. 
The obligation to seek mutual understanding is the means by which society is held together. 
The socialisation aspect here is that this process creates inside the individual a personality that 
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adheres to a principle of intersubjective communicative action. This has the consequence that 
the norms which come to be binding, although may get their grounding through the process of 
internalising the shared cultural history of a given society, actually act according to the rules of 
how the norms are transcribed, namely through communicative acts. Habermas makes this 
point clear when he states that: 
Communicative action turns out to be a switching station for energies of social 
solidarity, but this time we viewed the switch point not under the aspect of 
coordination but of socialization, in order to discover how the collective 
consciousness is communicated, via illocutionary forces, not to institutions but to 
individuals.288  
This idea is highly significant because it raises the individual in terms of their role and their 
responsibility. It gives a certain degree of agency to the individual by revealing the emptiness 
at the heart of the norms that oscillate through the collective consciousness. The rigid 
symbolic sacredness of traditional moral codes is now unjustifiable on its own terms. Norms 
have to be rationally agreed upon by the individuals concerned. It is in the act of real 
agreement, that conversation made possible by the transformation towards a rationalised 
language, which is where solidarity is located. The following passage indicates the steps of this 
process, one that grounds in everyday experience what was described above only in general 
terms:  
[T]he hypothesis that the socially integrative and expressive functions that were at 
first fulfilled by ritual practice pass over to communicative action: the authority of 
the holy is gradually replaced by the authority of an achieved consensus. This means 
a freeing of communicative action from sacrally protected normative contexts. The 
disenchantment and disempowering of the domain of the sacred takes place by way 
of a linguistification of the ritually secured, basic normative agreement; going along 
with this is a release of the rationality potential in communicative action. The aura of 
rapture and terror that emanates from the sacred, the spellbinding power of the 
holy, is sublimated into the binding/bonding force of criticizable validity claims and at 
the same time turned into an everyday occurrence.289  
The importance of authority was discussed in some detail in the last chapter, however here 
when authority is removed from the sacred, it is not given over to an educative role that is 
institutionalised. Rather, it is the communicatively reached consensus where the authority 
sits, one that is grounded in the everyday profane reality of the individual. The power of the 
authority that compels the individual to obey certain norms in the religious case, is no less 
powerful when it is enacted through the obligation to reach consensus. In fact, as the 
consensus has been reached through a rational process that can be recognised by the 
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participants it is perhaps even stronger, albeit the threat of eternal damnation is less 
pronounced. The power and authority of the ‘holy’ once transformed into debatable validity 
claims, is the bonding or binding force that encapsulates perhaps a version of solidarity 
necessary in a secularised world.290 As has been discussed in the last section, it is not that the 
new forms of linguistic expression appear brand new and ready formed, separate from the 
history that created them. Habermas argues that understanding relies on a shared foundation 
of culturally translated history. If this was not the case then communication would be 
impossible, as he writes in the following passage that ends with a pronouncement of the 
importance of solidarity:      
Both in its argumentative methods and its communicative presuppositions, the 
procedure of discourse has reference to an existential preunderstanding among 
participants regarding the most universal structures of a lifeworld that has been 
shared intersubjectively from the beginning. Even this procedure of discursive will 
formation can seduce us into the one-sided interpretation that the universalizability 
of contested interests guarantees only the equal treatment of all concerned. That 
interpretation overlooks the fact that every requirement of universalization must 
remain powerless unless there also arises, from membership in an ideal 
communication community, a consciousness of irrevocable solidarity, the certainty of 
intimate relatedness in a shared life context.291  
This passage again highlights that solidarity is the thread that runs through all forms of 
communal relationships. It is present before the linguistification of the sacred and it is required 
thereafter. In a certain way in both cases it is the element at the root of intersubjective 
experience that makes community and then society possible. This occurs on both the micro 
and macro level; on the universal and the particular plane. An aspect of Habermas’s somewhat 
teleological historical approach to solidarity that has been flagged already as possibly 
problematic, returns here, namely the success of certain forms of society over others. This is a 
problem that Anthony Giddens summarises well when he writes:  
Here we reach one of Habermas’s main – and, one might add, most questionable – 
proposals. The development of arenas of discourse, which he tries to trace through 
the emergence of the “world religions,” and the subsequent differentiation of 
science, morality, and art in modern culture signifies a general evolution towards an 
expansion of rationality. The more we are able rationally to ground the conduct of 
our lives in the three main spheres of existence – relations with the material world, 
with others, and in the expressive realm of aesthetics – the more advanced our form 
of society can be said to be.292  
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This is perhaps one of the most telling critiques of Habermas, however, it is not one that 
discounts his account of solidarity directly. In one way it actually reveals something important 
about the way that solidarity is often written, namely from a particular western and religious 
perspective. It also highlights the way that solidarity is often characterised as being a 
barometer for perceived changes in the make-up of given societies. So although Habermas 
may be wrong to argue that the form of solidarity that is active within Western modern nation-
states, is a more advanced (read better) form than forms found either in the past or like 
Durkheim before him in places found elsewhere. This way of understanding a progressive 
trajectory of society development that has one model as the yardstick for the others to be 
graded by, is of course problematic.293 However, for our purposes it demonstrates that 
solidarity is used as a means of comparing and contrasting relative rates of progress both in 
time and across space.  
This section on the importance of history for Habermas’s account of solidarity has looked at his 
account of the fundamental shifts from pre-modern states to modern nation-states. This has 
been related to how Habermas thinks solidarity is likewise transformed.294 Additionally the 
crucial role of religious worldviews, when confronted with the force of secularisation and a 
particular form of rational discourse that both stem from the Enlightenment, are transformed 
in terms of their relationship with solidarity. There has also been discussion of the way that 
solidarity continues to influence individual lived experience, once the aforementioned process 
occurs. That individuals in the end bind themselves to others consciously; this perhaps 
indicates which forms of solidarity can be chosen, as much as they are sometimes forced upon 
individuals. Finally, it has again been shown that solidarity would be meaningless without it 
being understood historically. It is this more than anything else that will be crucial as we move 
into the next chapter.      
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Chapter 5: Habermas and Solidarity exhausted   
What was shown in the previous chapter on Habermas was the importance of history to his 
theory of solidarity. In a variety of ways history can be seen to be of crucial importance as it 
informs, shapes and grounds his different uses of solidarity. This chapter will move forward 
from this position to examine how Habermas sees solidarity acting and reacting from this 
historical perspective. Firstly, in the tension that exists between theoretical descriptions of 
solidarity and its practice in political reality. Secondly, how Habermas orientates solidarity 
towards future cultural, social and political possibilities. The underlying argument for both is 
that all of Habermas’s thinking on solidarity relies on a particular historical progression. It will 
be shown that this is not a straightforward position with regards to historical processes. 
However, it will be argued that Habermas is tied to a deterministic view of both history and 
most importantly solidarity. This view in turn, it will be shown, has consequences for a range of 
ideas that Habermas argues for; in particular, his recent reflections on the future of the 
European Union, the changing role of nation-states and possible systems of governance that 
could act globally. However, the focus will remain how Habermas’s theory affects, illustrates 
and defines what solidarity can be, should be and is within the tradition that has been the 
focus of this thesis. Habermas’s attempts in recent years to propose solidarity as the solution 
to the crisis in the European Union is shown to be further proof that the two are intertwined. It 
should be noted from the start that Habermas fails to articulate or define what he means by 
solidarity. This will be shown to be particularly true when it comes to his use of civic solidarity. 
This lack of definition, which has been one of the themes running throughout this thesis, goes 
to further prove that getting a firm handle on what exactly solidarity means is largely 
impossible.   
The chapter is formed of sections beginning with his earlier work in Justice and Solidarity, 
through The Inclusion of the Other, and finally ending in his most recent work, Plea for a 
constitutionalization of international law.   Through this analysis Habermas will be shown to 
have reached an end point of a process that began in the post-French revolutionary milieu that 
was described in chapter one of this thesis. Effectively, Habermas takes a form of solidarity 
that has its origins in 1830s France to its logical end point, and ultimately exhausts it. The 
discussion will take place under four sub-headings:  
- Theory and Practice  
- The Normative Foundations for Solidarity 
- Nation-States, Global Politics and Human Rights  
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Finally, following this there will be a summary of Habermas’s relationship with solidarity in 
general. This will be the place where his various versions of solidarity will be critiqued and 
where the broader implications of the problems of Habermas’s account will be drawn out.      
 
Theory and Practice  
Beginning with Justice and Solidarity Habermas starts to articulate a moral argument for 
solidarity. This marks a shift in his previous thinking that saw solidarity as only a balancing 
force holding society together, along with administrative power and money. Solidarity, from 
Justice and Solidarity until The Post-National Constellation, is understood as the reverse side of 
justice. In both cases, solidarity and justice get their now deontological normative basis from 
the morality that arises from communicative acts and discourse more generally. These 
functions of communication are wedded to and made possible through the concrete reality of 
forms of life that are shared and intersubjectively re-enforced. In essence, each individual 
comes to see that they have a responsibility towards every other individual that happens to 
have membership with their shared life. Here, solidarity requires that individuals respect all 
other members as irreplaceable and thus worthy of equal justice. An attack on one would in 
effect be an attack on all, but, importantly, not reducible to all. It is argued, the qualifying 
status required to be a member of the same interconnected shared life can be ever more 
expanded to be inclusive of all members of the human race. The solidarity that is invoked 
through realising the need for fair treatment for all who are members of the shared life, 
implies it could be taken to the level of the universal. The possibility of a universal solidarity 
will be addressed later. However, solidarity constructed this way is open to questions relating 
to theory and practice.  
It is unclear when Habermas is discussing ‘shared life’ what he means. The difficulty stems 
from it being unclear whether Habermas is describing a process that has taken place, is 
currently taking place or will take place. Assuming that Habermas has in mind the context of 
European nation-states, is this description applicable across the continent? Likewise, if what 
Habermas is setting out is not just theoretical but prescriptive, as in, here is how solidarity 
should work if shared life came to be understood in this sense, then how could such a state of 
affairs be realised, what steps would need to be taken? To illustrate this point the following 
passage is given:             
From the perspective of communication theory there emerges instead a close 
connection between concern for the welfare of one’s fellow man and interest in the 
general welfare: the identity of the group is reproduced through intact relationships 
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of mutual recognition. Thus the perspective complementing that of equal treatment 
of individuals is not benevolence but solidarity. This principle is rooted in the 
realization that each person must take responsibility for the other because as 
consociates all must have an interest in the integrity of their shared life context in the 
same way.295  
The final sentence is the most telling. The realisation could be something that some individuals 
have acquired or it could imply that all ‘consociates’ have acquired it. Is it a condition of being 
a consociate that one has this realisation? It does appear that there is a requirement of 
‘mutual recognition’, one that is tied to the identity of the group. The further implication is 
that once mutual recognition of the members of a stable group can be identified, then 
individuals belonging to the group have an interest in maintaining and protecting others who 
are also members. In one sense this appears to be a straightforward example of a rational self-
interest argument that is part of many models of solidarity; by wanting equal treatment for 
those who are part of your group you are in effect wanting those rights for yourself. However, 
if “Justice conceived deontologically requires solidarity as its reverse side” then there is more 
required than a protective stance.296 Justice cannot simply operate on the assumption that 
each individual within the group is substitutable for any other; that the solidarity created 
through realising that one is a member of an identifiable group means that one could take the 
place of anyone else within that group.297 Although Habermas is clear that individuality and the 
non-substitutability is paramount, the more complex the group becomes, the less this appears 
plausible. For example, in the nation-state, equal treatment for men and women, or for 
different ethnic groups, requires special status and not necessarily equal treatment. Likewise, 
the varied lived experiences of individuals held within a nation-state makes the practice of 
such a reality as described above hard to prove. This is where the boundary between theory 
and practice is important. In theory, it is consistent to think that once individuals come to 
recognise themselves and select others as belonging to one and the same group (nation-state) 
that they would wish to have equal treatment for all. However, when this theory is placed 
against historical and contemporary reality it does not appear to be adequately witnessed or 
documented. There is a further option, it could be that Habermas is proposing (with his ideal 
of solidarity as the other side of justice) solidarity theory as a form of social and political 
critique.298  
                                                     
295 Habermas, J. ([1974]1990) ‘Justice and solidarity: On the discussion concerning stage 6’ In T. E. Wren (ed.) The 
Moral Domain, Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 244. 
296 Ibid, p. 244.  
297 This essentially is what moral agents do in ideal role taking in moral discourse: they look at a situation from the 
perspective of all other valid agents, to see whether a norm is in fact acceptable to all.  
298 See the following for two interesting attempts to perform this in reverse on Habermas through immanent 
critique: Carrabregu, G. (2016) ‘Habermas on Solidarity: An Immanent Critique’, Constellations, 23:4, pp. 507-522; 
113 
Every autonomous morality has to serve two purposes at once: it brings to bear the 
inviolability of socialized individuals by requiring equal treatment and thereby equal 
respect for the dignity of each one; and it protects intersubjective relationships of 
mutual recognition requiring solidarity of individual members of a community, in 
which they have been socialized. Justice concerns the equal freedoms of unique and 
self-determining individuals, while solidarity concerns the welfare of consociates who 
are intimately linked in an intersubjectively shared form of life and thus also to the 
maintenance of the integrity of this form of life itself. Moral norms cannot protect 
one without the other: they cannot protect the equal rights and freedoms of the 
individual without protecting the welfare of one’s fellow man and of the community 
to which the individuals belong.299  
This passage indicates the slippage between describing solidarity’s current function in practice, 
and how it is described in theory. Clearly, taken as a description of a current society (in 
Habermas’s case Germany or perhaps more broadly north-western Europe), there could be 
multiple objections to its validity. Whereas, it is defensible to say that there are socialized 
individuals in these communities, it does not follow that this creates equal respect for all, 
although it is an implicit norm of communication and discourse. When a community is entirely 
homogenous along racial, cultural, linguistic and historical grounds, then this possibility 
appears to be broadly likely, for the un-group but not towards the out-group. Equal treatment 
specifically refers to the norms of the communicative preconditions of discourse, moral norms 
of equal worth and legal norms of equality before the law. However, the multi-cultural reality 
of many of the nation-states that Habermas has in mind would struggle to fulfil these criteria. 
It is not impossible but it is improbable that the mere fact of membership to a particular 
nation-state would negate the other differences between the individuals. This appears 
especially true in societies such as England where there remains a class system, wild economic 
inequality and an undercurrent of racial discrimination. It could be the case that the 
intersubjective reality of becoming a consociate in a given society would also lead to an 
understanding by those individuals, requiring each individual be treated equally. However the 
recognition of the substitutability that is required, by simply being a member, appears to be 
insufficient. The widespread inequality, both material and cultural, between different groups 
within a nation-state appears to preclude this seemingly straightforward position, namely that 
an attack on one is an attack on all. It should also be noted that just because a norm of 
equality exists, even one that is a commitment of commutative agents or moral agents or as 
enshrined in law, does not imply that there must exist material equality in the actual world. 
The norm could be ideal, but weak or ineffective, or there could be countervailing pressures.   
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An alternative view, in keeping with the descriptive tendency, is that Habermas is offering an 
explanation as to how a given society can be self-sustaining. This certainly holds for at least 
one of his other views on solidarity; that it is one of the three elements that ensure social 
intergradation and reproduction is possible, along with administrative power and money. Here 
however, solidarity is understood as the reverse side of justice, and so it could not be taken to 
have an explanatory role. When solidarity is charged with the responsibility to hold in check 
the coercive manifestations of administrative power and the corrupting influence of money, it 
is shown to be necessary. This is because if it was not present at all, then the other two would 
be insufficient to create the conditions for society to reproduce itself. By shifting solidarity’s 
position to one that has a moral purpose creates the need for greater qualification of its 
function than is given by Habermas. Morality comes with its own set of difficulties; in this case, 
it raises questions about its subject and objective creation and enactment. If the morality that 
is being expressed with the help of solidarity, with its relationship to justice, is one formed 
through historical accumulation, as was indicated in the previous chapter, it is a process not 
requiring equal treatment as a component. Likewise, there have been choices made as to what 
comes to represent the moral basis in a given nation-state. All the actors involved have not 
contributed equally, voices have been silenced along the way and some internal groups’ 
opinions (for example Christian groups or newspaper owners) have had their views amplified. 
Habermas, is of course very much aware of these problems and it would be grossly unfair to 
suggest otherwise. However, the critique above is more meant as a way of highlighting an on-
going issue with solidarity as it appears in academic writing, of which Habermas is a prominent 
example. Habermas’s move from an explanatory descriptive sociological understanding of 
solidarity, to one tied to the moral terrain, muddies solidarity as a social and political concept. 
Perhaps, what this division in Habermas’s conception of solidarity shows (which Habermas has 
failed to ever articulate) is that solidarity exists in many different forms. The solidarity that is 
necessary to hold money and administrative power in balance, is a different thing entirely to 
the solidarity required for a just society. This appears to be the case when he writes that:                      
As a component of a universalistic morality, of course, solidarity loses its merely 
particular meaning, in which it is limited to the internal relationships of a collectivity 
that is ethnocentrically isolated from other groups that character of forced 
willingness to sacrifice oneself for a collective system of self-assertion that is always 
present in premodern forms of solidarity.300  
This is then followed by: 
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Justice conceived in postconventional terms can converge with solidarity as its 
reverse side only when solidarity has been transformed in the light of the idea of 
general discursive will formation.301  
In the first passage, Habermas argues, solidarity, as part of universal morality (within a given 
territorial space), is separated from its early premodern manifestation as enforced 
collectivisation. This, contrary to what has just been argued, would mean that solidarity is 
replaced or modified, rather than operating concurrently. Habermas, in the second quotation, 
argues that solidarity (morally universal) will have to be ‘transformed’ to fit its new justice 
enforcing capacity. It seems clear that there is a missing stage, not articulated, between the 
solidarity of the ‘premodern’ era and the morally reinforcing solidarity of the future. The 
historical picture, painted in the last chapter, shows that these two positions are not clearly 
demarcated and the arrival of this new form of solidarity, although sometimes written about 
as if it was already present, is more theory than practice.    
What is also clear from the above passages is the tension existing between conservative or 
defensive qualities of solidarity and its transformed forms. Taken with the previous chapter, 
there is an implied criticism of the ‘pre-modern’ forms of solidarity, whilst simultaneously 
noting its essential character. This was also a tension highlighted in the Durkheim chapters, 
that there does still appear to be a need for what Durkheim calls mechanical solidarity even in 
‘advanced societies’. Durkheim accepts this to a certain extent and argues instead that 
advanced societies require both versions of solidarity and that one does not completely 
supersede the other. For Durkheim this is a way of by-passing the need for a fixed set of free 
standing norms. That route, however, is not available for Habermas. Therefore, where 
Durkheim accepts that solidarity is two parts conservative and one part transformative, 
Habermas can only draw upon history as a learning process, but cannot have it as his 
grounding.  
Nevertheless, Habermas argues, solidarity as the other side of justice cannot be ahistorical. 
Rather, individuals have to also relativize their own personal norms, created through historical 
experience, to be able to adequately take part in ‘discursive will formation’. Initially, this 
appears to be a progressive position, especially as Durkheim’s proposal of essentially enforced 
homogeneity of morals has many obvious drawbacks, not least of which is how social progress 
of race, gender, material inequality etc, are supposed to develop. More will be said about how 
Habermas attempts to overcome the need for the older, more rigid form of solidarity below. 
However, what has been argued is that it is not clear in Habermas’s own argument where one 
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solidarity ends and the other begins; it is not even clear whether these are two distinct 
phenomena or one that is reoriented. Ultimately, is the energy that went into ‘pre-modern’ 
solidarity the same as that required for solidarity as the other side of justice? Precisely these 
type of questions have motivated this thesis and certainly the conservative version of 
transformative forms of solidarity will be discussed in conclusion. For now, what is important 
to highlight is that solidarity again is shown to be elusive and resistant to this kind of 
mainstream social and political analysis. The historical problem will now be addressed in more 
detail with reference to how Habermas identifies the withdrawing of metaphysics and religious 
moral norms, as a historical and social process of modernization.               
Normativity: What are the normative foundations for solidarity? 
One of the difficulties just highlighted was how early forms of solidarity can be set aside or 
transformed to be more aligned with how Habermas wishes them to be. This section addresses 
this difficulty by examining how Habermas understands metaphysical and religiously 
supported solidarity and how it could operate without this grounding. As shown in the 
previous chapter, the role of metaphysics and more obviously religious language creates a 
unique progression in Europe. It is still within this context that the following discussion will be 
based. The two main texts that will be used are Between Facts and Norms and The Inclusion of 
the Other: Studies in Political Theory. These two texts mark a shift in Habermas’s articulation of 
solidarity and act as a bridge to his most contemporary remarks, initiated by the publication of 
The Post-National Constellation.   
The historical attachment of religious and metaphysical moral norms and language has been 
discussed in the previous chapter. Therefore, the focus here will be on what Habermas argues 
can replace them. In the first instance the role of law will be examined to underline its 
importance to solidarity. It will show that law enables solidarity in contemporary society, but 
also requires it. In this discussion, solidarity is initially understood as an integrating force, yet 
when discussing The Inclusion of the Other it will again be seen as the other side of justice. The 
latter analysis will demonstrate the importance of defining the right against the good in his 
work, which will further indicate the relationship between religious/metaphysical motivations 
for norm forming.  
In the following passage Habermas sets out the problem as he understands it, with relying on 
metaphysical or religiously substantiated law:  
Either the legal order remains embedded in an encompassing social ethos and 
subordinate to the authority of a suprapositive or sacred law (as in the stratified 
societies and absolute states of early modernity), or else individual liberties are 
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supplemented by rights of a different type, rights of citizenship that are geared no 
longer to rational choice but to autonomy in the Kantian sense. For without religious 
or metaphysical support, the coercive law tailored for the self-interested use of 
individual rights can preserve its socially integrating force only insofar as the 
addressees of legal norms may at the same time understand themselves, taken as a 
whole, as the rational authors of those norms. To this extent, modern law lives off a 
solidarity concentrated in the value orientations of citizens and ultimately issuing 
from communicative action and deliberation.302  
In order to understand what Habermas means here it is necessary to briefly sketch the broad 
aims of Between Facts and Norms, and in particular to highlight a number of key points that he 
makes in regards to the distinction between moral and ethical discourse, democracy and the 
rule of law. Moral and ethical discourse can be said to be the underpinning of much of 
Habermas’s total project, therefore there is much that could be said about them.303 However, 
here what is important to note is that ethical discourse entails those values that have been 
generated and are supported through a particular tradition, held within a certain cultural 
group. In essence the way this works is that as someone is socialised within a given community 
they simultaneously absorb the values of that community. Therefore, Habermas argues that 
these values can be relativised and are by definition conditional when called upon for validity. 
It is also the case that for ethical discourse, values are understood to be on a sliding scale of 
good and bad that calls for judgement of choices made. Conversely, moral discourse pertains 
to norms that are either right or wrong, just or unjust. Therefore, they are absolute not 
relative and are non-contingent. They do not spring from a given community’s traditions, 
instead they should be valid for all traditions irrespective of culture, geographical area or 
history. The extent to which Habermas’s distinction here works in practice has been a topic of 
much debate.304 There have been concerns raised over Habermas’s ability to actually separate 
out these two ideas into discrete spheres that can exist side by side. His reason for thinking 
that they can, is based on his argument that they are answers to different but complementary 
questions. The ethical helps to answer questions about how to live the good life, pursuit of 
desires and interests etc, whilst the moral answers questions centring around what you ought 
to do and what is just. The problem with this distinction is that it appears very difficult to 
separate the two positions. Especially as Habermas thinks both have a historical component. 
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For the ethical, this is culturally contingent whereas the moral claims to be universal.305 
However the idea of, for example, universal justice, stems from a particular mainly religious 
background most prevalently witnessed in Europe. Why this tension is important to 
Habermas’s theory of solidarity becomes clear from the above passage where legal norms are 
supported (once secularised) by the values connected with solidarity. Continuing with this 
theme in starker terms the following passage seeks to set up a dialogue between the two 
positions:                  
The changes just sketched in the two other components can explain why modern 
legal orders must find their legitimation, to an increasing degree, only in sources that 
do not bring the law into conflict with those posttraditional ideals of life and ideas of 
justice that first made their impact on persons and culture. Reasons that are 
convenient for the legitimation of law must, on pain of cognitive dissonances, 
harmonize with the moral principles of universal justice and solidarity. They must 
also harmonize with the ethical principles of a consciously “projected” life conduct 
for which the subjects themselves, at both the individual and collective levels, take 
responsibility.306  
Here the tension between whether solidarity falls under a moral or ethical category is made 
somewhat more complicated. In the first passage solidarity is linked to values and therefore is 
more attuned to ethical discourse, however, in this passage solidarity is more firmly held under 
moral discourse. Stemming from the long process of secularisation that gets its impetus from 
enlightenment ideas, post-traditional ideals and justice must ‘harmonize with the moral 
principles of universal justice and solidarity’.307 Highlighting a point that has been raised 
already, perhaps the slippage between ethical and morally constituted solidarity is more a 
question of how it is directed. Thus, in the above sense it is directed towards a form of justice 
legally understood and therefore under morality, however in the following passage the 
direction is towards strangers (or foreigners) through the conduit of communication and so is 
closer to ethical discourse:  
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Only in an egalitarian public of citizens that has emerged from the confines of class 
and thrown off the millennia-old shackles of social stratification and exploitation can 
the potential that no doubt abounds just as much in conflicts as in meaning-
generating forms of life. But in a secularized society that has learned to deal with its 
complexity consciously and deliberately, the communicative mastery of these 
conflicts constitutes the sole source of solidarity among strangers – strangers who 
renounce violence and, in the cooperative regulation of their common life, also 
concede one another the right to remain strangers.308  
In this passage, what is interesting is the strong connection between communicative action 
and what solidarity is. This has already been alluded to in the previous chapter, however it 
does raise the question as to whether solidarity can be understood as a communicative 
phenomenon, rather than say an ethical stance, or a moral obligation. The passage also reveals 
that part of what is realised in a post-traditional secular society is that there is conflict. 
Obviously, traditional societies were full of conflict, however, the terms of what constitute a 
conflict have changed. Originally Habermas is, broadly speaking, in agreement with Durkheim’s 
categorisation of conflict in pre-modern societies; whereby conflicts arose when an individual 
or individuals broke, or subverted an established norm that was recognised by most if not all 
of the members of the community. This therefore could be understood as a breaking of a rule 
that could then only be resolved through the mechanism of punishment. This restores the 
equilibrium that had previously existed before the conflict had taken place. In the new arena 
of modern societies conflicts are established and carried out through the mechanism of 
communicative action. Respect for the medium of communication as the means to engage 
with conflicts and disagreements means by consequence having respect for the medium itself. 
It is the allegiance towards communication’s mediating nature that is the source of solidarity, 
argues Habermas.309  
Moving away from the legal context, Habermas further elaborates on solidarity in, The 
Inclusion of the Other (TIO). This has two benefits, it allows a greater elaboration of how 
solidarity with strangers works, and it acts as a bridge to the later civic and cosmopolitan 
solidarity. Much of the above discussion of Between Facts and Norms relied on solidarity by 
implication; it is in TIO that explicit treatment is given.  
In TIO, Habermas is arguing that a shared fate, built upon an expanded version of the 
communicative character, articulated in BFN, can create a recognition of a shared life. It is this 
vision of a shared universal fate that leads Habermas to think the need for metaphysical or 
religious norms can be avoided. Habermas turns to solidarity to help fill the moral deficit left 
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behind by the vacated, or the retreating, metaphysical and religious worldviews. It essentially 
helps to form reasons for action and motivations for taking the place of the other. This also 
helps to form his later, more overtly political program for a world society. In the following 
quotation he sets out his aims clearly in the preface, writing:  
I defend the rational content of a morality based on equal respect for everybody and 
on the universal solidarity and responsibility of each for all. Postmodern suspicion of 
an indiscriminately assimilating and homogenizing universalism fails to grasp the 
meaning of this morality and in the heat of controversy obliterates the relational 
structure of otherness and difference that universalism, properly understood, 
precisely takes into account.310  
It is important to note here that Habermas’s defence of a form of universalism is also his 
defence of (universal) solidarity. Therefore, if his defence of universalism is not successful then 
neither is his version of solidarity in this context. Equally, it is here where Habermas introduces 
perhaps his most demanding version of solidarity theory. In the following he sets out his aims 
in a succinct way:   
Equal respect for everyone is not limited to those who are like us; it extends to the 
person of the other in his or her otherness. And solidarity with the other as one of us 
refers to the flexible “we” of a community that resists all substantive determinations 
and extends its permeable boundaries ever further. This moral community 
constitutes itself solely by way of the negative idea of abolishing discrimination and 
harm and of extending relations of mutual recognition to include marginalized men 
and women.311  
For Habermas to be able to realise this vision, he again needs to return to the problematic 
nature of the difference between morality and ethics or the right and the good.312 This has 
been discussed already with regard to legal regulations that pertain mainly to citizens of a 
nation-state. Here, however Habermas wishes to go further and encapsulate a global picture. 
In order to do this he has to place the right (moral) over the good (ethics). The importance of 
this hierarchy is clearly argued for in the following passage where he essentially states that 
only with the right informing justice, a chance at actual universalism is possible:  
Without the priority of the right over the good one cannot have an ethically neutral 
conception of justice. This deficit would have unfortunate consequences for equal 
treatment in pluralistic societies. For the equal treatment of different individuals and 
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groups, each of which has its own individual or collective identity, could only be 
assured by standards that are part of a shared conception of the good equally 
recognized by all of them. The same condition would hold mutates mutandis for the 
just regulation of international relations between states, for cosmopolitan relations 
between world citizens, and for global relations between cultures. The improbability 
of this requirement of a globally shared conception of the good shows why neo-
Aristotelian approaches fall short of the universalistic content of a morality of equal 
respect and solidaristic responsibility for everyone. For any attempt to project a 
universally binding collective good on which the solidarity of all human beings – 
including future generations – could be founded runs up against a dilemma: a 
substantive conception that is still sufficiently informative entails an intolerable form 
of paternalism (at least with regard to the happiness of future generations); but an 
empty conception that abstracts from all local contexts undermines the concept of 
the good.313  
The key aspect of this passage for understanding the place of solidarity is that it is linked to 
responsibility. Responsibility, in this instance could also be understood as an obligation or 
something that you ought to do. Therefore, the significance of claiming that the moral can be 
universal as opposed to an ethical good that is culturally specific is that, although it is 
demanding, it only applies to a thin understanding or normative base. Solidarity, in this case, 
supports the universal justice claim that respects the difference of competing ethically 
informed conceptions of the good.  
Initially, this line between moral and ethical considerations appears to run into a problem, 
namely the issue of authority. For the ethical or the good, the appeal can be made to the 
immediate community that helped to form it. This can work in different ways, perhaps through 
democratic structures and conduits of general will formation, arrived at through 
communicative acts. Alternatively, one could turn to the authority of a religious community 
that may well exceed the confines of a nation-state. Habermas argues that this is not by itself 
adequate to resolve all questions of what ought to be done. Therefore, there is a requirement 
in certain circumstances to be able to appeal to an external arbitrator. Traditionally, the role 
played by the world religions, however, as he now regards these to be a part of an ethical 
community, he must look elsewhere for an external yardstick. Basically Habermas thinks (and 
he is right on this) that individuals are simultaneously both a part of their own community 
(nation-state) and equally that “[a]ll individuals who have been socialized into any 
communicative form of life at all belong to this [universal] community.”  
Therefore Habermas’s phrase that “solidarity is simply the reverse side of justice” can now be 
better understood. Justice or universal morality has to accept that every individual, no matter 
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from where, has had their individuality made possible through the process of socialisation. This 
socialisation is only possible, according to Habermas, because of the mechanism of 
communication. Therefore, two universals can be established, that we are all socialised 
through communication and that socialisation makes it possible to be an individual. It is on this 
basis that Habermas claims the possibility for a universal understanding of solidarity.  
What this is leading towards is the formalisation of human rights. As rights are not subject to 
gradation or grey areas, they are unlike the good that is on a sliding scale. They can be 
appealed to as the embodiment of the (external) moral community. The authoritative nature 
of the rights however, for Habermas, requires also the mechanism of solidarity. It is solidarity 
that moves the realisation that our individuality is made possible through our interdependence 
(socialisation) to accepting there is a just position that applies to all. This raises the question as 
to what should count as a universal moral norm. The only form of guidance that Habermas 
appears willing to offer at this stage is to resort to his universal principle, which is as follows: 
“a norm is valid if and only if the foreseeable consequences and side effects of its general 
observance for the interests and value-orientations of each individual could be freely accepted 
jointly by all concerned.”314 Therefore, it is perhaps the willingness to go through this process 
and the recognition that one ought to, which is the essence of solidarity in this case. However, 
it is important to point out that this is not a first-order norm, such as, do not kill. It is a 
reconstituted principle for the selection and validation of norms.   
In summary, solidarity is at the heart of Habermas’s solution to both the normative deficit left 
by retreating metaphysical and religious world views, and a way of supporting its replacement, 
universal justice. Solidarity helps, in the first instance as it forces individuals of one community 
to recognise the equality of different communities, which have different languages, traditions, 
religions, culture etc. It does this through individuals coming to see that all others are equally a 
part of the same overarching community of humans. The second is that it supports this 
realisation by linking it to the idea of universal justice. This duel personality of solidarity will be 
discussed in the next section.  
Finally, and perhaps most tellingly for a broader understanding of solidarity, the implications of 
whether to designate it as a moral or ethical concept are very significant. The previous 
discussion in the Durkheim chapters argue that moral education is central to his conception of 
solidarity, however, to translate this into Habermas’s schema, it would almost certainly fall 
under ethical discourse. This is because in Durkheim’s case, what is at stake is the passing on of 
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relative and therefore specific norms of that given society, through education, and as such 
should be considered to be ethical rather than moral in Habermas terms. Habermas would 
perhaps agree to this to a certain extent, but would probably argue that the authority that 
Durkheim identifies is misplaced and should rather be found in the moral community of which 
everyone is a member, irrespective of their given community or nation-state. It is this 
challenge, the movement between the nation-state and the total moral community, which will 
now be explored.      
Nation-States, Global Politics and Human Rights  
Habermas understands globalisation as both an economic process and as a perspectival shift in 
relation to shared risk and fate. Therefore, the social ties and interdependence of social 
groups, communities and networks of all kinds, communicative and commercial, are shrinking 
spatially and temporally. This contraction reveals the globe’s natural limits and the offsetting 
of economic and social costs/risks (or exploitation) to previously invisible regions and 
workforces, and acknowledges potential detrimental effects for future generations which can 
no longer be ignored.315 
The idea for Habermas is that now that this picture is emerging more and more visibly, global 
actors (politicians, international commercial leaders, nebulous members of international 
organisations such as NATO, the EU and the WTO) need to be pressurised by their national 
populations to express some sort of solidarity with those effected most negatively by 
globalisation. Essentially, ruling elites need to be forced to realise that the populations that 
support and maintain them will only keep doing so if they move towards fairer distribution of 
burdens, costs and risks. It is this domestic population pressure that is, or could be, the result 
of Habermas’s version of civic solidarity.316  
National solidarity, the forerunner to civic solidarity, is historically constituted through its 
development alongside the creation and recreation of the modern nation-state, with its 
mythical origins and its unlikely but subscribed to cultural and ethnic homogeneity, ties of 
kinship, shared language, history and religion.317 These factors, that help to give birth to the 
modern nation-state and its subsequent democratic welfare version, come to no longer be as 
reliable as they once were. Immigration in particular, both between European partners but 
also from across the world, increasingly intertwined financial systems, perhaps cultural 
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hegemony and systems of regional and global governance all add up, for Habermas, to a 
process of globalisation that requires a reformed version of national solidarity.318 It would no 
longer make sense to have it tied to only a national picture (although its roots will remain 
there); it must be free to cross borders.319 Essentially, it is the realisation that accompanies the 
outgrowing of the nation, the recognition of the interconnectedness of commerce, culture, 
politics and the environment that acts as the catalyst for the promotion of civic solidarity. The 
few thin moral rules that are left give the foundation for how a solidarity can emerge between 
populations that have developed both in a conjoined way such as France and Germany, as well 
as through less clear means, for instance Argentina and Wales. Most importantly for 
Habermas’s model to be plausible populations come to see the legitimacy of other 
interconnected populations as having the right to express their interests and to have their 
concerns addressed. This is basically, communicative action on a global scale.320 This 
transformation of national solidarity to a new form of civic solidarity needs to be powerful 
enough to challenge global elites (or replace them).  
Forcing these organisations to be responsive to the interests of the populations that support 
them, both in the short term but also crucially in the planning of long term projects (think 
tackling climate change) is what is made possible through civic solidarity. The caveat is that this 
possibility relies on knowledge networks being transparent and widely available. Habermas 
thinks that the existing modes of traditional media can perform this task, but that they need to 
get a lot better at communicating, firstly political discussions in other countries, but also social 
discussions of non-elite actors and general dispassionate reporting of regional and global 
events. The reliance on traditional media and the plausibility that it will accurately portray 
these discourses is one of the weakest points in Habermas’s argument.321 Civic solidarity at its 
best aims at pushing for equality between national populations spurred on by the realisation 
that the globe is interconnected in many ways, this realisation being bolstered and maintained 
through increasing knowledge of what is going on out there, beyond national borders. It is a 
form of solidarity that is elicited through downplaying the uniqueness of prescribed 
nationalism and instead relying on rational ethical discourse that promotes fair treatment for 
                                                     
318 This is most clearly articulated in: Habermas, J. (2014) ‘Plea for a Constitutionalization of International Law’ 
Philosophy and Social Criticism, 40:1, pp. 5-12. 
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https://www.ft.com/content/eda3bcd8-5327-11df-813e-00144feab49a   
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all those effected. It is the adherence and defence of this process which encapsulates civic 
solidarity for Habermas.                             
Moving on now to cosmopolitan solidarity which is a different type of thing, one that is unlike 
civic solidarity in its scaffolding. Civic solidarity is historically constituted, malleable and leaves 
itself exposed to changing emphasis and to whom it is directed and to whom is included. Civic 
solidarity is a negotiated process, one that gets its energy from a specific population that 
remains tied to a particular geographical space i.e. the nation-state; cosmopolitan solidarity 
relies on a different form of energy, one that is free floating from a specific concrete base such 
as a nation-state. For Habermas, it is a part of the few thin universally applicable ideas which 
are non-contingent.  
The need for cosmopolitan solidarity, as opposed to simply extending ever further civic 
solidarity, is that it does different things. Civic solidarity has been the means for making it 
possible to have a welfare state, transnational semi-democratic organisations such as the EU 
and to coordinate things like aid and war. It is the mechanism through which the willing energy 
of sacrifice and redistribution of resources is delivered, mainly through taxation and adherence 
to the law, both domestic and international. In essence, projects that cost individuals in the 
immediate or medium term for benefits that could, but do not necessarily, benefit them 
directly either in the short term or in the future. For example the childless adult hopefully does 
not mind that some of their taxes go to schools etc. Therefore, the basic way civic solidarity 
works is that some sacrifice is required to maintain universal institutions for all who fall within 
specifically pre-defined groups, most commonly the nation-state, but could according to 
Habermas, also be transnational configurations where state representatives act on behalf of 
the nation-state, albeit in a more diluted form than the previous national solidarity.  
Cosmopolitan solidarity cannot rely on this kind of rational model, it can only rest on the 
presumption and ubiquitously recognisability of human rights. It is also not proactive, it is 
merely retroactively initiated after human rights abuses become known. Unlike the breaking of 
a domestic law however, the retroactive position is not a cold one, quite the opposite, it is 
according to Habermas indignation. Cosmopolitan solidarity is inherently an almost involuntary 
emotional reaction to the suffering of any other person, no matter who they are. 
The irascible rage that one feels when confronted with the suffering of another human 
especially directly but also through a medium such as television, is something that most if not 
all of us share, Habermas thinks, because we are human. The issue remains however, how to 
translate this emotive (and perhaps universal capacity) from being practically non-cognitive 
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and non-expressible in the first instance, into political practice.322 It is on this crucial point that 
Habermas is most inadequate as a theorist of the liberal left. This might be because he is too 
attached to a particular procedural democratic system, one that would (in theory) channel the 
indignation into mechanisms supported by civic solidarity, to redress the ‘crime against 
humanity’.    
However as civic solidarity operates at the level of nation-states through transnational 
organisations, the question is, can a reformed version, of say, the EU or more tangentially the 
UN, be the conduit for our indignation? For instance could the EU’s fortress mentality in the 
face of the refugee crises be overcome, through elite actors being more responsive to the 
voices of their indignant citizens? Could something like the EU, or taken on a larger scale the 
UN, truly shake its obvious vested interests in favour of a common feeling of solidarity with 
everything that wears a human face, as Habermas thinks is possible (although difficult to 
achieve)? Operating on a different more fundamental and philosophical level, cosmopolitan 
solidarity is actually a demand for universalism, which is perhaps inadequately expressed 
through civic solidarity. Does not this insistence of universalism exhaust solidarity’s energy and 
its possible practical application? The untargeted nature of cosmopolitan solidarity coupled 
with the overly targeted and pragmatic nature of civic solidarity leaves little room in between 
for redressing the unequal burdens and treatment felt globally.  
In conclusion, solidarity should be thought of as historically contingent, Habermas being a 
prime example of this. Civic solidarity, in one form or another is still supported by nation-
states, albeit in a more detached way and cosmopolitan solidarity does look as though it 
captures something about what it might mean to be human. However, neither offer convincing 
next steps to be taken nor frankly to offer a powerful enough critique of neo-liberal capitalism 
and its institutions. What he describes as civic solidarity assumes that nationalist feeling and 
attachment is becoming more benign when actually it is becoming more strident. Civic 
solidarity was for a more hopeful time, long enough after fascism for it to feel that nationalism 
was no longer the threat it once was and the means to unite Europe after the fall of the Iron 
Curtain. It could be argued that it was a necessary part of European prosperity. However, and 
Habermas is routinely criticised for this, his theory of civic solidarity is overwhelmingly 
Eurocentric.323 Equally, cosmopolitan solidarity appears overwhelmed by its own scope and so 
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instead of being the vehicle for our indignation it instead falls too easily into catatonic anger 
and helpless silence.  
Conclusion  
This selection of Habermas has been less to do with how convincing his arguments are, or how 
they might guide future oriented social and political practice. It is instead that his views 
represent, both a particular historical moment in thinking about solidarity and that the 
problems with his account are problems that many accounts of solidarity would have to deal 
with. Habermas himself is also interesting, in that he represents a dying breed of public 
intellectuals which came to prominence in the last third of the 20th century. They can be 
characterised by needing to articulate a form of social and political thought that could never 
allow for the rise of fascism or the possibility of total war. Whilst at the same time being 
defensive of the political system that had allowed for sustained peace in Western Europe since 
the end of WW2. This balancing act between a genuine fear of fascism’s return and a critical 
defence of the newly formed capitalist democratic welfare state, was further complicated by 
the inheritance of the end of a particular form of German Idealism, metaphysics and the falling 
away of the authority of religion. Essentially, the foundations of philosophical enquiry were 
massively destabilised in this period, precisely at a moment when normative grounds were 
most in need.  
Habermas traversed this balancing act through his now famous theory of communicative 
action, which saw the communicative infrastructure of society as able to restore meaning to a 
social and political body under threat from colonisation. The rise to prominence of normative 
deliberative democratic theory was, and is, supported by a presumption and reliance on the 
presence of solidarity. The acquiescence around a foundation of solidarity that in turn rests 
upon a shorn basis in shared historical ties and adherence to perceived retreating influence of 
Judeo-Christian ethical practices requires an additional normative basis. Various proposals 
have been put forward; John Rawls’s ‘Veil of ignorance’, Richard Rorty’s ever expanding ‘we’ 
and Axel Honneth’s ‘theory of recognition’.324 Habermas’s response has altered through time, 
reacting to these thinkers as well as the changes to social and political reality, most 
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importantly the fall of the Berlin wall and with that, the supposed triumph of neo-liberalism 
globally.  
The period from around 1992/3 until the present has witnessed firstly the swaggering 
chauvinism of a victorious political and economic system, which saw itself, to hackney Fredric 
Jameson, as unimaginably unending.325 This arrogance, although challenged repetitively by 
crisis after crisis, most recently with the 2008 global financial crash and the self-mutilation of 
Brexit, remains largely intact. Habermas, although critical at times, does have a sustained and 
occasionally naïve defence of the European Union.326 Nevertheless, this is informative as it 
indicates the limits of a way of thinking that cannot detach itself from its post-WWII roots, 
where peace in Europe was the first priority. Habermas is of particular importance because by 
examining how he tries to articulate his theory of solidarity within the confines of the 
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Conclusion: Cosmopolitan solidarity and the future  
The first chapter of this thesis told the largely unacknowledged story of the historical birth of 
the modern concept of solidarity. The next four chapters, on Durkheim and Habermas, typified 
the range of ways that solidarity is understood following this tradition in the modern period. 
There is further and fruitful discussion of these two thinkers in this conclusion as they are 
brought together in a more precise way. Equally, it is here where their concepts of solidarity 
and how they relate to various forms of crisis will be joined with contemporary discourse on 
solidarity. It is shown that Durkheim and Habermas’s ideas, whilst remaining conscious of their 
historical creation, can add to the growing current literature.  In particular with regards to 
anomie in Durkheim, this is a concept that has greater explanatory power than when discussed 
only within the Durkheimein paradigm. The reason for this is that Durkheim himself did not 
advance the theory greatly in relation to solidarity. Therefore, it is more productive to discuss 
this intriguing notion alongside the contemporary debate where it can more easily interact 
with contemporary notions of solidarity and crisis. Equally, the Habermas chapters omit some 
of his more recent writings, something rectified in this conclusion. The reason for this ordering 
is so that these writings can interact with contemporary discourse. Put simply, for a time 
Habermas was (with the exception of Rorty) somewhat of an outlier in placing solidarity so 
prominently within his writing. Although Habermas was forced to rethink certain aspects of his 
thinking on solidarity, most notably through the challenge that was brought through feminist 
writings on care, it is his later writings that most clearly respond to an ongoing literature on 
solidarity. The structure of this conclusion will be to, first, discuss the most recent 
developments in solidarity theory, citing where necessary how these new forms of thinking 
about solidarity challenge Durkheim’s and Habermas’s ideas. This is not meant as an 
exhaustive literature review but more to highlight the recent ways that solidarity discussions 
have been developing. It will be shown that much of what concerns the contemporary 
solidarity debate has its roots in what has been the focus of this thesis. This therefore invites 
interactions between the two thinkers and these newer forms of thinking. The conclusion will 
end with a reflection and analysis of where the solidarity debate currently is. It will indicate 
that Habermas, in particular, does still offer useful insights, but most importantly he 
represents perhaps the limits of this form of solidarity thinking.   
Coral Gould, in a recent article, argues compellingly for a version of solidarity that aims to be 
more democratic, transnational and to work within a framework of human rights.327 Gould 
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argues that human rights require the affective nature of solidarity to work. Gould believes that 
her version of solidarity would, through being enacted through overlapping networks, be tied 
to the idea of justice (even global justice) in a significant way. The linking of solidarity and 
justice is something that has already been discussed at length in the Habermas chapters; 
however, Gould offers a differing version, one that ultimately challenges some of Habermas’s 
fundamental philosophical argumentation, if not his political thought.  
Consciously building on the work of Fiona Robinson and Virginia Held, Gould wishes to replace 
care with solidarity.328 Solidarity, it is argued has the advantage of being more applicable for 
social and political groups and association interactions. The argument continues that solidarity, 
when seen as a form of “social empathy”, is more useful in transnational or global interactions 
than empathy or care alone. The proposal is that solidarity be partnered with empathy as its 
“social counterpart”.329 It is therefore to be viewed helping to form and maintain relations 
between “an individual to the members of a different group, and to the relations among 
groups.”330 So far this has not introduced anything strikingly new, however, what follows from 
this premise does move away from the Habermasian model in significant ways. The obvious 
problem that Gould is keenly aware of, and something that both Habermas and Rorty were 
also very much concerned with, is what she describes here as “whether or not we can speak of 
mutual concern among strangers, and particularly when others may not even be aware of the 
people standing in solidarity with them.”331 This has clear resonance with one of Habermas’s 
positions as previously discussed, concerned with the right to remain a stranger. Equally, what 
is again raised is the important question or problem of reciprocity. This could be said to be one 
of the real difficulties that is perhaps inherent in any use of the term solidarity.  
Gould, likewise, acknowledges that to have the norm, such as found in Habermas, that one 
should have solidarity with everyone “would be impossible to apply, if not also utterly 
vague.”332 Interestingly, Gould’s response to this is not to instead insist on a particular or 
narrower form of solidarity, something that in the end is part of Habermas’s political solidarity, 
but rather to hold onto the notion with certain clarifications. The idea of solidarity with every 
human being can be retained if it is understood as a “limit” case or something held within a 
“horizon of possibility”. Therefore, solidarity would be felt more as a “disposition” towards 
action as and when the others required it. Becoming aware and being open to the possibility 
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that all others may be in need and being conscious of this can lead to support for universal 
human rights, for example. It could also help to maintain, transform or build institutions that 
would be capable of acting on a global scale. Equally, “general human solidarity” can lead to 
involvement in social movements whose explicit aims are human rights accomplishment.333  
What sits behind Gould’s thinking on this is an accepted notion that solidarity is generated 
through at least a minimal amount of empathy. It is unclear whether empathy is to be 
understood here as something that we have by virtue of simply being human or whether it is a 
capacity that human beings tend in general to possess. What Gould is attempting to articulate 
is a way of thinking about solidarity that could counter some of the ways that it perhaps fails in 
previous accounts. Therefore, what is important to Gould is not whether the quality of 
empathy is synthetic or natural, but given that it appears to be something that can be said of 
most people, what could this lead to. Gould does not want to simply limit solidarity by 
designating it as a moral outlook. Rather she wishes to see whether solidarity built on a thin 
basic level of empathy could be turned towards a form of social critique. This would mean that 
there would be a demanding element in the solidarity that she has in mind, which leads to 
individuals attending to “institutional structures, as well as to the opportunities that changes in 
such structures might afford for improving the lot of others.”334 This leads to what Gould is 
ultimately proposing; solidarity as overlapping networks. The aim is to find a way to curtail the 
vagueness and perhaps impossibility of a universal demand for solidarity with everyone, whilst 
not denying the energy of motivation that it gives to individuals. Gould’s solidarity is one 
characterised through relationships and networks made up of people. For these to work 
effectively there is a requirement of the participants towards “openness”. She believes that 
this openness can transform “particularity, without moving it completely to a universality of 
principles.”335 This is the most difficult aspect of Gould’s proposal because it is hard to work 
out in a philosophical construction that can be presented without fungible elements. However, 
that is not what is important for her or her proposal, she is not interested in deep 
philosophical matters, rather she is setting out a possible way to instantiate a solidarity model 
that could lead to practical results.  
The difficulty of solidarity in this context, the question of universality, is that solidarity can be 
seen to dwell within both camps, the particular and the universal. Gould does not think that 
this is a difficulty or a problem but actually a strength of solidarity. Once those who engage in 
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solidarity networks and relationships based upon their predisposition towards openness, they 
begin to “establish commonalities across differences”. They are able to put in place structures 
that allow individuals and groups to be incorporated within broader solidarity movements and 
ultimately, “help to construct more universalistic conceptions of our obligations to each 
other.”336 Finally, solidarity comes to be understood within the backdrop of global ethics as a 
mediating device, its quality or lack of certainty as to whether it is particular or abstract, is 
actually its most useful quality. One of the key questions for Habermas was whether his 
various versions of solidarity could handle the difference between the actual concrete, 
interpersonal relationships established and maintained through solidarity, a more 
philosophical acceptance that all human beings deserve our solidarity understood as universal 
principles, and finally how to link these two with their practical implementation, supporting 
human rights and justice.     
Whilst Gould’s proposals are useful for moving away from Habermasian models of solidarity as 
discussed in the previous chapters, and for thinking about solidarity in a more practical 
fashion, there remains a need to expand upon and clarify her ground work.337 In a similar vein, 
attempting to capture and express something akin, but more grounded in practical 
international politics, Joseph Schwartz articulates a dialectic between the particular and the 
universal with regards to global solidarity.  
Schwartz shows that in contemporary thinking about solidarity as moral and political 
philosophy, there are two camps; pragmatic communitarians and neo-Kantian universalists.338 
For Schwartz, pragmatic communitarians see solidarity as growing out of a strong shared 
identity, which is expressed through a willingness towards mutual care. In a similar way as 
articulated in the Durkheim version of solidarity (particularly mechanical solidarity), the 
particularity of the group is reinforced through identifying others that do not belong (simply us 
and them is required). The neo-Kantian or Rawlsian inspired position is, according to Schwartz, 
the “claim that human cooperative endeavors can only be sustained over time if carried out 
under just conditions of mutual respect.”339 In essence, this is an extended version of the 
difference principle, only this time thrown into the global sphere. These two positions, in one 
way or another, have been covered in the thesis and do not add radically new understandings 
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of solidarity. However, it is what Schwartz goes on to say about the impasse between these 
two positions that is worthy of further exploration.  
Schwartz is clear that if there is to be international solidarity it will be led firstly by 
transnational movements powerful enough to shift domestic politics towards that end. The 
aim being that states are forced to act to “enhance global labor, environmental, and human 
rights conditions.” In a similar way to how Gould viewed the moral component of solidarity as 
an outer limit, here Schwartz sees it as working as a “horizon”.340 However, the difference (in a 
somewhat similar way to a hermeneutic methodology), the moral horizon can be expanded. 
Just as was seen in Habermas’s version, solidarity is capable of being expanded to greater and 
greater numbers of groups. Although, in Habermas’s examples it became unclear when he was 
discussing a practical reality or a philosophical aspiration. Schwartz is clear that more and 
more social groups can become included within the horizon and that we have historical 
evidence for that. Equally, the aspirant part of Schwartz’s argument rests on this previous 
expansion, stating that for there to be a transition from the domestic to a “regional to 
international solidarity” there will be a requirement to force it. Schwartz does not mean 
violence, he thinks that for his version of solidarity to transition from the particular to the 
universal, or from the nation-state to the global setting, would mean a great deal of what he 
calls “political contestation”.341  
What constitutes the limits of the horizon for Schwartz are important, given what he 
tentatively puts forward as a definition of solidarity. One of the important things to realise 
before analysing Schwartz’s definition is that he is reflecting on its possibility for the 
contemporary United States. His definition is as follows:  
[S]olidarity [is] the readiness of individuals to aid other members of a common 
enterprise – an enterprise in which each feels a duty to promote a minimal level of 
well-being for all other members.342  
The context is therefore important, as the above definition is understood to be held within the 
particular democratic system of the United States. This is significant as it means that Schwartz 
sees solidarity as part of a democratic process. He is clear that it therefore cannot be enacted 
in particularistic or universal means. The horizon of those that come to be included within his, 
fairly thin, definition of solidarity becomes something that is decided through democratic 
means. The issue that Schwartz raises with this is that it is far from certain that the horizon of 
those included will become broader, and so move towards a move inclusive perhaps universal 
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duty. The history of the United States does have many instances where it has been increased, 
through for example, civil rights. However, this is no guarantee that this will continue. In fact, 
Schwartz is quick to point out that democratic social solidarity could just as easily “degenerate 
into brutal hatred of others.”343 And just as there are many historical instances that can be 
drawn upon as inspiration, there are equally many cases that can be pointed to that should be 
seen as a warning of the opposite. Solidarity understood in this way has been touched upon in 
this thesis already. It is not to be assumed that solidarity automatically is to be seen as a 
progressive tool; it has been argued that it is neutral on moral grounds. The point that 
Schwartz makes convincingly is that solidarity should not be taken for granted, that there is 
nothing to show that it is inherently teleological. It is something that has to be continuingly 
fought for and defended. Instead the method that Schwartz argues in favour of, is active 
engagement in politics. It is through that conduit where the ‘political contestation’ occurs. So 
far so uncontroversial. This is a model that is not that far away from what Habermas would 
propose, although they probably have a different understanding of what politics is and what it 
would mean to partake in ‘political contestation’. It is what Schwartz goes on to argue that is 
more controversial and noteworthy.  
Schwartz states that “the future of global social solidarity rests considerably upon the future of 
social solidarity in the United States.”344 His logic for this is not unsound. It is based on the 
presumption that the United States will remain:  
[N]ot only the global military hegemon, but its foreign policy will be a key valence 
factor in the future development of international regulatory regimes governing labor, 
investment, trade, human rights, and the environment.345  
Instinctively, it feels that there should be resistance to any model that has the continued 
dominance of the United States as even a description of likely reality. This is not just because 
having one central pull of soft or hard political power would require checks and balances that 
have hitherto never materialised. Attempts have been made along procedural lines, however, 
it appears pretty clear that the rules of game rarely apply equally among all actors. Another 
reason to be sceptical of Schwartz’s assertion that the United States will set the parameters for 
what a global social solidarity will look like, is that it has rarely articulated a self-conscious 
version of its own solidarity. Naturally, that does not mean that it has not relied upon some 
kind of social solidarity for its continued reproduction, however, if it is to export this it would 
at least need to be able to articulate to others what its version would entail.  
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It would be foolhardy to think that the United States is not going to play a hugely prominent 
role in setting the tone and agenda of future international arrangements. However, they will 
not be alone, and power centres are becoming more varied particularly with the rise of China 
and other BRIC countries. It has certainly not been the business of this thesis to prophesise 
about the future of solidarity, but to think that social solidarity should be drawn by the United 
State’s belief that they are moral leaders by virtue of being militarily and monetarily superior 
does not appear to be sound logic and should at the very least be something that is actively 
resisted. An alternative model of solidarity, one argued for persuasively by Fuyuki Kurasawa, 
will now be examined.  
Schwartz’s account although compelling in some ways could be accused of denying or simply 
leaving unacknowledged possible other resources of solidarity networks. These networks are 
ones capable of transnational or global reach. The energy for such distance covering solidarity 
networks if it was to be drawn from an understanding akin to Schwartz’s would be hard 
pressed to not be seen as top down in at least its construction and application. Maybe, 
something like a Schwartz model is a realistic account, however, Kurasawa thinks that an 
alternative is possible, one built from below.  
Kurasawa’s stated aim is to construct a form of “cosmopolitanism from below” through 
“normatively and politically oriented forms of global social action.”346 This would be capable of 
meeting the challenge that most manifest forms of global solidarity face, that of “cultural 
homogenization, political fragmentation, and social thinness.”347 The view contends that social 
bonding with distant others, is founded upon neither just “normative principle[s] or 
institutional arrangements” alone.348 The contention being put forward is that these are 
second order constructions of global cosmopolitan solidarity that require the establishment of 
networks from below. This, Kurasawa argues, fails to see therefore how actual “individuals and 
groups are cultivating relatively thick global social relations.”349         
Part of the problem as Kurasawa sees it, is that the two explanations or proposals for 
cosmopolitanism each have their own set of draw backs, although he is clear that they 
certainly should not be discounted all together. Firstly, normative cosmopolitanism, 
understood as being ethically universal, moves too quickly to dismiss the “rooted experiences” 
of people. This leads to a devaluing or outright animosity towards local or national subjectivity, 
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believing it to be “ethnic nationalism” in character. However, as Kurasawa points out, the 
normative cosmopolitan cannot show the causal chain for how the ends will be achieved. 
Through what process can actual “progressive global civil society struggles” be realised?350 On 
this the normative cosmopolitan does not have a very convincing argument.  
The other proposal Kurasawa identifies is institutional cosmopolitanism, otherwise known as 
some kind of global or regional governance. This is a version of the procedural solution that is 
most commonly associated with Habermas. Here, in more general terms, there is a reliance on 
just international laws. Some of the drawbacks of this approach have already been noted in 
the Habermas chapters. The point here is more that when these two models are placed 
alongside one another, they make up three aspects of cosmopolitanism, but crucially do not 
exhaust it. The three are; global ethical standards, models of global governance and 
procedurally justifiable international law.        
What Kurasawa wants to make clear is that this understanding of cosmopolitan limits comes 
up against what he regards as a recognition of global pluralism. Essentially, the issue that it 
raises is a complex one, which has at its core the question of equal treatment of human beings. 
Basically, for thinkers such as Gitlin and Rorty, who Kurasawa labels assimilationist egalitarians 
there is a need for cultural similitude from national to global settings. Ostensibly, an individual 
is treated identically as they are citizens with uniform rights, in all places. This implies or relies 
upon a universal notion of rights and duties that crucially, or at least tends towards, ignoring 
“socio-cultural specificities” that are replete with hierarchies and structures of domination.351 
This has not gone unnoticed by proponents of what Kurasawa identifies as the alternative 
globalization movement (AGM). Their consideration and appreciation of the lack of 
heterogeneity that is witnessed across the global, culturally, economically, politically and 
socially, has led to a revaluation of the role of solidarity itself.   
Solidarity becomes in this new understanding aligned with the dispossessed and oppressed, 
the excluded from gaining control of the mechanisms that govern their living experience. This 
does raise a difficulty in the mode that solidarity takes. Namely, in this context, i.e. a global 
one whereby solidarity is directed at those whom do not necessarily have a common lived 
experience with those who are extending the bonds of solidarity. Equally, and this is something 
that has been a difficultly for at least the theory of solidarity if not its practice; does it matter 
for solidarity, whether it is unidirectional? Leaving that question aside for now, Kurasawa 
offers a really interesting solution to the seeming impasse between global universal rights type 
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cosmopolitanism and its (seemingly) diametrically opposed particularistic opposite. He states 
that it is “[b]etter to think of a cosmopolitanism built out of cross-cutting lines of affinity 
between civic associations in different parts of the world.”352 What this view recognises, to its 
advantage, is that there is not a plan/blueprint/roadmap that precisely sets out a course for 
the building of these lines of affinity. Kurasawa instead suggests the analogy of a web as the 
best way to understand how it could fit together.  
He states it succinctly in the following manner:  
[A] vast web of this sort contains shifting nodes of commonality and shared interests, 
with groups discursively negotiating solidaristic bonds and pragmatically assembling 
alliances that join forces around specific issues while remaining united in resistance 
to global neoliberalism.353  
Leaving aside, for a moment, the first part of this statement that requires further analysis, the 
second aspect of identifying a common general or perhaps even universal shared goal, is 
potentially very significant. This is particularly true if Kurasawa’s characterisation of 
cosmopolitan solidarity is correct. This turn towards resistance to global neoliberalism as 
something that could underpin more specific political action and change offers perhaps a 
different approach to the one articulated by Habermas (as discussed in the previous chapters). 
This will certainly be something that will need to be returned to in the concluding analysis of 
this final chapter.  
The first part of the above statement will now be explored in more detail, as it initially appears 
to be a passable answer to the problematic question as to how such, webs in this case, could 
be realised in practice. One of the criticisms that could be levelled at the previously discussed 
account of global solidarity argued for by Schwartz was that it reaffirmed a centralised 
structure, with the United States at its centre. Kurasawa is keen to instead develop a structure 
of AGM that is decentralised.  
It is important to note that the structure that Kurasawa is envisioning is one that is flexible and 
capable of adaptation. The network of ‘nodes’ are to be assembled to interact with specific 
needs arising from “precise issues and events”. Subsequently, these networks can be formed 
and reformed through interactions with specific communities. The idea is that these kinds of 
networks of solidarity would lead to new “subaltern counter-publics and communities of 
interest.”354 One of the more interesting and perhaps novel possible consequences of pursuing 
this kind of decentred structure that has this degree of built in flexibility is that it is open-
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ended. So, although there are clear goals, what the networks go on to address, or how they 
are constructed even, is unknown. There is however, a drawback to this type of AGM 
arrangement that Kurasawa himself points out, namely, the difficulty of decision making.  
Effectively, what needs to be built into the system as proposed is a mechanism or a thorough 
defence of the right to disagree. Basically, it can often be the case when groups, particularly 
perhaps ones that are on a large, potentially impersonal scale, that decisions passed by the 
majority should be followed by the minority as a requisite of belonging in the first place. This is 
not an easily sidestepped issue and the protection of minority interests and their right to 
dissention has been important to many political theories. Following Graeber, Kurasawa states 
that “participants should not be coerced to adopt a position or commit an act with which they 
do not explicitly and freely agree.”355 This certainly appears to be a high bar to be reached, 
however, the idea is that decisions are made through a dialogical non-hierarchical learning 
process. The centre of which is the assumption that compromise makes decisions, in the long 
run, stronger, as they have been arrived at through a recognised process of which all 
participants can see their involvement acknowledged.  
Finally, Kurasawa’s thoughtful and largely convincing conceptualisation of what a 
cosmopolitan solidarity would resemble on global scale, appears to rest ultimately on a 
Habermasian insight. Namely, the D principle for deliberations and imagining a communicative 
action that would be transnational. Becoming active in the kind of AGM that Kurasawa is 
picturing would strive to tap into a sense of belonging that stems from an accountability 
towards all humankind. It would be capable of offsetting ‘clash of civilisations’ type of 
“primordialism” through a series of networks that help to realise intersubjective bonds based 
on “trust, respect and mutual assistance among individuals and groups active in the AGM.”356 
The difficulty that often accompanies this type of project is how are these networks meant to 
both be created in the first place, and maintained over distance and time. Kurasawa offers 
what in many ways is a rather traditional method; taking back and maintaining public spaces 
where these kinds of deliberations can happen, without interference from those in power. At 
least part of the answer then is “ludic” by design; “a crowd that marches through the streets of 
a city, can cultivate transnational relations of solidarity.”357 The networks are co-created by 
those who take part in expressions of political action. The spaces that are occupied supply the 
very real grounds for forms of direct communication that are often denied in more general 
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everyday life. Behind this there also appears to be an insistence that public spaces be re-
imagined and wrestled away from neo-liberal control and power. The solidarity that Kurasawa 
is ultimately arguing for is more a first step, it is creating or forcing through the ability of 
individuals to connect with each other in ways that will enable them to have the ability to form 
the bonds that would have the strength to challenge elite forms of power.                      
The question as to how, or even if it is possible, to form bonds strong enough to challenge 
dominant forms of power remains an open one. However, in a recent article by Vivienne Jabri, 
the framing of what these bonds could or would have to resemble is usefully clarified. Jabri’s 
argument centres on one of solidarity’s difficult qualities, as has already been discussed above, 
that it can sit somewhere “between the international and the human” in a “indefinable 
location where the political takes place beyond the confines of the sovereign state.”358 What 
she wants to understand is what the possible implications might be of understanding solidarity 
in this way, to the ways in which international structures are envisioned (and ultimately 
critiqued and challenged). She limits her study to only those forms of solidarity that move 
beyond a mere community/state dichotomy to “distinctly liberal and cosmopolitan 
interpretations.”359 This is clarified still further through solidarity being characterised as two 
forms of cosmopolitanism; liberal and political. Further, one of the claims that Jabri goes on to 
make is: “that the ways in which solidarity is understood, formulated and practised will have a 
profound impact on how solidarity is related to structures of domination globally.”360 This is an 
aim that chimes with one of the main arguments of this thesis, namely that to investigate what 
solidarity comes to mean or represent at a particular moment is to reveal something important 
about the social, cultural and political history of that given context. The difference here is that 
Jabri is applying it directly to current and global realities. Her argument naturally rests upon a 
historical account, however, it is attempting to reveal a contemporary situation in order, 
ultimately, to change it.  
Jabri’s two forms of cosmopolitan solidarity will now be presented and then critiqued. This will 
be useful to demonstrate how a better understanding of solidarity might lead to novel ways of 
understanding global inequalities as well as potentially offering some clues as to how the 
bonds (as discussed above) could actually be created and maintained. Firstly, liberal 
cosmopolitanism, perhaps a version of solidarity which can most readily be thought of as 
connected to universal human rights.  
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Significantly, Jabri points to the mechanism at the heart of the liberal cosmopolitanism world 
view that the law trumps sovereign right. Equally, the individual within that is the product of 
the “historical project of modernity” which views:  
the individual self as autonomous and hence as a holder of rights protected in a 
transformed global order where sovereign impunity comes face to face with a legally 
enshrined cosmopolitan law that can hold sovereigns to account.361  
Certainly, here there can be witnessed the earlier problem that Jabri highlights of solidarity, 
that it sits between the sovereign state and transnational structures. In this liberal version 
human rights are directed as self-evidently universal and therefore applicable to all 
circumstances of time and place. It necessarily has to be global in reach and would require an 
accompanying framework of power relations and mechanisms to enforce compliance. Equally, 
to been seen to have broken or contravened a human right has to be assessed by some means. 
This creates the further question of who gets to be the judge and to what extent that structure 
of juridical power can be said to be impartial and legitimate to all parties concerned. At the 
core of this conundrum Jabri locates a more fundamental, and also subtler, legitimacy concern. 
Stating:  
The charge goes further, however, and highlights the systems of knowledge that 
confer legitimacy to modes of representation that elevate the liberal self in relation 
to the ‘rescued’ other.362  
Naturally, there is a lot of literature that has been written about the western gaze or attitude 
towards those which, are seen as, in need of saving. Perhaps the most famous example in the 
public sphere is the Live Aid imagery. However, specifically on the question raised by Jabri, it is 
about countering or overcoming the unequal nature of the relationship. Effectively there does 
exist, both economic and social inequality in the global and national setting that make the 
conditions for a possible version of solidarity, complex at a minimum and maybe wishful 
thinking at the other extreme. Liberal cosmopolitan solidarity has to contend with the hard 
reality that humans do not exist outside of their lived experience and social, political and 
economic conditions. An awareness that humans who come to extend solidarity relations, 
come to the table not as equals, other than through their membership as a human, is not 
enough for Jabri to think that the liberal version can succeed alone. It needs to be at least 
complemented by some of the characteristics from a form of cosmopolitan solidarity rooted in 
an acknowledgement of cultural diversity.  
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Political cosmopolitanism, has for Jabri, an inbuilt capacity for “contestation” of ideas. It 
recognises that the political is rooted in and expressed, at times, through cultural institutions. 
It is a view that promotes the public sphere as an arena for debate amongst, in the best case, 
equal participants. This view can leave open concrete and future binding definitions of 
universal values and instead assumes that “the universal is a contested space.”363 What is at 
the heart of political cosmopolitanism, therefore, is a requirement, perhaps no less demanding 
than that found in its liberal form, for a “a political agency that has the politics of mobilisation 
at its core”.364 The consequence for solidarity of this latter political agency clause is that it is 
consciously specific in scope. It could be that this political version needs to have clear vision of 
exactly what the participants are mobilising for and just what they are against. It is here that 
the door is left open for some of the more universal principles or goals associated with the 
liberal tradition. Finally, Jabri offers the following succinct formulation of how the two forms 
might interact:  
Solidarity is hence always a solidarity of claims and a solidarity of effort, driven 
aspirationally through some conception of an otherwise to the present while drawing 
on and constituting the fictive universality that is the modern state and the modern 
global arena.365  
This in many ways offers perhaps the clearest formulation of what this thesis has attempted to 
highlight. The main critique that was articulated against Durkheim’s version for an educational 
project capable of constructing a critical form of, what I am calling, solidarity is that it relies too 
heavily on a shared conception of a historical project of nation-state building. This is whilst not 
being concise enough about how a changing social, cultural, and political landscape could be 
sought in a possible future. Essentially, the balance between the two positions as put forward 
by Jabri leans too far towards the solidarity through shared history and cultural values and 
does not leave enough space for a critical engagement with those historical narratives and 
cultural norms.  
Habermas is likewise grappling with something similar to the problem highlighted by Jabri. 
Habermas can perhaps be accused of wanting to have his cake and eat it. So, for example, in a 
2001 article, he again reiterates, in a statement that could be either a description of Western 
Europe or an argument in its favour:  
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Here [Western Europe] the political traditions of the workers’ movement, the 
salience of Christian social doctrines and even a certain normative core of social 
liberalism still provide a formative background for social solidarity.366  
However, whilst this can be criticised in the same way as his earlier work was in the Habermas 
chapter, when it is read alongside the current cosmopolitan debate, different aspects become 
more significant. Essentially, is it possible to hold that historically constituted fights for 
workers’ rights (and presumably social/legal rights) can sit alongside religious doctrines, 
however well integrated into Western European society? Likewise, how do these two sources 
of solidarity complement social liberalism, when they could be at odds? There are a range of 
responses to these questions. Firstly, the Habermasian response will be given, followed by and 
to bring this conclusion to an end, other possible responses. This will be an analysis that draws 
on the thesis taken together with what has been presented in this conclusion. This will then be 
linked back to crisis and solidarity.  
Habermas’s response is in keeping with much of what he has said previously on the topic of 
solidarity, but also on how he views history. Habermas commits himself to a non-deterministic 
metaphysical or transcendental idea of historical understanding. However, as has been made 
clear in the Habermas chapter, history is vitally important to any argument that he makes 
about solidarity. The following is his clarification about how solidarity arises or should arise. It 
returns to his need to be able to accommodate the notion of strangers, whilst not 
commanding participation as a requirement for membership. He states:  
A nation of citizens must not be confused with a community of fate shaped by 
common descent, language and history. This confusion fails to capture the 
voluntaristic character of a civic nation, the collective identity of which exists neither 
independent of nor prior to the democratic process from which it springs. Such a 
civic, as opposed to ethnic, conception of ‘the nation’ reflects both the actual 
historical trajectory of the European nation-states and the fact that democratic 
citizenship establishes an abstract, legally mediated solidarity between strangers.367  
What this passage highlights is a tension that exists in the idea of solidarity itself, particularly in 
the contemporary realm. Although Habermas merely speculates about the possibility that it 
could be rolled out to include the globe, he is consciously highly hesitant to promote that idea 
in concrete terms. This passage is only relevant to Western Europe, with its particular set of 
historical, cultural and political realities. However Western Europe does not exist in a vacuum; 
its history, and with that its spreading of a specific cultural and religious heritage, has been and 
remains dominant globally, but it also has to acknowledge the influence from outside. The 
argument can be made that Habermas’s own theory, whilst remaining an admirable aspiration, 
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eventually reaches its limit of possibility when confronted with the scope and literal size that 
would be required to achieve it. This is in reference specifically to Habermas’s most famous 
idea, that of communication. Habermas argues that the only way for the “legitimation deficit” 
to be bridged is through “a European-wide public sphere – a network that gives citizens of all 
member states an equal opportunity to take part in an encompassing process of focused 
political communication.”368  
Habermas concedes that at present this possibility only exists inside nation-states and that as 
yet the mechanism for extending it beyond has not been constructed. This is where perhaps 
Habermas’s theory fails to move towards practice. If it is the case, as Habermas rightly points 
out, that a functional public sphere has only ever been (partially) possible within a nation-state 
and has not extended beyond that, this raises serious questions for how it could be possible to 
even begin to think that it could work, ultimately on a global scale. This is where the thinkers 
just discussed can perhaps help to find a way to conceptualise a more probable version of 
solidarity, one that could be globally achieved. The key is to reframe what would count as a 
global form of solidarity. The aim is to assert a different set of criteria, one that recognises the 
contributions made by the cosmopolitan thinkers just discussed, but also the possible 
problematic consequences of their theories.  
Here it will be helpful to return to the discussion touched upon in the Durkheim part of this 
thesis, namely the question of anomie. It is a concept that Durkheim fails to develop or really 
articulate in any great depth, however, its usefulness is nevertheless not diminished. Unlike 
Marxists’ view of crisis, which is more wondering with increasing desperation how it is the case 
that current societies do not revolt given their crippling inequality; Durkheim is seeking to 
show how a society once in anomie/crisis can find its way out. The comparison between the 
Marxist tradition and the Durkheimian model is theorised most famously by David 
Lockwood.369  
Lockwood essentially builds upon a Parsons reading of Durkheim in attempting to show that he 
is a normative functionalist. This is an approach that was something argued against in the 
earlier Durkheim chapters. However, on conflict or crisis, Lockwood does offer some important 
insights that are not clear from a straightforward (or necessarily accurate reading) of 
Durkheim. Following Parsons’s 1951 book The Social System, Lockwood is trying to distinguish 
social from system forms of integration.370 Incidentally, this is also a central concern for 
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Habermas in 1989 where he discusses at length the connection between system and what he 
names the lifeworld. Lockwood, whilst being highly sympathetic to Durkheim, does offer an 
important criticism centring on an underdeveloped aspect of his project (something alluded to 
already in the first Durkheim chapter of the thesis). The question is, what is it that initiates 
disorder in the first place? Lockwood goes on to argue, or at least infer, that the Marxist 
tradition solves this question and therefore implies that combination of the two is possible. 
Whilst it could be the case that the Marxist tradition can offer important insights into how 
crisis arises, thus solving its absence in Durkheim’s theory, there is I believe a better solution, 
one found in Habermas. 
The framing of the question has altered from that initiated by Durkheim and the Marxists, and 
later Lockwood. It is evident that crisis occurs or arises out of different sets of circumstances 
and is felt across different levels of human society. However, the possible reactions to crisis 
have at times failed to keep up with the changed circumstances. In following Durkheim’s 
thinking on anomie, it seems fair to say that he was picturing its cessation (although it would 
often return) in the future. Anomic times were Durkheim’s times and not only a descriptive 
sociological category for describing his (and possibly other) societies. What the second chapter 
on Durkheim in this thesis sought to show was that he saw one possible solution to his own 
society’s anomie being moral education. Moving beyond Durkheim’s rather restricted view of 
what moral education should consist of, the basic idea appears sound, although vulnerable to 
the changing of political tide. Equally, and this is certainly something that a Durkheimian 
account of education as social change would have to address; education is a reproduction of 
the society that it is situated within. Therefore, although Durkheim stipulates that education 
must be free from church, politics, and prescribed occupational determinism, it would appear 
that this proposal would be very hard to achieve in practice. That is not to say that education 
would not have to be a crucial part of any thinking that sought a way out of a social crisis, such 
as the one we are experiencing currently.  
One of the difficulties described already in the Durkheim chapter on moral education is how 
change can come about given his insistence on the authority of the schooling received by the 
pupils. Although possible solutions were discussed above, it is this aspect that is least 
convincing in his account. However if we see education in a different way, one that is not 
rigidly set in the school environment, but in our contested social spaces, then it can impact 
solidarity’s interaction with crisis. To illustrate the point, a short discussion of Gerard Delanty’s 
recent work will be given, before finally returning to the idea of education and an analysis of 
Habermas.  
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Delanty begins his discussion of solidarity by dividing it into two general camps, one that is 
culturally and spatially defined, the other broadly or potentially global in scope, whilst relying 
on some form of moral universalism.371 He labels these two views bounded and unbounded. 
Delanty thinks that neither form of solidarity is adequate, either descriptively or prescriptively 
as they fail to address key concerns, some of which has already been stated in this conclusion. 
Importantly he understands solidarity only as political, relying, according to him, on a defined 
political community. The concern that Delanty rightly raises is how do the limits of a political 
community get defined. The bounded view would have it that it is based, most typically, on a 
shared or common identity usually found within a national context. The unbounded, 
presumably must extend the community to include all human life. This is broadly speaking in 
keeping with the above discussion, however Delanty then goes further to argue that the 
paradigm of political tradition since the French Revolution has come to an end. He thinks that 
it no longer makes sense to see the dialectic as one between liberalism and socialism. His 
reason for thinking this is that he understands the primacy of liberty and equality to have 
vacated the political realm. Delanty effectively reverses the common notion that you establish 
liberty and equality so that solidarity can then develop. He argues convincingly that solidarity 
needs to come first for the other two to be realised.  
Returning to crisis, Delanty introduces the idea that it is both the absence of solidarity and not 
knowing how to create it, which leads to transformation in social life. In a similar way to how 
Durkheim described anomie, it is the reaction to the absence or break down of solidarity that 
is a part of the social crisis, its cause and the source of its eventual renewal. Part of what has 
motivated this thesis is to investigate the chameleon quality of solidarity. Although something 
that is not unique to solidarity, it is certainly something that is rarely acknowledged; solidarity 
most typically shifts its meaning in line with the particular crisis that demands it. This is a point 
made by Delanty as he attempts to navigate a path between bounded and unbounded 
solidarity.  
The key to Delanty’s speculative proposal is based on the idea that if nation-sates require 
there to be an imagined community for them to continue to exist, then an enlarged cross-
border version of solidarity could likewise be plausible. It would need political order and 
something approaching a functioning public sphere. It also returns to the question as to who is 
included/excluded and what comes to define these boundaries and who polices them. What 
Delanty argues is that with every crisis there is a breaking point whereby the crisis becomes 
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unacceptable to those experiencing it. This was also something looked at in the earlier 
Durkheim chapters, namely that a law can only remain a law if the majority accept that the 
breaking of the law requires, at minimum, recognition that it has been broken and at 
maximum, that punishment, which is agreeable to the majority is handed out. Here though, 
and following to a certain extent Habermas, this is not a question of the law.  
A crisis is therefore felt when what is acceptable for a political community reaches its limit. 
This can be a crisis brought on in spite of the law, even one that has been procedurally 
secured, even through democratic means. An example of this would be the abolition of 
slavery. There are many reasons why this happened at particular times and places, however, it 
was not the law acting independently that ended it. It was, in no small part, due to it becoming 
unacceptable to most people. That human slavery became, and is today almost universally 
seen, as unacceptable does not happen by accident. It is, to follow both Habermas and 
Delanty, because of the establishment of social relations that come to recognise all humans as 
humans and that no human should be a slave. However, to again follow Delanty, it is not 
common experience that makes this possible (I have never been a slave), but instead the act of 
sharing, of connecting, however fleetingly with others. What this means for thinking about 
solidarity is that it can therefore escape one of the problems with the bounded account of 
solidarity, namely that it is defined spatially. Cultural sharing is now possible across any state 
lines at a speed that was not even possible 20 years ago. The sharing bypasses the old 
territorial dividing lines and moves closes to a global web of social relations. This in turn will 
not give rise to a global form of solidarity based on universal moral norms, but could instead 
be specific in its political targets, whilst not being limited to a particular location.  
This is where I believe Durkheim can still offer some useful inspiration. If Delanty is right about 
the freeing of social networks from their spatial specificity and I think that he clearly is, then 
those who take part need to come to those interactions prepared. The way that individuals 
come to share through this recently developed infrastructure, is partly through education. 
Durkheim’s view on education could be seen as a way of instilling in the citizens of tomorrow 
the moral codes and practices of that society, whilst also equipping them with the ability to 
question those same morals. Although this could be disputed, education in England at least 
attempts something roughly akin to this. However, the real problem is that the second 
purpose appears to be rarely achieved, at least not on a large scale. The sharing that Delanty 
cites could be part of the answer to this. Through interactions between individuals from very 
different backgrounds shared goals can be revealed, links can then be made and international 
movements can be formed. This is not to say that it is straightforward, however, this appears 
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to be a more plausible route to take than roughly speaking the bounded or unbounded forms 
of solidarity. Seeing social relations extend globally creates the possibility of not just sharing 
but also learning. Gaining knowledge and knowing how to place it within a global context is as 
close as we are likely to get to a global solidarity. 
Conclusion 
On January 20th 2017 Donald Trump stepped up to give his inaugural speech to the American 
people. This, after one of the most divisive presidential races in living memory, was hoped to 
be a speech that would help to heal a fractured nation. It was expected that Trump would 
strike a conciliatory tone, one that reached out to all Americans. It was also anticipated that he 
would attempt to reassure global allies, made nervous by the nativist rhetoric of the 
Republican’s campaign. It is an open question as to whether he managed any of these things or 
whether or not he even set out to. What is striking is that two-thirds of the way through a 
speech that was being watched not just by millions in the United States, but around the world, 
he chose to use the word solidarity.372 For many of those watching the President that day, the 
use of the term solidarity would have barely registered. However, for anyone who had even a 
passing interest or awareness of the significance of the word, it was startling to hear solidarity, 
fall from the lips of the newly inaugurated, most powerful man in the world. Surprising as it 
was initially, Trump is not the first right-wing politician to add solidarity to their vocabulary.  
A little over a week before this on January 9th, the UK Prime Minster Theresa May gave a 
speech to the Charity Commission to set out her vision for a shared society. The speech had 
been widely billed as May’s attempt to articulate her version of what Conservatism would 
mean. This was a speech from the play book of the compassionate Tory, a deliberate move 
away from their ‘nasty’ image. It was a speech that aimed to reposition the Conservatives as a 
party that would leave no one behind. A party committed to providing the foundation for 
aspirations of all to be realisable regardless of background. It is also in this speech where she 
defends the notion that “if you think you’re a citizen of the world, you’re a citizen of 
nowhere”. It is within this context that May calls, repetitively, for a “new philosophy”, one that 
has “solidarity at its heart”. May makes clear throughout her speech, consciously given in a 
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third sector environment, that solidarity is the bond that creates and maintains communities, 
that it is a resource for protecting Britain and that finally, it should be regulated.373  
Solidarity has never been simply under the ownership of left wing labour movements, trade 
unions or cooperative organisations. However solidarity today, more than at any time since 
the mid-19th century, is at a cross roads. Politically, solidarity could become synonymous with 
nativism, patriotism and jingoism. Socially, it could be used to strengthen nationalism and 
racist sentiment. Economically, it may be used as a justification for protectionist policies that 
further entrench global inequalities. The theory of solidarity is receiving more attention than 
ever before, with a growing number of academics from across disciplines engaging in an on-
going debate. Therefore, it is equally a possibility that the abuse of the rhetoric of solidarity 
will be met with critical voices that can dismantle this dangerous ideology.  
This thesis has sought to add to the growing number who are engaging with the issues that a 
proper study of solidarity throws open. It has done this through examining the most central 
figures in the history of solidarity writing, whilst offering a background to the current debates 
that is rarely examined. The structure has intended to offer a progression through time of the 
development of solidarity discourse. Attention has been paid to how the ideas of what 
solidarity comes to mean and under what set of circumstances particular variants have 
developed. It has demonstrated that there is nothing inevitable about the unfolding of a term 
such as solidarity.  
The first chapter therefore focused on its irregular arrival out of legal terminology and into 
social and political vernacular, thus standing as a testament to the unpredictability of its 
development. Effort has been made to present writers and thinkers who best exemplified the 
most prominent areas of solidarity scholarship. They, although perhaps not the most radical in 
the genre, should be understood as representatives of general trends in understanding 
solidarity. What has been looked at has been far from exhaustive and has remained firmly 
within a particular European tradition. Yet, just as solidarity stands at the apex of choice 
between reaching out or withdrawing in, so does Europe itself. The crisis in the European 
Union mirrors the retreating hegemony of European ideas. The time when Durkheim could 
write about the sociological structure of French society as being separable from the rest of the 
world would be impossible to say today about French society and its on-going entanglement 
with its colonial past. Likewise, the dilemma at the heart of Habermas’s recent writing is also 
                                                     
373 The Shared Society: Prime Minister’s speech at the Charity Commission annual meeting 9 January 2017. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-shared-society-prime-ministers-speech-at-the-charity-commission-
annual-meeting (accessed 12/12/2017).  
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Europe’s; how to maintain a united Europe that continues to require far reaching reform, with 
its relationship to the rest of the world. Solidarity, a simple but highly frustrating little word, 
which on first glance appears not to warrant much by way of explanation, has been drawn into 
the centre of these concerns.  
This thesis set out to demonstrate the limits of a particular tradition of solidarity that starts 
around the time of the French Revolution, is substantiated through Durkheim and is taken to 
its limit by Habermas. Whilst there is certainly some potential left in this way of thinking about 
solidarity as a form of critique, outside in the real world however the forms of solidarity that 
are identified by this tradition, are perhaps reaching exhaustion. The ability of solidarity to 
keep in check the most rapacious current forms of capitalism, appear seriously undermined, 
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